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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Main objective of the dissertation 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to contribute to ongoing research on fare effects and 
dynamics of network structure in the air transport industry. In the past twenty years, managing 
carriers and airports from the perspective of network has become a prevalent and crucial rationale 
for both operators and economic policy makers.  
For any carrier, its network structure not only links to the business model of the carrier but 
also has impact on its pricing strategy which is a crucial determinant of profitability (Holloway, 
2008). As the leading and longstanding ‘species’ in the airline industry, full-service carriers 
(FSCs) have established and maintained hub-and-spoke (HS) network configurations to 
distribute huge numbers of passengers daily through their hubs. The large concentration of 
traffic, connections and flights has led to FSCs playing dominant roles at their selected hub 
airports, which may grant them market power to charge higher airfares on routes from and to 
their hubs – i.e. the well-known ‘hub premium’ debate in the airline industry (Borenstein, 1989; 
Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005). Moreover, the ongoing market consolidation has increased the 
differences among hub airports per se. For example, Air France’s primary hub Paris Charles de 
Gaulle is 20 times larger than its secondary hub Paris Orly and about 5 times larger than 
Austrian’s primary hub Vienna in terms of the number of weighted indirect connections per day 
in 2003 (Burghouwt, 2007). This implies that the service levels of hubs are not always even and 
vary not only within an individual carrier’s network but also among different carriers. The 
emerging ‘hub hierarchy’ raises great interests to study the structure of hub-to-hub (HH) 
networks that are formed by hub airports as a separate group of airports, and link this with the 
‘hub premium’ debate. 
For airports, they have been increasingly taking prominent and ever proactive roles in 
attracting air services and developing their networks of destinations through constant business 
transformation (Airports Council International, 2014). In both regional and intercontinental 
markets, airport networks have been evolving at an unprecedentedly fast pace in terms of traffic 
growth, new destinations, routes establishment and capacity expansion. These changes may be 
facilitated by several significant external factors, such as a series of liberalization policies (e.g., 
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the deregulation in the United States (US), three subsequent liberalization ‘packages’ in Europe 
and the ‘open skies’ agreements between the European Union (EU) and the United States) (Budd 
and Goetz, 2014; Button, 2009; Goetz, 2002; Graham, 1997), the low-cost phenomenon 
(Dobruszkes, 2009; Fan, 2006), globalization and technology revolution (Goetz and Graham, 
2004; O’Connor and Fuellhart, 2012). Nonetheless, the development of airport networks can be 
exposed to risks, such as the cyclical economic crises (Dobruszkes and Van Hamme, 2011) or 
the spatial spreading of infectious diseases (Balcan et al., 2009). The volatile external 
environment urges airports to continuously inspect the dynamics of their networks in a more 
comprehensive way, i.e., from a networked perspective. 
However, to date few literature has been dedicated to: (i) examining how network structure 
affects the pricing behaviors of FSCs by solely focusing on their hub markets, and (ii) exploring 
both internal and external factors that drive the changes of air transport networks by considering 
an airport’s shifting role as a proactive ‘actor’ in their network development. This dissertation 
attempts to fill these gaps by addressing both issues, which is achieved by systematically 
examining the position and function of an airport in the structure of the overall carrier or airport 
networks.  
In this dissertation we embed network structure analysis into econometric models, integrate 
carrier and airport operational practices with social network analysis and apply them in different 
geographical regions. This brings a new and more comprehensive perspective on the air transport 
network management, and therefore, contributes to the academic literature theoretically, 
methodologically and empirically. First, theoretically, we demonstrate that hub hierarchies 
characterizing route structure should be incorporated into a pricing model to better control inter-
route heterogeneity. In addition, we propose that conceptual parallels can be established between 
the analysis of dynamic air transport network structures and longitudinal social network analysis. 
Second, this dissertation introduces a stochastic actor-based modeling method to contribute to 
literature on exploring the mechanisms driving the evolution of air transport networks. Finally, 
we apply the deployed frameworks to three geographical markets, i.e., the domestic market in 
the United States and Europe, respectively, and the transatlantic market between the two regions. 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. This first introductory chapter continues by 
focusing on the background of this study. We then establish the theoretical framework, review 
literature on factors influencing airfares in HH markets and introduce the overall objectives and 
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research questions which guide the substantive work presented subsequently. Chapter two 
presents how network structure affects pricing of the US FSCs in their hub markets, and chapter 
three continues this stream of research by applying the refined framework to Europe. Chapter 
four examines the dynamics of network structure by introducing an advanced technique. Chapter 
five addresses this issue by focusing on the impact of air transport liberalization policy. These 
four chapters are presented as academic papers three of which were published in peer-reviewed 
international scientific journals: Journal of Air Transport Management, European Journal of 
Transport and Infrastructure Research and Networks and Spatial Economics. In the final 
chapter, we summarize the main findings of the entire work, provide further discussions, and 
outline some avenues for further research in this realm. 
1.2 Context 
1.2.1 Air transport liberalization 
Liberalization in the air transport industry has been considered as one of the most significant 
forces shaping the market structure, network configuration and business models of carriers in 
the 21st century. In a regulated regime, the growth of the industry was restricted as it was 
regulation authorities (such as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the US) that controlled 
route entry and exit, fares, frequencies, capacities and carrier mergers and acquisitions (Goetz 
and Sutton, 1997). While in a liberalized environment, carriers have more freedom to do business 
driven by revenue maximization and it is market force that determines the survival of carriers. 
We first review the impact of air transport liberalization in domestic markets of the worldwide 
regions including the US, Europe and other regions in the world, and then in the intercontinental 
markets.    
The US 
The first air transport liberalization regime was the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 aiming 
to deregulate the US domestic airline industry. Following deregulation, large carriers intensified 
or shifted to HS networks whereby passengers have to transfer via an intermediate airport (i.e., 
the so-called hub) to reach their final destinations. The HS network configuration can benefit 
carriers from economies of density, scale and scope (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994) and also grant 
the dominant carriers market power at hubs (Borenstein, 1989). In this way, large carriers have 
transformed into FSCs by adopting a full-service strategy which bundles multiple services, such 
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as sophisticated yield management systems, fleet with various aircraft types, in-flight 
entertainment, VIP waiting lounges, and other ‘frill’ services (Hazledine, 2011). In this period, 
the US domestic airline industry tended to be controlled by fewer FSCs through their HS 
configurations. Consequently, strong domestic hubs (e.g., Dallas, Chicago or Atlanta) and 
international gateway cities (e.g., Los Angeles, New York, or San Francisco) played the core 
control roles in the system, while putting the non-hub airports in a peripheralized place (Goetz 
and Sutton, 1997). However, a major revolution was looming in the airline industry during 
1990s, with low-cost carriers (LCCs) (Brueckner et al., 2013). Southwest pioneered the low-cost 
model which is characterized by point-to-point (PTP) network structure and simpler business 
model, such as a single passenger cabin class, standardized aircraft utilization and gradually 
became the sixth largest carrier in the US (Air Transport World, 2003). Since its inception, 
Southwest’s success has been the blueprint for the launch of other LCCs in the US and around 
the world. We will discuss the impact of LCCs in the subsequent section. Reviewing the story 
so far, we observe that deregulation has led to i) the market structure of the US airline industry 
to be the competition mainly between FSCs and LCCs, and ii) the network structure to be the 
longstanding debate between HS and PP. 
The single European market 
In parallel to the US, a single European aviation market was gradually established through the 
three- stage deregulation ‘packages’ in 1988, 1990 and 1992, respectively. The aforementioned 
outcomes of the US deregulation can still apply to the case of Europe, even though there are 
variations in terms of the construction of a space-time continuum HS network (Burghouwt and 
de Wit, 2005) and the trend of LCCs going forward hybrid (Klophaus et al., 2012). First, even 
before the liberalization, FSCs (the erstwhile national carriers) in Europe has spatially 
established HS networks whereby a vast majority of traffic and flights were naturally 
concentrated at their hubs, but lack of a wave-system structure to coordinate time schedules. In 
contrast to FSCs in the US, many European FSCs are still on the way of refining their HS 
network practices. Second, LCCs have gained rapid growth in their market share following their 
entry into the European market since 1995. Over several years’ development, researchers found 
that LCCs have changed their business model towards a hybrid strategy by blending low-cost 
traits with those of FSCs (Klophaus et al., 2012). For example, Klophaus et al. (2012) 
categorized LCCs into four types: pure LCCs (e.g., Ryanair), hybrid carriers with dominating 
LCC characteristics (e.g., easyJet), hybrid carriers with dominating FSC characteristics (e.g., 
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Norwegian) and FSCs (e.g., Air Berlin). In addition, the development of LCCs in Europe shows 
great volatility and fragility. Francis et al. (2006) found that 28% of the LCCs which started 
between 1997 and 2002 were withdrawn, compared to an average of 2% for FSCs. These 
findings suggest that any research involving LCCs should provide a concise and real-time 
definition of LCCs. 
Other regions in the world 
In other geographical regions, the air transport industry is either tightly regulated such as 
China or not as liberalized as that in the US and Europe such as Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. As air transport liberalization has frequently been considered as a catalyst for the launch 
and development of LCCs (Francis et al., 2006), the success or failure of LCCs, to some degree, 
reflects the extent of liberalization. Even though the LCC phenomenon occurred in some of these 
regions, most of them collapsed soon. When survived, it seems that they have not dramatically 
changed the market structure of the regions as their US and European counterparts have done. 
This is due to the fact that, in addition to deregulation, other factors such as entrepreneurial drive 
and resources also attribute to the proliferation of LCCs (Francis et al., 2006).  
The intercontinental markets 
In contrast to the deregulation within domestic borders, intercontinental aviation markets have 
been relatively regulated and only become feasible based on a portfolio of liberalized air service 
agreements, open skies treaties, regulation and deregulation of national/regional aviation 
markets, and traditional Bermuda-type air service agreements (Burghouwt, 2014). The EU/US 
‘Open Skies’ agreement (OSA) signed in April 2007 marks one of the most significant and 
substantial regimes of international air transport liberalization, which grants any licensed 
European Union (EU) carrier the right to fly between any EU airport and any United States (US) 
airport. In addition, it does give US carriers full fifth freedom rights between EU countries, 
provided that the flight originates from or is destined for an airport in the US. This makes the 
EU/US transatlantic market an interesting area to study the impact of such liberalization policy 
on traffic, market competition and fares.  
This dissertation, therefore, focuses on the more liberalized US domestic market, the single 
European market and the EU/US transatlantic market as empirical case studies. Any 
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(un)successful lessons from practices of these more matured markets can be learned by other 
regions in the world. 
1.2.2 The low-cost phenomenon 
“Probably the most significant development in the US airline industry during the past decade 
has been the continued expansion of Southwest Airlines and the resurgence of low-fare entry 
generally.”  
                                                              (The Transportation Research Board, 1999) 
“We went to look at Southwest. It was like the road to Damascus. This was the way to make 
Ryanair work.” 
                                                             (Michael O’Leary, Chief Executive, Ryanair) 
As a new phenomenon sweeps the worldwide air transport industry, the ‘low-cost’ concept 
has been one of the greatest achievements of the deregulation in the US and Europe and 
profoundly affected both airline and airport industry in various aspects. Centering on the 
objectives of this dissertation, we examine what entry strategies in terms of network construction 
have been taken by LCCs to occupy markets, how the presence of these LCCs affects the airfares 
of the predominant FSCs and how airports adapt to accommodate the services of LCCs.  
As the airline deregulation unleashed the restrictions on routes entry and fares, LCCs can 
choose whatever entry strategy and network structure fit into their business models. The 
literature generally distinguishes between three types of competition from the entry of LCCs: 
actual, adjacent and potential competition (Brueckner et al., 2013; Dresner et al., 1996; Krista, 
1996; Morrison, 2001; Vowles, 2006). The actual competition is caused by the entry of LCCs to 
serve the market in question and impose an head-to-head competition. The adjacent entry is due 
to the operation out of secondary airports within large metropolitan areas (e.g., Midway in 
Chicago and Baltimore in the Washington, D.C. area). Moreover, if LCCs exhibit significant 
presence at the endpoints of a route but not serving the route itself, LCCs are said to provide 
potential competition.  
Although it is well-known that the archetypical network structure of LCCs is PTP as originally 
adopted by the pioneer of LCCs (Southwest), the reality is far more complex. For LCCs with 
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sound PTP networks, such as Southwest, it is possible to leverage their networks by providing 
connecting services between existing airports within their networks to enjoy economies of 
airport costs (Boguslaski et al., 2004). In addition, newly launched LCCs revolutionarily altered 
the PTP model and implemented the quasi-HS network of FSCs (e.g., AirTran at Atlanta and 
JetBlue at New York JFK). The motivation behind this network structure divergence is to ease 
entry barriers through providing connecting flights. For instance, Müller et al. (2012) found that 
if the number of one-stop connections JetBlue could serve after a non-stop entry between two 
airports increased by one, the hazard (i.e., the probability of starting to serve a route directly 
within a short interval of time, conditional on not having entered that route up to the starting 
time of the interval) of entry increased by 11.2%. The coexistence of these two types of network 
structure among LCCs has complicated the way of competition from LCCs. A recent research 
done by Brueckner et al. (2013) suggested that a comprehensive analysis of competition from 
LCCs should consider not only the way of competition per se but also the entry type of route 
structure (i.e., a non-stop or connecting service).  
Several studies have confirmed that the LCC competition has dramatically reduced fares, 
whether the resource is from in-market competition, at adjacent airports, or as potential 
competition (Brueckner et al., 2013; Dresner et al., 1996; Krista, 1996; Morrison, 2001; Vowles, 
2000; Windle and Dresner, 1995). In the studies for the US markets, researchers have particularly 
distinguished Southwest from other LCCs due to the much larger fare impacts of the former. For 
instance, Brueckner et al. (2013) found that the presence of nonstop competition from Southwest 
reduced fares by 26%, while nonstop competition from other LCCs had a smaller 12% effect. In 
addition, the potential competition from Southwest reduced fares by 8%, while other LCCs had 
no fare effect in this way of competition. 
The proliferation of LCCs not only significantly affects the pricing strategies of other carriers 
but also reshapes the relationship between airports and carriers. The business model of LCCs 
makes them favor secondary airports due to lower charges and less congestion, and their rapid 
growth substantially benefits the chosen secondary airports in terms of traffic growth and 
revenue-generating opportunities. This encourages many airport managers to proactively take 
actions to attract LCC services in order to achieve the economies of scale (Francis et al., 2004). 
In addition, metropolitan regions (MR) even develop a number of secondary airports to support 
LCC services (e.g., Liverpool in Manchester MR for Easyjet or Skvasta in Stockholm MR for 
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Ryanair) (De Neufville, 2004). All these actions imply that the traditional airport-airline 
relationship in which airlines go forward airport to seek business has been changed. 
The dramatic impacts of LCCs spreading in various aspects of the air transport industry 
suggest that academic research should also incorporate this factor into modeling. 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
This section elaborates the theoretical framework emanating from which we describe the 
structure of air transport networks, demonstrates the position of an airport in these structures and 
define the ensuing route structure. In specific, we review the empirical literature on the analysis 
of air transport networks from the perspective of a spatial dimension, a temporal dimension and 
complex network theory. 
1.3.1 Spatial dimension 
The spatial approach has been the most extensively used approach to help researchers 
conceptualize, describe and compare the geographical variation of air transport networks in 
space (Burghouwt, 2007). The position or role of an airport varies in different types of networks, 
i.e., whether in an individual carrier’s network or a gross network aggregated by all individual 
carrier networks. This distinction is important in that: first, in an individual carrier’s network, an 
airport plays a less active role and act merely as a network-service provider. In this way, the 
network strategy taken by the carrier may have drastic impact on the airport in terms of traffic 
and connectivity. Second, in an aggregated network, the role of an airport can be enlarged and 
diversified as the air transport industry becomes increasingly liberalized. This implies that 
airports also compete for airline services and consumers. We, therefore, examine which spatial 
indicators can adequately describe the position of an airport by distinguishing between individual 
carriers’ networks and aggregated networks. 
Since the deregulation of the US airline industry in 1978, the FSCs have intensified the 
adoption of the HS network structure, broadening the service differences between hub and non-
hub airports. A series of research have emerged to focus on identifying and defining hubs in the 
networks of FSCs. For instance, Bania et al. (1998) proposed a hub index which is the actual 
nonstop connections divided by the hypothetical maximum nonstop connections of an airport in 
a given carrier’s route network. Then they used a cluster technique to identify the number and 
location of hubs for a carrier. Shaw (1993) defined hubs based on three different measures (i.e., 
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standardized degree, standardized Shimbel shortest-path index and valued-graph index 
considering geographical distance) by analysing the top 10 lists. In his research, he explicitly 
discussed the hierarchical structure of hubs in a carrier’s network and stressed that this issue 
deserves research attention in topics such as the hub network design problem, hub location 
modeling and carriers competition research. The indicators applied by Bania et al. (1998) and 
Shaw (1993) share some similarities and de facto originate from the graph theory1, even though 
they did not explicitly mention or discuss this. Moreover, several other researchers applied 
economic concentration indices to define hubs or to examine the network structure. For example, 
US General Accounting Office defined airports with more than 60% of passenger enplanements 
by one carrier or 85% by two carriers as hubs (Goetz, 2002; US Department of Transportation, 
2001). Reynolds-Feighan (2001) and Burghouwt et al. (2003) applied the Gini index to describe 
the spatial configurations of carriers in the US and the Europe. However, Martín and Voltes-
Dorta (2008) and Martín and Voltes-Dorta (2009) criticized that these economic concentration 
indices overlooked the connecting behavior of passengers and justified that the number of 
connecting passengers is a more adequate index to measure the hubbing practices in carrier 
networks. 
When analyzing the aggregated air transport networks, researchers tend to combine the 
aforementioned spatial indicators with airline operational practices. Ivy (1993) developed a gross 
vertex connectivity index to evaluate the country-level accessibility of pre-defined carriers’ hubs 
(i.e., based on the percentage of connecting passengers) by considering both direct and indirect 
connections. Grubesic and Zook (2007) used the number of non-stop, one-stop and two-stop 
flights to categorize the 156 busiest airports in the US into eight groups. Moreover, Derudder et 
al. (2007a) examined the hubs in the global air transport networks based on the number and the 
percentage of connecting passengers and the standardized degree index. 
1.3.2 Temporal dimension 
The indicators expressing the temporal dimension of carrier networks still center on the 
questions about how to adequately describe the HS network structure and how to measure the 
competitive role of hubs. This strand of research was motivated by the fact that a real HS network 
where traffic is concentrated not only spatially around a few hubs but also temporally through a 
                                                 
1 Graph theory is a branch of mathematics studying how networks can be encoded and their properties measured 
(Gross and Yellen, 2004).  
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wave-system structure has not been well established by European carriers after deregulation as 
‘a substantial number of services at these airports only provided transfer connections by 
accident’ (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; Dennis, 1994). The adoption of a wave-system structure 
in the carrier flight schedule can create a number of indirect connections with longer travel time 
but higher frequencies or cheaper prices which is likely to be attractive to passengers (Veldhuis, 
1997). Several studies have, therefore, emerged to develop connectivity models by emphasizing 
the importance of indirect connections. Burghouwt and Redondi (2013) provided a systematic 
overview of eight different connectivity models deployed in air transport literature and 
concluded that the choice of these models depends on: i) the acceptable level of information loss, 
ii) the number of steps required, and iii) considering whether a connection is the shortest or 
quickest connection among all possible connections for a particular origin-destination market. 
Table 1.1 shows the definition and calculation complexity of the eight models presented in the 
work of Burghouwt and Redondi (2013).
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Table 1.1 Definition and calculation complexity of connectivity models 
Model Short definition Calculation complexity Main references 
WNX (weighted number of 
indirect connections) 
Number of direct and indirect connections weighted by their quality 
in terms of transfer and detour time 
Medium complexity 
(Microsoft Access) 
Burghouwt and de Wit 
(2005); Burghouwt (2007) 
Netscan connectivity units Number of direct and indirect connections weighted by their quality 
in terms of transfer and detour time relative to a theoretical direct 
flight 
Medium complexity 
(Microsoft Access) 
Veldhuis (1997) 
Bootsma connectivity Number of connections. Indirect connections meet conditions of 
minimum & maximum connecting time and are classified as 
'excellent', 'good' and 'poor' 
Low complexity 
(Microsoft Access) 
Bootsma (1997) 
WCN (weighted 
connectivity number) 
Number of direct and indirect connections weighted by their quality 
in terms of transfer and detour time  
Medium complexity 
(Microsoft Access) 
Danesi (2006) 
Doganis and Dennis 
connectivity 
Number of connections. Indirect connections meet conditions of 
minimum & maximum connecting time and routing factor 
Low complexity 
(Microsoft Access) 
Doganis and Dennis  
(1989) 
Number of connections 
patterns 
Number of statistical significant patterns of incoming and outgoing 
flights 
High complexity 
(Matlab) 
Budde et al. (2008) 
Shortest path length Number of connections lying of O-D shortest paths. The shortest 
path is the path involving the minimum number of steps from O to D 
High complexity 
(Matlab) 
Malighetti et al. (2008) 
Quickest path length Number of connections lying of O-D quickest paths. The quickest 
path is the path involving the lower travel time from O to D 
Very high complexity 
(Matlab) 
Malighetti et al. (2008) 
Resource: Burghouwt and Redondi (2013) 
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1.3.3 Complex networks theory 
In addition to the spatial and temporal dimensions, air transport networks are widely studied 
using the theory of complex networks which has developed a great variety of techniques to 
study real-world systems consisting of a large portfolio of interacting nodes and experienced 
dramatic changes in the last decade (Zanin and Lillo, 2013). We review the application of the 
complex networks theory in the air transport networks based on three methods, i.e., unweighted 
topological analysis, weighted topological analysis and integrated analysis combining the 
complex networks theory with the spatial or temporal aspects as discussed before. First, 
focusing on measuring the unweighted topological structure where only the existence or 
absence of direct connections between pairs of airports is considered, researchers find that air 
transport networks share the universality of the complex network phenomena as a small-world, 
scale-free and modular network (Bagler, 2008; Barrat et al., 2004; Guimera and Amaral, 2004; 
Neal, 2014; Xu and Harriss, 2008). The metrics commonly used are degree (distribution), 
betweenness (distribution), the average length of shortest paths and clustering coefficient and 
can be measured at both network and individual airport level2. The contributions of this type of 
method are: i) its finding about scale-free feature confirms the airline practice of hub-and-spoke 
network configuration; ii) the degree centrality is widely used to identify the most important 
airports (i.e., hubs) in an airline network (Shaw, 1993); iii) the betweenness centrality at the 
network level can be used to identify the distinct network characteristics within the same carrier 
group (i.e., either an FSCs group or an LCCs group) (Cento, 2008). However, it also has great 
limitations in that: i) the lack of considering the weight and type of flows between pairs of 
airports can mask substantively important structural differences (Neal, 2014; Xu and Harriss, 
2008); ii) the sole analysis of topology cannot well explain the emerging questions in specific. 
For example, Guimerà et al. (2005) found that the most connected cities (largest degree) are 
typically not the most central cities (largest betweenness centrality) when analyzing the world-
wide airport network and termed this as the ‘large-betweenness/small-degree’ puzzle. In 
addition, Cento (2008) concluded that the network-wide betweenness centrality cannot 
                                                 
2 Degree is the number of topological connections of a node to other nodes. Average short path is defined as the 
minimum number of ties linking two nodes. Betweenness centrality measures the number of shortest paths that 
passes through a node. The clustering coefficient is defined as the fraction of existing edges of a node in its 
neighborhood. Readers interested in social network analysis are referred to Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
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distinguish between FSCs network and LCCs network. These drawbacks enable the creation of 
the weighted complex networks theory and the complementary methods.  
Drawing on the framework of the unweighted complex networks theory, researchers also 
considered the most important performance or operation indicators (i.e., weights) in the air 
transport industry, such as the number of flights, the number of available seats, passenger 
volumes, distance and fares (Barrat et al., 2004; Xu and Harriss, 2008) and found that there 
exists a strong correlation between the degree of an airport, and the number of flights and 
passengers. However, these findings add little new knowledge to the literature as it appears to 
be commonsensical that an airline’s hub with more connections, will handle more passengers 
and accumulate higher quantities of frequencies.  
Recently, several studies have complemented a complex network approach by the spatial or 
temporal methods. For instance, Malighetti et al. (2008) deployed a time-dependent minimum 
path approach coupling with the analysis of the shortest path lengths to systematically examine 
the connectivity of the European airport network. The same research group also combine the 
traditional clustering tools with the innovative simulated annealing methodology in the realm 
of the complex networks theory to classify airports in Europe into clusters and modules by 
considering both their characteristics and positions in the network (Malighetti et al., 2009). 
Moreover, Cento (2008) integrated the betweenness centrality analysis with the analysis of 
temporal dimension by considering the number and frequency of one-stop city-pairs and 
concluded that the combined method can better compare the differences between the network 
configurations of FSCs and LCCs. In addition, a recent study conducted by Ryerson and Kim 
(2013) re-defines the hub hierarchy in the US by including the flight frequency along with the 
degree centrality and passenger volumes. These studies illustrate that the complementary 
methodology provide a more profound direction for research analyzing air transport networks. 
1.4 Factors influencing airfares 
Examining the impact of network structure on fares requires establishing a formal 
econometric model that should also control for other crucial factors due to the complex process 
of airfare setting. Market structure is commonly considered as an important determinant of 
airfares apart from network structure. This section thus focuses on reviewing literature on how 
general determinants of network structure and market structure influence airfares in the airline 
industry, even though subtle variations can exist depending on data availability, aggregation 
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level (e.g., route or route-carrier level) of observation units and scale of the investigated markets 
(e.g., entire or focused part of an air transport system).  
Network structure 
The role of network structure in airfare pricing has been closely related to the HS type of 
network where one or, occasionally, two FSCs have large market share of enplaned passengers 
or scheduled flights at their hubs, which is commonly termed as hub dominance. Researchers 
have shown that the hub dominance can confer FSCs market power to charge higher fares on 
routes involving their hubs  (Borenstein, 1989; Chi and Koo, 2009; Giaume and Guillou, 2004; 
Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005). The ensuing hub premium naturally raises the question whether 
dominance at any airport other than the hub can lead to higher fares. The operationalization of 
airport dominance has also been proved to have a significant effect on fares (Evans and 
Kessides, 1993). Moreover, having a large market share on a route (i.e., route dominance) may 
also grant carriers certain degree of market power to raise fares (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003; 
Piga and Bachis, 2007; Stavins, 2001). An example is the European market where many routes 
can be considered ‘natural monopolies’ due to their limited size, were charged higher prices by 
their dominant carrier (Piga and Bachis, 2007). Researchers, therefore, often incorporate both 
airport dominance and route dominance into a pricing model to capture the influence of network 
structure on airfares.  
As the scope and market presence of a HS network configuration are limited in the 
international aviation due to relatively restrictive regulation policies, alliances have become the 
major means for FSCs to expand and strengthen their global networks (Oum et al., 2001). 
Interlinking each other’s networks via their hubs leads to the development of explicit and 
implicit multi-hub-and-spoke networks. Given the findings of a ‘hub premium’, an alliance may 
also increase the market power of allied carriers at their hubs, and thus causes higher fares 
(Brueckner and Pels, 2005; Youssef and Hansen, 1994). This indicates that strategic alliances 
(when existed) are also relevant in airfare settings. 
In addition, the nature of the HS network gives rise to the complexity of route type where 
non-stop and one or two-stop connecting services coexist. In a more liberalized market, carriers 
can choose either non-stop or connecting strategy to capture market share. The competition 
between route types has been found to influence prices (Brueckner et al., 2013; Lee and Luengo-
Prado, 2005). 
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Market structure 
Airfare pricing is driven not only by the internal carrier-specific considerations but also by 
the structure of external markets, such as overall degree of market concentration, the 
proliferation of LCCs and competition from other transportation modes. First, market 
concentration frequently measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) at route level has 
mixed impact on prices. On the one hand, increases in route HHI can raise prices to some degree 
due to collusion among a few carriers (Chi and Koo, 2009) or booking tickets near departure 
days (Piga and Bachis, 2007). On the other hand, a negative relationship exists caused by 
technological advantages of the dominant carrier over its rivals (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003) 
or high inequality of market share between carriers (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). Second, as 
discussed in section 1.2.2, LCCs have directly and indirectly affected airfares in the airline 
industry, and thus serve as a significant determinant of pricing models. Moreover, air transport 
increasingly confronts competition from other transportation modes, mainly high-speed train 
(HST), in regions such as Western Europe and China (Dobruszkes, 2011; Yang and Zhang, 
2012). Research relating to these regions should consider this effect into modelling. 
1.5 Dataset 
The main dataset used in this dissertation was collected in December 2010 through a research 
cooperation with Sabre Airline Solutions’ on-line data provider - Airport Data Intelligence 
(ADI). Sabre’s ADI seeks to establish the most complete dataset for carriers and airports by 
collecting and validating data from: 1) global distribution systems (GDSs), 2) travel agencies, 
3) Global Demand Data that adjusts for direct bookings, low-cost carriers, charter operations, 
4) Industry data from carriers, airports, or government agencies, and 5) Internal carrier data 
such as ticket coupon data from revenue accounting and post departure traffic data from the 
departure control system. The validation process involves both automatic and manual clean-up 
of the raw data, as well as the removal of passive and duplicate bookings. The processed and 
adjusted data is then calibrated using various statistical and model-estimation techniques such 
as linear and logistic regression, clustering, maximum-likelihood and demand based on 
sampling techniques (Pradhan, 2014). The consistent and accurate calibration can help all types 
of carriers, including the two main types of players (i.e., FSCs and LCCs), to define and execute 
their short-term and long-term planning in terms of network design, demand forecasting, 
profitability evaluation and other principal factors. Moreover, The ADI dataset allows 
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monitoring and tracking real-time fare information as passenger data is updated monthly and 
schedule data is renewed weekly.  
 The ADI dataset contains valuable information on global passenger and schedule data3. In 
particular, its central part (i.e., the ‘O&D Market’ section) provides the most detailed origin and 
destination (O&D) level data in terms of airports (i.e., origin, destination and connecting 
airports), carriers (i.e., operating, marketing and segment carriers), cabin class, the number of 
passengers, the total revenues and other salient information. Figure 1.1 shows an overview of 
the screen design of the O&D Market section. These indicators can help carry out research in 
at least four aspects relating to this dissertation: (1) The true origin, destination and connections 
between airport-pairs allow us to establish reliable networks and analyze network strategies 
adopted by carriers. (2) The indication of connecting airports is crucial to analyze the 
performance of hubs and competition between hub airports. (3) As one of the main players in 
the air transport industry, carrier information can help identify different types of carriers and 
analyze market structure. (4) The number of passengers and total revenues are two fundamental 
economic metrics which determine operating strategies of carriers and airports on the demand 
side.  
  
                                                 
3 http://www.sabreairlinesolutions.com/home/software_solutions/airports/ 
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Source: User support documentation of Sabre Airline Solutions’ Airport Data Intelligence 
Figure 1.1 Screen design of Sabre ADI’s O&D Market section 
We collected the required data to satisfy four research objectives. First, in order to proceed 
the proposed pricing analysis in Chapter 2 and 3, we extracted information on passenger 
numbers, revenue, cabin class and distance at the route and carrier level in May 2009, the most 
recent year of data available at the time of writing. It has thereby acknowledged that seasonality 
may influence the pricing behaviours of carriers. For instance, the third quarter in general shows 
high demand for air travel and may have a positive impact on airfares. The month of May (i.e., 
the median month of a year) lies not only between cold seasons (i.e., Winter and Spring) and 
warm seasons (i.e., Summer and Fall) in the Northern Hemisphere, but also after the Easter 
holidays in April and before summer holidays beginning in June. Data regarding this month can 
in principle better control for the impact of the seasonality and provide a relatively unbiased 
estimation of airfares. Routes are connected by origin and destination airports located in either 
the US (Chapter 2) and/or the Western/Central parts of Europe (Chapter 3). Intermediate stops 
are also indicated when connecting services are available. 
Second, as examining network dynamics requires evolutionary data at different time points, 
we collected data on actual connections between airports in Europe in 2003 and 2009 to 
construct the network data that serves as the dependent variable in the model (Chapter 4) and 
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on passenger numbers of routes connected by airports located in the EU and the US during the 
time period 2005-2008 (Chapter 5). 
Although the ADI dataset has been adjusted and calibrated via an extensive process, there 
are still some limitations. First, as outputs are saved in Excel files with limited capacity, it is 
difficult to analyze the outputs stored in multiple sheets in Excel and multiple Excel files. More 
advanced databases, such as Access, were applied to proceed a secondary storage of the outputs 
and to facilitate the analysis. Second, a significant number of records contain routes with 
passenger numbers less than 100. It is unclear whether this is due to input errors or is the actual 
passenger numbers transported by a carrier. As it seems unreasonable for a carrier to transport 
only one or two passengers monthly, we carried out a second-round clean-up of the data based 
on market share of a route or a carrier. In particular, routes or carriers with at least 1% of market 
share in terms of passenger numbers are included in the analysis. Finally, as Sabre’s ADI system 
is commercial, it is costly to be used by academic researchers. 
1.6 Aims and research questions of the dissertation 
As illustrated in the Introduction section, the concept of network management has brought 
new insights for today’s carriers and airports when doing business in the air transport industry. 
Substantial progress has been made within the academic literature of i) examining the effects 
of hub dominance and carrier competition on airfares by economists (Borenstein, 1989; 
Brueckner et al., 1992; Brueckner et al., 2013; Dresner et al., 1996; Evans and Kessides, 1993; 
Morrison, 2001; Morrison and Winston, 1990), ii) investigating network configurations of 
carriers, or connectivity and accessibility of airports by geographers (Burghouwt, 2007; 
Derudder et al., 2007a; Derudder and Witlox, 2009; Derudder et al., 2007b; Dobruszkes, 2006), 
and iii) examining large air transport networks using the advanced complex network theory in 
network science by physicists (Barrat et al., 2004; Ducruet and Beauguitte, 2014; Guimera and 
Amaral, 2004). However, due to a lack of inter-discipline cooperation, the achievements 
obtained in these fields still cannot be fully utilized by each other. This dissertation, therefore, 
attempts to fill this gap and bridge a connection among these disciplines. At the backdrop of 
the background and our theoretical framework about network structure analysis, we propose 
two major goals which address the two under-studied issues as detected in the Introduction and 
serve as the basis of formulating our research questions later on: 
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(i) Although hub-and-spoke networks have been extensively researched, hardly any literature 
focuses on hub-to-hub (HH) networks in which nodes are full-service carriers (FSCs)’ 
designated hubs and links are airport-pairs connected by hubs. It is unclear whether the ‘hub 
premium’ imposed by FSCs also exist in such networks where hierarchical structures exist. The 
first goal of this study is, therefore, to establish a refined route structure for HH networks and 
examine whether such a route structure has impact on the pricing strategies of FSCs. This is 
achieved by establishing econometric models that also consider the market competition 
environment of FSCs in the era of LCCs in two different geographies, i.e., the US (Chapter 2) 
and Europe (Chapter 3).  
(ii) Air transport networks are dynamic in nature as routes can be established and flourished, 
or retreated and weakened. Research related to this topic is still limited due to under-
implementation of the advanced methodologies in network science or a lack of literature 
focusing on intercontinental markets which appear to experience slower changes under the 
condition of relatively strict regulation policy. The second goal of this study is, therefore, to 
contribute to on-going research on dynamics of air transport networks. This is accomplished by 
introducing a profound methodology – Stochastic Actor-based Modelling (SABM) technique 
to examine the evolution of the air transport network in Europe (Chapter 4) and by investigating 
how the new signed EU/US ‘open skies’ agreement influences traffic change in the transatlantic 
market (Chapter 5). 
Figure 1.2 shows the overview scheme of this dissertation. 
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Figure 1.2 Overview of the dissertation (chapter number is shown in brackets) 
Below, these goals are explicated in greater detail by formulating four research questions as 
presented in the following four chapters. 
In Chapter 2, we explore the factors influencing the pricing behaviour of FSCs by giving a 
central attention on the HH markets in the US. The research questions are devised as: What 
factors affect the fares of full-service carriers in the US hub-to-hub markets? In particular, does 
an airport’s position in carrier’s hub hierarchies impact fares? A spatial indicator is applied 
to define hubs for the investigated FSCs which further determines the ensuing route structure 
of the HH network. We then introduce an econometric model to estimate the impact of network 
structure (i.e., hub hierarchy) and market structure (i.e., competition from LCCs) on the average 
fares charged by US FSCs by controlling for other demand and supply variables (i.e., passenger 
numbers, vacation destinations, slot-controlled hub, and distance). In the analysis, we also 
highlight the differences between Southwest and other LCCs as regards the extent to drive 
prices down in markets dominated by FSCs. 
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As a subsequent study, we apply the same rationale to European HH markets. However, 
given a different geography and market structure from the US, a systematically exploratory 
analysis is preceded before the formal econometric analysis. As such, we raise the following 
research question in Chapter 3: What factors determine the airfares of full-service carriers in 
European hub-to-hub markets? A temporal indicator is used to define hub hierarchy. We then 
consider network structure variables as represented by hub hierarchy and alliances, and market 
structure variables including market concentration, competition from LCCs and high-speed 
train as potential determinants. Meanwhile, we also compare the result obtained in the European 
market with that in the US case.  
Chapter 4 attempts to broaden our understanding on the spatial-temporal development of air 
transport networks in a more comprehensive way by addressing the mechanism of changes in 
the process of opening, canceling and maintaining routes between airports. We explore a 
stochastic actor-based modelling (SABM) technique which to date is the first time that it is 
applied in a longitudinal analysis for air transport networks, even though it has been extensively 
applied in many other fields, such as friendship networks, inter-organizational networks or 
political networks, to examine network dynamics (Andrew, 2009; Liu et al., 2013; Snijders et 
al., 2010). The empirical case study is the European air transport market. We pursuit answers 
for the following question: What factors drive changes of the European air transport network 
drawing on the explanatory framework of the stochastic actor-based modelling technique? We 
incorporate endogenous effects representing the current network structure itself and exogenous 
effects describing the characteristics of airports (i.e., actor covariates) and airport-pairs (i.e., 
dyadic covariates) into the models. The studied period is between 2003 and 2009. 
Air transport liberalization has been considered as a catalyst for network evolution as airports 
and routes can be freely entered or exited. As stated in section 1.2, even though under the 
condition of the ownership and cabotage restrictions, the EU/US ‘open skies’ agreement (OSA) 
has gradually liberalized the EU/US transatlantic markets and may bring opportunities for 
airports other than FSCs’ primary hubs which traditionally handled a vast majority of the long-
haul traffic, such as secondary airports. In addition, research have shown that there is a tendency 
of long-haul traffic towards dispersion in favor of secondary airports (Bel and Fageda, 2010; 
Maertens, 2010; O'Connor and Fuellhart, 2013; Sismanidou et al., 2013; Weber and Williams, 
2001). We, therefore, propose the following research question in Chapter 5: To what extent  
does transatlantic traffic change at secondary airports in the European Union and the United 
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States in the context of the EU/US ‘open skies’ agreement? The investigated time period is 
2005-2008.  
The sixth and final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the main findings drawn from the 
combined conclusions of the previous four chapters, and outlines some avenues for further 
research.  
With regards to my role in the aforementioned chapters given that some of these are co-
authored papers, I have independently completed the first and final chapter, and conducted the 
data collection, analysis and interpretation in the other chapters of this dissertation. In 
collaboration with my co-authors, the original manuscripts of these chapters throughout the 
dissertation have been significantly improved in terms of research objectives, statements and 
language.  
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Abstract 
This paper explores factors influencing the pricing behaviour of full-service carriers in hub-
to-hub markets, which to date have rarely been the exclusive focus of research. Drawing on a 
2009 dataset containing route and airfare information, we estimate a pricing model for hub-to-
hub markets in the United States. Our econometric analysis suggests that an airport’s position in 
carriers’ hub hierarchies, competition from low-cost carriers, and other market structure 
variables influence average airfares.   
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2.1 Introduction 
Air travel demand in the United States is expected to increase to 1.2 billion passengers in 
2032, a near-doubling compared to the 731 million passengers in 2011 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2012). In principle, such further growth of the domestic market implies major 
business opportunities for US carriers. However, there are on-going concerns about the poor 
financial performance of US carriers. American Airlines’ recent filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
implies that the largest full-service carriers (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United 
and US Airways) have recently gone through a period of major restructuring. Part of the recent 
financial woes can of course be attributed to the on-going financial and economic crises that 
began in 2007, which have temporarily stifled demand (Dobruszkes and Van Hamme, 2011). 
Nonetheless, whatever the source of the poor financial performance of US carriers, it is clear 
that constantly (re)examining pricing strategies will be of key importance in order to reap the 
potential benefit of an expanding market. 
The extensive literature on airfare pricing strategies in the US aviation market predominantly 
focuses on (i) individual carriers’ overall route networks (Chi and Koo, 2009; Lee and Luengo-
Prado, 2005), (ii) the United States air transportation network as a whole (Borenstein, 1989; 
Brueckner et al., 1992) or (iii) specific airports (Borenstein, 2005; US Department of 
Transportation, 2001). As a consequence, there has been relatively little research exclusively 
focused on how carriers determine airfares in hub-to-hub (HH) markets, where both origin and 
destination are to some degree dominated by a full-service carrier (FSC). A major exception is 
the work of Vowles (2006), who found that route structure and competition between carriers 
(especially from low-cost carriers) play prominent roles in determining airfares in HH markets.  
In his analysis, Vowles included two route structure variables: routes where a single carrier 
controls both endpoints (i.e., ROUTE1, such as Newark -Houston in the erstwhile Continental 
network) and routes where two different carriers control the endpoints (i.e., ROUTE2, such as 
Salt Lake City-Cleveland for Delta and Continental). However, what remains unclear is how 
hubs and their service levels are defined because ‘the lack of any universally accepted definition 
of hub can be confusing in debate’ (Button, 2002, p.180). In addition, the operationalization of 
ROUTE1 did not consider the variation in the ‘levels’ of hubs within a carrier’s network. 
However, previous research has shown that service levels do not simply vary between ‘hubs’ 
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and ‘non-hubs’, but also amongst a carrier’s hubs4. For instance, Shaw (1993) divides hubs into 
‘national hubs’ and ‘regional hubs’ based on the ‘importance’ of an airport in a carrier’s network, 
while Ivy (1993) distinguishes between ‘primary hubs’ and ‘secondary hubs’ based on the levels 
of transfer traffic. This ‘hierarchy of hubs’ suggests that the service levels of the routes 
connecting these hubs within a carrier’s network will also be different, while the ensuing 
difference in HH routes may thus also impact the pricing strategies of the different carriers: it 
can be hypothesized that routes involving more dominant hubs can be related to higher airfares. 
This information is important for carriers and global alliances willing to maintain or establish 
multi-hub-and-spoke networks when they determine airfare pricing, frequencies and capacities 
for inter-hub routes (Holloway, 2008). 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to extend Vowles’ research through a more refined 
analysis of the impact of hub hierarchies on pricing in US HH markets. We hypothesize that (1) 
the presence of hub hierarchies may be relevant as there may be differential impacts based on 
the level of ‘hubness’ of both points on a route, while (2) there may be duopolistic effects or 
intensive competition in routes connecting hubs of different carriers. In our model, we therefore 
adopt a more refined operationalization of the notion of ‘hub-to-hub routes’ and hierarchies 
among hubs. Our empirical framework is thereby centred on the overall HH market as 
‘produced’ by the six largest FSCs (at the time of the data gathering) in the US.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews previous studies on 
the ways in which network structure and market competition determine airfares and yield in the 
US airline industry. Section 2.3 defines HH networks in the US and introduces our data and 
model. This model is operationalized in section 2.4, where the results of the overall HH market 
are used to illustrate how network structure, market competition, demand and cost variables, and 
market structure influence pricing strategies. In section 2.5, we summarize the main implications 
of our analysis and outline some avenues for further research.  
2.2 Literature review 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that this angle of defining hubs is different from that of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), who classifies hubs based on the share of the total number of US domestic airline passengers rather than an 
airport’s place in a carrier’s network. 
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2.2.1 Network structure in the business models of US carriers 
Network structure is related to the business model adopted by US carriers and has dramatically 
shifted since the industry deregulation in 1978. Although devising carrier typologies becomes 
an increasingly difficult task, the literature generally distinguishes between two types of carriers: 
full-service carriers (FSCs) and low-cost carriers (LCCs).  
FSCs are associated with a hub-and-spoke (HS) network structure, whereby a significant 
proportion of national and international flights is concentrated at their hubs (Button, 2002; 
O'Kelly, 1998). HS network structures allow airlines to exploit productive efficiencies from 
economies of traffic density (Nero, 1999). Associated with this type of network structure, FSCs 
run a complex business model by bundling a series of services. For instance, they develop 
sophisticated yield management techniques to utilize their fleet with multiple aircraft types. In 
addition, they offer in-flight entertainment, VIP waiting lounges, and other ‘frill’ services 
(Hazledine, 2011).  
LCCs deploy a different network strategy from FSCs: point-to-point (PTP) network structures 
offering more direct flights (Gillen and Morrison, 2005). The PP organization has distinct 
productivity advantages, such as reduced transaction costs and travel time related to the absence 
of a transfer system (Taneja, 2004). LCCs also have a simpler business model in terms of the 
‘extra’ services being offered beyond the mere connection. For instance, the US Department of 
Transportation definition of LCCs focuses on dimensions like (i) the presence of a single 
passenger cabin class, (ii) ‘no frills’ service, (iii) standardized aircraft utilization and other 
characteristics. 
Although this distinction between FSCs and LCCs continues to stand as the foremost 
difference amongst carriers, the reality is far more complex. For LCCs with sound PP networks, 
it is possible to leverage their networks by providing connecting services between existing 
airports within their networks to enjoy economies of airport costs (such as Southwest’s network 
strategy) (Boguslaski et al., 2004). This strategy is, however, markedly different from the FSCs’ 
HS network, whereby network economies are realized by adding more new destinations to their 
hubs and profitability heavily depends on connecting traffic. Moreover, recently launched LCCs 
tend to organize HS networks (e.g., Air Tran at Atlanta, Frontier at Denver and JetBlue at John 
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F. Kennedy) (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). It should be noted that their entry pattern (such as 
JetBlue) is still dominated by providing non-stop services, while opening new one-stop 
connections may be considered after non-stop entry (Müller et al., 2012). Meanwhile, FSCs have 
launched their own low-cost subsidiaries in response to the low-cost competition (e.g. Song by 
Delta) (Graham and Vowles, 2006).  
2.2.2 The impact of network structure and market competition on the pricing 
behaviour of US carriers 
Broad literature deals with the factors influencing airfares and yields. This paper focuses on 
studies that explicitly consider the role of network structure and competition. In the next section 
we will use this review to select variables in our analysis of the HH market.  
The relationship between network structure and pricing originates from the dominance of 
carriers adopting a HS business model at their hubs. Pricing tends to be influenced by dominance 
for two reasons. First, the very presence of hubbing tends to reproduce its engendered 
monopolistic tendencies as it deters other carriers from entering (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; 
Oum and Tretheway, 1990). Second, and more implicitly, carriers may dominate airport facilities 
at hubs (e.g., slots and gates), thus providing a better level of service (Ciliberto and Williams, 
2010; Williams and Snider, 2011). Based on these advantages, carriers adopting a HS network 
can charge higher fares on routes to/from their hubs (Borenstein, 1989; US Department of 
Transportation, 2001), especially on the routes connecting their hubs (henceforth termed 
‘dominant routes’). Even though this so-called ‘hub premium’ has decreased over the last 10 
years, some routes from/to hubs (e.g., those centred in Charlotte, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, and 
Memphis) are still characterized by significantly higher fares (Borenstein, 2005). 
A carrier’s pricing strategy is, however, also strongly influenced by its competitors’ behaviour 
(Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). This includes the routes between hubs of different carriers 
(henceforth termed ‘strategic routes’) characterized by either fierce competition to ‘steal’ 
passengers or the replication of hub premiums because of duopolies.  
The dramatic growth of LCCs has been a principal driver for shifting airfares in the US airline 
industry. Research by Windle and Dresner (1995) and Dresner et al. (1996), for instance, has 
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shown that LCCs tend to lower airfares on the routes they enter. It is useful to distinguish 
between the influence of Southwest Airlines and other LCCs, as the former has had the most 
significant impact in this regard. Dresner et al. (1996) found that yield was reduced by 
approximately 53% when Southwest served a route, while a 38% yield reduction occurred when 
other LCCs were included in the model. Incumbent FSCs also continue to respond differently to 
the entry of Southwest compared to the entry of other LCCs. Daraban (2007) suggests that 
incumbents cut their fares twice as much when Southwest entered the market compared to other 
LCCs.  
Addressing the relevance of a competitor’s behaviour is, however, more intricate because of 
the presence of airports in close proximity to hubs. Airports are increasingly part of multi-airport 
systems (MAS) (de Neufville, 1995; Derudder et al., 2010), implying multiple gateways for 
accessing metropolitan areas. Recent research has shown that LCCs not only influence pricing 
and traffic patterns at the airports they serve, but also at the other airports in a MAS (Brueckner 
et al., 2013; Tierney and Kuby, 2008; Vowles, 2001). This competitive effect has, for instance, 
been observed after the entry of Southwest in the Baltimore-Midway route: the significantly 
lower price offered on this route connecting the Washington and Chicago metropolitan areas 
forced carriers operating on other routes between Washington and Chicago to reduce the fares 
to protect their market share, which Vowles (2001) has dubbed the “spatial Southwest effect.” 
More recently, Brueckner et al.(2013) reappraised the impact of airline competition on domestic 
US airfares and confirmed that LCCs have dramatically reduced airfares whether they provide 
services in the airport-pair markets or at adjacent airports. 
In addition to the potential effect of network and market-related processes, there are also a 
number of other variables that influence pricing. Operating costs related to the distance, the total 
demand, and market structure variables such as slot-control policies and the relative proportion 
of tourism-related travel are the most important examples here and will serve as control 
variables.  
2.3 Methodology and data 
2.3.1 The US hub-to-hub market 
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As the main function of a carrier’s hub is to reroute passengers, our working definition of 
hubs in US domestic markets focuses on the relative volume of transfer passengers. In this paper, 
we adopt the classification of Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005), who define hubs as airports with 
more than 10% transfer passengers in a given carrier’s network (see also Ivy, 1993). A further 
distinction is made between ‘primary hubs’ (>50%) and ‘secondary hubs’ (10%-50%). Table 2.1 
presents an overview of the primary and secondary hubs in the US according to this 
classification. The table also lists ‘competing’ airports5 in the wider metropolitan area (MA), and 
thus provides the scope of our study as the HH market is taken to consist of all origin and 
destination (O&D) pairs where the airports are hubs (see Figure 2.1).   
  
                                                 
5 Competing airports are defined as airports located less than 75 miles away from the hub airports. Morrison 
Morrison, S.A., 2001. Actual, adjacent, and potential competition estimating the full effect of Southwest Airlines. 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 35, 239-256. found that a distance of 75 miles provided the best fit 
compared with distances of 25, 50, 100 and 125 miles. 
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Table 2.1 Categorization of hubs for US FSCs and their competing airports 
Hub Airport Carrier 
Transfer 
Passengers 
(%, in 2000) 
Competing Airport 
Primary Hubs    
Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) American 59.2 Dallas Love (DAL) 
Chicago O’Hare (ORD) American 50 Chicago Midway (MDW) 
Houston-George Bush (IAH) Continental 56.4 Houston Hobby (HOU) 
Cincinnati (CVG) Delta 75.3 Dayton (DAY) 
Atlanta (ATL) Delta 64.7  
Salt-Lake City (SLC) Delta 63.3  
Mineapolis-St. Paul (MSP) Northwest 53.3  
Detroit (DTW) Northwest 50.9  
Memphis (MEM) Northwest 76.9  
Chicago O’Hare (ORD) United 48.9 Chicago Midway (MDW) 
Denver (DEN) United 59  
Charlotte (CLT) US Airways 78.4  
Secondary hubs    
Miami (MIA) American 38.2 
Fort Lauderdale (FLL), Palm Beach 
(PBI) 
Newark (EWR) Continental 13.1 
John F. Kennedy (JFK), LaGuardia 
(LGA) 
Cleveland (CLE) Continental 38.5 Akron-Canton (CAK) 
Washington Dulles (IAD) United 37.6 
Washington National (DCA), 
Baltimore-Washington (BWI) 
San Francisco (SFO) United 26.5 Oakland (OAK), San Jose (SJC) 
Philadelphia (PHL) US Airways 41.9  
Source: Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005. 
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Figure 2.1 O&D routes connected by hubs of the six largest US FSCs 
2.3.2 Data 
The main dataset used in this paper was collected through a research cooperation with Sabre 
Airline Solutions, and contains information drawn from Airport Data Intelligence (ADI) on 
actual air travel bookings. In comparison with other commonly used datasets (e.g., DB1B data), 
the Sabre ADI has two major advantages when analyzing pricing and scheduling strategies in 
the airline industry. First, ADI datasets allow monitoring and tracking real-time fare information 
as passenger data is updated monthly and schedule data is renewed weekly. DB1B data, in 
contrast, combines quarterly fare information, and can therefore not be used by researchers to 
capture the rapid industry changes occurring within a three-month period. Second, the DB1B 
consists of a 10% sample of airline tickets. Even though a sampling of 10% is in principle quite 
large, it is possible that low-density routes are not sufficiently sampled (Grubesic, 2005). 
Datasets drawn from ADI paint a more complete picture by combining and calibrating data from 
1) global distribution systems (GDS), 2) travel agencies, 3) airline direct bookings, low-cost 
carriers and charter operations and 4) other non-IATA distribution channels. 
Sabre’s ADI database provides the required data for the proposed pricing analysis, including 
information at the route and carrier levels on passenger numbers, revenue, and distance. It also 
indicates the intermediate stops when connecting services are available. As the focus is on US 
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domestic HH markets, the unit of observation is the O&D market connected by 17 hubs in the 
networks of US FSCs, as given in Figure 2.1. We do not consider the directionality of a market 
(i.e., Atlanta-Detroit is assumed to be the same as Detroit-Atlanta). The data used in this paper 
is for May 2009. There are 131 routes in total, on which about 2.2 million passengers were 
carried during this time period6. 
2.3.3 Model specification 
We devise an econometric model that tries to explain the variability of earnings on HH routes 
in US domestic air passenger markets. Earnings are measured through average one-way fares7, 
which serves as the dependent variable in our model. The independent variables in the model 
combine control variables, network structure indices, and market competition variables. The 
empirical pricing model for the HH network is specified as follows: 
AVGFARE = α0 + α1PASS + α2DIST + α3VACATION + α4SLOTCONTROL +
α5DOMROUTE1 + α6DOMROUTE2 + α7DOMROUTE3 + α8STRROUTE1 +
α9STRROUTE2 + α10STRROUTE3 + α11SOUTHWEST + α12WNMA + α13OTHERLCCS                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                               (1) 
Where: 
α0 is the intercept and αi are the estimated coefficients for the independent variables; 
AVGFARE is the average one-way fare charged by the six largest FSCs on a route; 
PASS is the total number of passengers on a connection regardless of how it was realized 
(non-stop or with intermediate stops), and aggregated for both directions. We calculated the 
Pearson correlation coefficient to explore the potential relationship between PASS and 
AVGFARE. The result shows that PASS is negatively correlated with fares (correlation 
                                                 
6 In theory, the number of observations should be 136 (i.e., n*(n-1)/2=17*(17-1)/2=136, where n is the number of 
airports). However, five routes (i.e., CVG-CLE, CVG-DTW, CVG-MEM, CLE-DTW and EWR-PHL) were not 
served by any of the six FSCs in May, 2009, and are therefore excluded from the model. 
7  For the case of a roundtrip ticket, the Sabre ADI treats inbound and outbound as two separate one-way 
observations. 
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coefficient r = - 0.189, P<0.05): increasing passenger volumes lead to higher load factors 
(Devriendt et al., 2009) so that the per-passenger cost of the flight declines, thus lowering the 
price (Borenstein, 1989). However, above all, it can be hypothesized that bigger markets will be 
characterized by lower prices because of fierce competition. For instance, in addition to HS 
networks, almost all major US FSCs will offer LAX to JFK flights, which reflect the size of the 
market and the concomitant importance of being present in it. Given the correlation analysis and 
the ever-increasing levels of competition in the airline industry, the sign of PASS can be 
hypothesized as negative. 
DIST is the non-stop distance (measured in miles) between two hubs. As distance increases, 
average fares can be expected to rise since carriers’ operating costs with regard to fuel, in-flight 
service and wages will increase (Borenstein, 1989; Vowles, 2006; Windle and Dresner, 1995). 
Because it can readily be assumed that passengers are not willing to pay for longer routing 
because of intermediate stops, the model uses the non-stop distance of a route irrespective of the 
actual route segments (Chi and Koo, 2009). The expected sign for DISTANCE is positive. 
The VACATION control variable determines whether or not the origin or destination of a HH 
route is a clear-cut holiday destination. Researchers have found that airfares to cities in Florida, 
Hawaii, Nevada and Puerto Rico are lower because those cities are likely to have high 
competition for holiday travellers (Borenstein, 1989; Chi and Koo, 2009; Dresner et al., 1996; 
Windle and Dresner, 1995, 1999). In our framework, Miami (MIA) is the only holiday 
destination. A negative relationship is expected between VACATION and airfares. 
The SLOTCONTROL control variable determines whether the origin or destination of a HH 
route is a slot-controlled airport. Air carriers and other authorities impose regulatory limits on 
the number of takeoffs and landings each hour at the four highly congested airports (Chicago 
O’Hare, New York La Guardia, New York JF Kennedy and Washington National). The only slot 
controlled airport in our research is Chicago O’Hare (ORD), which is reported to be extremely 
congested, especially in the late afternoon and early evening (Johnson and Savage, 2006). The 
severe delays and the longer departure procedure at ORD may increase passengers’ travel time 
and reduce the service level. This may decrease demand and lead to a decline in airfares (Chi 
and Koo, 2009). The expected sign of SLOTCONTROL is negative. 
41 
 
The three dominant route variables (i.e., DOMROUTE 1, DOMROUTE 2 and DOMROUTES 
3) identify routes where both endpoints are hubs for the same carrier. The DOMROUTE 1 
variable captures routes where both endpoints are the primary hubs of the same carrier (e.g., 
Atlanta (ATL) - Cincinnati (CVG) for Delta); the DOMROUTE 2 variable captures routes where 
one endpoint is the primary hub and the other is the secondary hub for the same carrier (e.g., 
Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) – Miami (MIA) for American); and the DOMROUTE 3 variable 
describes routes whereby both endpoints are the secondary hubs for the same carrier (e.g., 
Newark (EWR) - Cleveland (CLE) for Continental). As the carrier is dominant at both airports, 
it can charge significantly higher prices on this route; the expected sign of these variables is 
therefore positive. However, the impact can be expected to lessen as we move from 
DOMROUTE 1 to DOMROUTE 3 because of the reduced dominance at the secondary hub.  
The three strategic routes variables (i.e., STRROUTE 1, STRROUTE 2 and STRROUTE 3) 
identify routes where both endpoints are hubs for different carriers. The STRROUTE 1 variable 
captures routes whereby both endpoints are the primary hub for different carriers (e.g., Atlanta 
(ATL)-Charlotte (CLT), as ATL and CLT are the primary hub for Delta and US Airways); the 
STRROUTE 2 variable captures routes whereby one endpoint is the primary hub for a particular 
carrier and the other endpoint is the secondary hub for another carrier (e.g., Atlanta (ATL)-
Philadelphia (PHL) because ATL is a primary hub for Delta and PHL is a secondary hub for US 
Airways); and the STRROUTE 3 variable identifies routes where both endpoints are the 
secondary hubs for different carriers (e.g., Miami (MIA)-Newark (EWR), as MIA is a secondary 
hub for American and EWR is a secondary hub for Continental). The expected sign and strength 
of such routes on pricing is harder to predict than for routes between hubs for the same carrier. 
These routes may have lower average fares because of fierce competition to ‘steal’ passengers, 
but nonetheless maintain higher fares because the monopoly of the previous set of HH routes is 
merely replaced by a duopoly. For instance, the Miami (MIA)-Philadelphia (PHL) market is 
dominated by American and US Airways with nearly equal market shares (48.6% for American 
and 46.7% for US Airways), and pricing strategies may go both ways (and also be contingent on 
other factors).  
The SOUTHWEST variable measures the effect of the presence of Southwest when it is 
directly present in a market. The expected sign is negative. 
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The WNMA variable (WN is the IATA code for Southwest) measures the effect of the 
presence of Southwest in competing markets. For instance, the Oakland (OAK)-Cleveland 
(CLE) route would be a competitor to the San Francisco (SAN)-Cleveland (CLE) route, since 
OAK is within the San Francisco MA. The expected sign is negative. 
OTHERLCCS is a variable examining the impact of the direct presence of low-cost carriers 
other than Southwest on a HH route. Low-cost carriers are taken to be present in a market when 
they collectively have a market share that is larger than 1% of passengers in a market (Ito and 
Lee, 2003; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005; Windle and Dresner, 1995). The other low-cost carriers 
included in this paper are Air Tran, Frontier, Jet Blue, Virgin America and Sun Country. The 
expected sign is negative. 
2.4 Result and discussion 
Summary statistics for the variables used in the model are presented in table 2.2. Both 
dependent and independent variables (i.e., AVGFARE, PASS and DIST) are transformed into 
natural logarithmic form to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities. We also 
perform two diagnostic tests for heteroscedasticity and endogeneity to produce a robust and 
unbiased model. First, the White test is applied to check for heteroscedasticity in the model 
(White, 1980). The result shows that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected 
at the 5% significance level. Second, we conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to detect possible 
endogeneity of explanatory variables (PASS in particular may potentially be endogenous) 
(Hausman, 1978). The result shows that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at 
the 5% significance level for PASS. 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of variables for the overall markets (monthly data) 
 Mean Std. Min Max 
AVGFARE ($) 186.02 51.46 80.64 354.25 
PASS 16933.97 15793.95 252.14 80821.64 
DISTANCES (miles) 1001.52 562.64 212.72 2591.52 
VACATION 0.12 0.33 0 1 
SLOTCONTROL 0.12 0.33 0 1 
DOMROUTE1 0.06 0.24 0 1 
DOMROUTE2 0.07 0.26 0 1 
DOMROUTE3 0.02 0.12 0 1 
STRROUTE1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
STRROUTE2 0.42 0.50 0 1 
STRROUTE3 0.08 0.28 0 1 
SOUTHWEST 0.03 0.17 0 1 
WNMA 0.29 0.46 0 1 
OTHERLCCs 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
Table 2.3 summarizes the key statistics for the overall model applying the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression, whereby 10 out of 12 independent variables are found to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level, collectively explaining about 70% of the variation in 
the pricing in the US HH market.  
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Table 2.3 Overall model 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients B 
Standardized Coefficients 
Beta 
(Constant) 3.869*** (0.197)  
LnPASS -0.042*** (0.016) -0.179 
LnDISTANCE 0.255*** (0.027) 0.544 
VACATION -0.318*** (0.047) -0.379 
SLOTCONTROL -0.162*** (0.053) -0.193 
DOMROUTE1 0.367*** (0.064) 0.320 
DOMROUTE2 0.328*** (0.063) 0.302 
DOMROUTE3 0.474*** (0.118) 0.212 
STRROUTE28 0.039 (0.035) 0.069 
STRROUTE3 0.211*** (0.062) 0.213 
SOUTHWEST -0.402*** (0.085) -0.252 
WNMA -0.062* (0.035) -0.103 
OTHERLCCs -0.081 (0.053) -0.092 
R Square 0.694  
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at 
the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Control variables 
The coefficient for PASS is negative: as the number of total passengers in the US HH markets 
increases by 1%, prices are predicted to fall by 0.04%9. The impact of distance, in turn, is indeed 
positive, and indicates that 1% increase of the distance results in an average increase in fares of 
0.25%. And finally, the coefficients for VACATION and SLOTCONTROL are, as anticipated, 
negative: HH routes involving Miami and Chicago O’Hare imply smaller ‘hub premiums’. 
Hub hierarchy  
Routes where both nodes are hubs for the same carrier do indeed result in significantly higher 
fares10. However, our results show that this effect is uneven in the sense that hub hierarchies 
                                                 
8 STRROUTE1 is excluded from the model due to its high collinearity with STRROUTE2. 
9 When both independent and dependent variables are natural logarithmic transformed, back-transformation is 
compulsory to accurately interpret the results. The equation is ((1 + 1%)β − 1) ∗ 100% . For all the dummy 
variables, the equation applied to interpret the results is (eβ − 1) ∗ 100%. 
10 We performed a separate regression model excluding the variable PASS and found that the regression results as 
a whole did not change. 
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also play a significant role: the standardized beta coefficients11 reveal that DOMROUTE1 has a 
bigger impact than DOMROUTE2, which in turn has a bigger impact than DOMROUTE3. Fares 
on routes between a carrier’s primary hubs are on average 44% higher than general fares, while 
these for primary-secondary routes are raised by 39%. Although the standardized beta coefficient 
is lower on secondary-secondary routes, the price increase is bigger (61% for DOMROUTE3). 
This can be explained by the specific nature of the two secondary-secondary routes in our 
dataset; i.e., Cleveland (CLE)-Newark (EWR) for Continental and Washington Dulles (IAD)-
San Francisco (SFO) for United. In May 2009, Continental carried about 96.6% of the passengers 
(as measured in our Sabre Database) in the CLE-EWR market, while United had the largest 
market share with 62.8% in the IAD-SFO market. Both examples are therefore specific in the 
sense that, although connecting secondary hubs, the routes are de facto monopolies, hence the 
disproportionally inflated fares.  
Market competition 
Routes between hubs for different carriers do not result in higher fares, except for an average 
increase of 23% on secondary-secondary routes.  
Southwest drives down prices in the US HH markets: its direct presence cuts prices by 49% 
(all other things being equal) and its presence in the competing markets reduces prices by 6%. It 
is worth noting that the other LCCs have no significant impact on prices in the overall markets, 
which corroborates Daraban’s (2007) research on the particular effect of Southwest.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper explored the factors influencing the pricing strategies of US full-service carriers 
in specific hub-to-hub markets. The results confirm Vowles’ (2006) observations regarding 
higher airfares in these markets, but also extend his findings by showing that hub hierarchies 
play a role. As hypothesized, the monopolistic effects on airfares diminish as the hubs become 
less crucial in a carrier’s network. Meanwhile, duopolies in routes connecting the hubs of 
different carriers have no or limited effects on airfares. This indicates that the variant ability of 
                                                 
11 Standardized coefficients are applied to estimate which of the independent variables has a greater effect on the 
dependent variable when the variables are measured in different units of measurement. 
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FSCs’ hubs to reroute passengers leads to inter-HH route heterogeneity, which further drives the 
pricing variation in HH markets. We suggest that inter-HH route heterogeneity should also be 
incorporated when studying the ‘hub premium’ issue. Our model controls for other crucial 
pricing factors, such as the competition from low-cost carriers and market structure, and thereby 
corroborates earlier research regarding the differential impact of Southwest viz. other low-cost 
carriers.  
The air transport world is, of course, in constant flux, and future research should thus assess 
the impact of these changes on our observations. In the US, for instance, further rounds of 
consolidation (e.g., the Northwest/Delta merger) and rapidly unfolding new trends (e.g., the 
increased impact of self-hubbing) could well alter the profoundness of the patterns revealed here. 
In addition, given the unfolding integration and concomitant consolidation of other markets (the 
European Union, and increasingly the ASEAN region), the time seems ripe for analyses of the 
pricing effects of emerging hub-to-hub markets in these regions as well. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores the factors influencing the pricing behaviour of full-service carriers in 
European hub-to-hub markets. Drawing on a 2009 dataset containing route and airfare 
information, we establish an econometric model to estimate the impact of route structure, 
alliances, and market concentration on the pricing of European full-service carriers in these 
markets. The results suggest that alliances on routes connecting two primary hubs, airport 
concentration, market share inequality and competition from low-cost carriers influence 
average airfares of full-service carriers in the European hub-to-hub markets. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Air transport deregulation in Europe has led to dramatic changes in the network configuration 
and business models of erstwhile national carriers. First, they have implemented or intensified 
the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks by concentrating traffic and flights around their hubs 
to accomplish network economies (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; Button, 2002; Caves et al., 
1984; Janic and Reggiani, 2002). Second, sophisticated revenue management techniques have 
replaced the traditional regulated pricing mechanisms. Offering more differentiated products - 
such as in-flight entertainment, VIP waiting lounges, and other ‘frills’ - has gradually 
transformed national carriers into so-called ‘full-service carriers’ (FSCs) (Tretheway, 2011). 
Third, the industry has been consolidated via cross-border mergers to address the excess 
capacity caused by establishing too many airlines in the outdated flag-carrier system (Brueckner 
and Pels, 2005), as well as through establishing global alliances (Benacchio, 2008; Doganis, 
1994). In addition, the emergence of low-cost carriers (LCCs) has been a competitive challenge 
for FSCs due to the former carriers’ well-known cost advantages (Alderighi et al., 2012). These 
changes force FSCs in Europe to constantly (re)examine their pricing strategies in order to 
achieve profitability in what have become (relatively more) liberalized markets. 
The literature examining the pricing strategies of FSCs in Europe is not as extensive as the 
one focused on the aviation market in the United States. Some of the exceptions include 
research on 1) flights from Nice Airport (France) to 9 European countries (Giaume and Guillou, 
2004), 2) domestic routes and airport-pairs between the United Kingdom and 14 European 
countries (Piga and Bachis, 2007), and 3) city-pairs between Italy and the main destinations in 
the UK, Germany and the Netherlands (Alderighi et al., 2012). As a consequence, to the best 
of our knowledge there has been no research exclusively devoted to how carriers determine 
airfares in the emerging European hub-to-hub (HH) markets, where both origin and destination 
are to some degree dominated by a FSC. 
An analysis of pricing in European HH markets is relevant for three reasons. First, hubs are 
typically located in Metropolitan Regions characterized by large populations, major levels of 
economic development, and an economic structure that is conducive to business travel 
(Dijkstra, 2009). Carriers operating HH routes can therefore not only expect to realize 
economies of density, but also capture more high-yield business travellers (Neal, 2011). 
Second, hubs assume different service levels in individual FSCs’ networks, i.e. the so-called 
‘hub hierarchy’ that is also emerging in the US (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; Burghouwt and 
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Hakfoort, 2001; Dennis, 2005; Derudder and Witlox, 2009; Frenken et al., 2004; Malighetti et 
al., 2009; Thompson, 2002). Burghouwt (2007), for instance, clusters airports into 1st tier, 2nd 
tier and 3rd tier hubs based on the number of weighted indirect connections in a carrier’s 
network, while Malighetti et al. (2009) distinguish between ‘worldwide hubs’, ‘hubs’ and 
‘secondary gates’ based on traffic volume, destination of connections, connectivity and 
topology of service. The ensuing ‘hub hierarchy’ implies that the routes connecting different 
levels of hubs may vary in their pricing: routes involving more dominant hubs can in principle 
be related with higher airfares because of ‘hub premiums’ (Vowles, 2006; Zhang et al., 2013).  
Third, strategic alliances have complicated the route structure of HH networks. European 
FSCs have over time joined one of the three global alliances, thus leading to the development 
of explicit and implicit multi-hub-and-spoke networks: carriers extend their reach by 
interlinking each other’s networks (often via their hubs), so that the scope of their network 
grows without having to internally extend their own networks. Alliance carriers can, as a 
consequence, increase frequencies on their nonstop HH routes to facilitate customers, especially 
time-sensitive business travellers. Doganis (2006), for instance, found that the Lufthansa-SAS 
alliance increased daily departures between Frankfurt and Copenhagen for both carriers. As a 
consequence, carriers that do not ally on HH routes may lose competitive advantages comparing 
to allied carriers, so that the resulting market concentration can be expected to play an important 
role in explaining price discrimination (Borenstein, 1989; Piga and Bachis, 2007).  
The emerging ‘hub hierarchy’, the growing importance of alliances and their combined 
impact (i.e., a route connected by two hubs with different levels of hubness may also be an 
allied route) gives rise to an inherently complex European HH network. This raises questions 
on the major factors influencing the pricing strategies of FSCs serving the hub markets. The 
objective of this paper, therefore, is to investigate to what extent the emerging hub hierarchy, 
strategic alliances and the ensuing landscapes of market concentration influence the price-
setting of FSCs in the European HH markets. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 3.2 reviews previous studies on how alliances and market structure determine 
airfares and yield in the US and European airline industry. Section 3.3 defines the European 
HH network, and introduces our data and methods. Section 3.4 presents an analysis of the 
complex market structure of the European HH markets, and examines how route structure, 
alliances and market concentration influence the pricing strategies of FSCs. In section 3.5, we 
summarize the main implications of our analysis and outline some avenues for further research.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Hub dominance and airfares in HH markets 
Hub-and-spoke networks are associated with the dominance of a hub airport by one or, 
occasionally, two carriers (Borenstein, 1992). If a carrier provides a large number of 
competitive indirect connections (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005) or connects large volumes of 
transfer passengers (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005), then this carrier is said to ‘dominate’ its hub 
airport. The debate about the relationship between hub dominance and airfares rests on the 
question whether carriers can wield market power by charging higher airfares on routes from/to 
their hubs than on other routes. There is no consensus as to whether a carrier’s pricing power 
at its hub airport can be conveyed to all routes involving the dominant airport, so that this 
relationship is discussed at both the airport and the route level to obtain unbiased estimations.  
In US airline markets, researchers had found that the market power exercised by carriers has 
not been undermined since deregulation. Borenstein (1989) found that a carrier dominating at 
both the airport and the route level has the ability to charge higher fares, whereby the sources 
of this market power originate from 1) the dominant carriers’ ability to deter the entry of 
potential competitors by controlling airport facilities, as well as 2) the marketing devices such 
as frequent flyer programs (FFP). However, Evans and Kessides (1993) found that dominance 
at the airport level, but not the route level, can confer substantial market power upon the carrier 
when unexplained inter-route heterogeneity is considered. Aircraft can be switched relatively 
easily and costlessly between different routes making these routes naturally contestable, 
whereas airport facilities, product differentiation barriers arising from FFPs and other 
impediments make these harder to contest. More recently, researchers have offered new 
evidence for US markets and found that a carrier dominating at the route level can also charge 
higher fares (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003; Stavins, 2001).  
Marín (1995) was the first to address the issue in the European context and found that, in 
contrast to the US situation, European carriers tended to compete in terms of prices by 
exploiting cost advantages after liberalization. Captain and Sickles (1997) further found that 
the reasons why some ‘flag carriers’ cannot exploit such cost advantages is due to technically 
inefficient use of inputs and high labour wages rather than wielding market power between 
1976 and 1990. However, it is clear that these studies deal with the earlier stages of European 
aviation deregulation. As the European aviation sector has gone through dramatic changes in 
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the last decades, the impact of market dominance on airfares has also been altered by factors 
such as the proliferation of low-cost carriers (LCCs). Piga and Bachis (2007) concluded that 
the impact of market dominance on fares in European airline market depends on the type of 
carriers (i.e. FSCs versus LCCs). FSCs’ dominance at an airport plays a crucial role only for 
the fares associated with a particular set of booking days, i.e. the late booking dates, whereas 
LCCs’ dominance at an airport is highly correlated with fares on any booking day before 
departure due to their ability to operate at lower costs. Dominance at the route level enables 
FSCs to exercise market power, but limits LCCs’ ability to charge higher fares only for late 
booking fares. They also argue that the limited size of many ‘natural monopoly’ routes 
contribute to the route dominance enjoyed by European carriers. 
3.2.2 Alliances and airfares in HH markets 
An alliance can increase the market share and market power of alliance carriers at their hubs, 
and reduce or eliminate competition on specific routes. However, when alliances or mergers 
significantly reduce competition in the relevant markets, the European Commission has 
imposed conditions such as giving up airport slots or route licenses to encourage the entry of 
new carriers (Doganis, 2006).The vast majority of dense intra-European routes are short-haul 
routes with less than two-and-a-half hours of flying time, implying that alternatives via transfer 
routes are not very attractive. Joining in an alliance can therefore very effectively reduce 
competition on those routes by turning the previous duopoly into a de facto monopoly (Doganis, 
2006). However, the degree to which alliance partners (ab)use their strengthened dominance to 
charge higher fares on their hub-to-hub routes remains unclear. Oum et al. (2000) study 22 
international airlines for the 1986-95 period and find that partner airlines lowered prices by 
1.3% after entering an alliance, and ascribe this result to the reduced cost because of efficiency 
or productivity gains. They particularly find that an airline with a longer average route length 
charged lower prices than that with a short average route length due to the competitive 
advantage of longer routes (e.g., reduced fuel consumption). At the same time, researchers have 
found that fares in markets served by an alliance were higher than those in non-alliance markets 
because of reduced competition, as in the SAS-Swissair alliance (Youssef and Hansen, 1994) 
and the Air France-KLM merger (Brueckner and Pels, 2005). Meanwhile, Wan et al. (2009) 
investigate the impact of airline alliances on airfares on transatlantic HH routes, and come to 
the conclusion that the net effect on airfares is uncertain as it depends on the ability of an 
alliance to coordinate fares.  
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3.2.3 Market concentration and airfares in HH markets 
A carrier’s pricing strategy is driven not only by the internal carrier-specific considerations 
but also by the structure of external markets. As a market (i.e., individual airport-pair market) 
is comprised of carriers, passengers, air travel products, and competing mass travel modes such 
as railway links, the external market structure in which the carriers are operating depends upon 
four aspects: 1) the number of carriers and passengers, 2) ease of market entry, adaptation, and 
exit, 3) the extent of product differentiation or distinctiveness, and 4) the availability and cost 
of information (Holloway, 2008).  
The structure of the European airline markets can in practice be mainly categorized through 
three types, based on the number of carriers: monopoly (i.e., one carrier), duopoly (i.e., two 
carriers) and oligopoly (i.e., more than two carriers) (Alderighi et al., 2012). However, the 
number of carriers per se on a route is not the best measure of market structure and the 
competitive behaviour of carriers as it does not evaluate concentration (i.e., the market share 
distribution of carriers) (Giaume and Guillou, 2004; Shepherd, 1999). The concept of 
concentration has been extensively applied to represent market structure in research focused on 
the relationship between market structure and pricing. Aiming to reflect the entire market share 
distribution of carriers in a single indicator, researchers frequently use the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to quantify market concentration (Hannan, 1997). 
The impact of route HHI on prices can be mixed and depends on the geographical areas. In 
the US airline markets, researchers have found that increases in route HHI raise prices to some 
degree as a few carriers in a concentrated market may collude more easily to charge higher 
prices (Borenstein, 1989; Chi and Koo, 2009; Evans and Kessides, 1993). However, a negative 
relationship between route HHI and prices also occurs when the dominant carrier enjoys 
technological advantages over its rivals and forces the other carriers to reduce prices to compete 
(Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003). In the European airline markets, Piga and Bachis (2007) found 
that prices were raised by FSCs and LCCs as route HHI increased, but only for the prices 
associated with late booking days. Giaume and Guillou (2004) observed a negative relationship 
between route HHI and prices in the European markets and attributed it to the high inequality 
of market share leading to strong price competition between carriers. 
These findings suggest that the impact of changing market structure on fares for European 
markets will probably not be a copy of the US case, which calls for a systematic appraisal of its 
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role in European aviation markets. Moreover, we also consider the impact of LCCs’ presence 
at secondary airports and high-speed train (HST) competition on airfares, which to date are 
rarely incorporated in a pricing model related to European market. 
3.3  Data collection and descriptive analysis 
3.3.1 Data collection procedure 
A first step is to define the geographical scope of our research. As there are no generally 
recognized boundaries of ‘Europe’, the scope of this study is confined to those Western/Central 
parts of Europe where the air transport industry is relatively more liberalized and developed. 
This paper considers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  
The second step is to define European FSCs and their established hubs as well as secondary 
airports close to these hubs. Researchers have long defined all ‘flag carriers’12 of the countries 
listed above as FSCs in Europe (Alderighi et al., 2012; Burghouwt et al., 2003). However, on-
going deregulation has broadened the differences amongst these erstwhile flag carriers, as can 
be seen in the cases of Aer Lingus’s (i.e., Ireland’s flag carrier) transformation into a LCC 
(Barrett, 2006; O' Connell and Williams, 2005; Wallace et al., 2006) and the demise of Sabena 
(i.e., Belgium’s former flag carrier) in 2001. Moreover, some flag carriers, such as Icelandair, 
Luxair and Olympic Airlines, did not join one of the major airline alliances. As per our research 
objective, FSCs are defined as the current flag carriers of countries locating in Western and 
Central Europe which run a complex business model by bundling a series of services, and have 
also joined one of the three global alliances (i.e., Star, Oneworld and SkyTeam) at the time of 
our research (column 2, table 3.1). Next, we identify these FSCs’ hubs, thus establishing the 
hub-to-hub network in Europe. As the main purpose of a FSC’s hub is to concentrate flights 
through synchronized waves and reroute passengers, our working definition of hubs in the 
European airline market focuses on the number of competitive indirect connections as presented 
                                                 
12 A flag carrier (also known as national carrier) is one that is substantially owned and effectively controlled by 
nationals of that state in the EU (Doganis, 2001; Barrett, 2006). However, waves of deregulation and privatization 
have changed the ownership of some flag carriers whereby they have become partially or even fully owned by the 
private sector. However, most of them are still considered to be flag carriers today as they are often interpreted as 
a  sign of their home country’s international presence (Smith, 1991). 
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by Burghouwt (2007). In his work, hubs are defined as airports with more than 200 indirect 
connections per day13 and served by FSCs. A classification scheme based on the number of 
indirect connections is then applied to distinguish between ‘primary hubs’ (>2500) and 
‘secondary hubs’ (200-2500). Table 3.1 presents an overview of the European FSCs’ hubs and 
their adjacent secondary airports14. This provides the scope of our study as the HH market is 
taken to consist of all connections where both origin and destination are hubs (see Figure 3.1). 
As a result of the presence of this ‘hub hierarchy’, European HH network consists of three 
different types of routes, i.e., primary-primary (PP), primary-secondary (PS), and secondary-
secondary (SS) routes. 
  
                                                 
13 Burghouwt (2007) considered all the airports having indirect connections in an FSC’s network as hubs or 
primary nodes. However, we set a minimum threshold as 200 indirect connections per day as this tends to select 
more important hubs through which airlines strive to establish a wave-system structure. 
14 Secondary airports are defined as airports located less than 75 miles away from the hubs. 
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 Table 3.1 Categorization of hubs for European FSCs and list of secondary airports 
Hub Airport Carrier 
Number of weighted 
indirect connections per 
day (200315) 
Competing Airport 
Primary (8)    
Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG) 
Air France 14005 Beauvais (BVA) 
Frankfurt (FRA) Lufthansa 13616 Frankfurt Hahn (HHN) 
London Heathrow 
(LHR) 
British Airways 9439 
London Luton (LTN), 
London Stansted (STN) 
Amsterdam (AMS) KLM 8713 Rotterdam (RTM) 
Madrid (MAD) Iberia 6941  
Munich (MUC) Lufthansa 4184  
Copenhagen (CPH) 
SAS 
Scandinavian 
2576 Malmo (MMX) 
Vienna (VIE) Austrian 2553  
Secondary (10)    
Rome Fiumicino 
(FCO) 
Alitalia 2384 Ciampino (CIA) 
Barcelona (BCN) Iberia 2128 Girona (GRO) 
Milan Malpensa 
(MXP) 
Alitalia 1946 
Linate (LIN), Bergamo 
(BGY) 
Oslo (OSL) 
SAS 
Scandinavian 
1139 Torp (TRF) 
London Gatwick 
(LGW) 
British Airways 979 
London Luton (LTN), 
London Stansted (STN) 
Helsinki (HEL) Finnair 957  
Lisbon (LIS) 
TAP Air 
Portugal 
792  
Paris Orly (ORY) Air France 709 Beauvais (BVA) 
Brussels (BRU) Brussels16 452 Charleroi (CRL) 
Dusseldorf (DUS) Lufthansa 214 Kolon/Bonn (CGN) 
Source: Burghouwt (2007) 
                                                 
15 Burghouwt (2007)’s work to the best of our knowledge is the most detailed source on the hub-and-spoke 
practices of FSCs in Europe. Even though this classification was developed using pre-2005 data, it is still a valuable 
source because FSCs and their hubs tend to have longstanding, symbiotic relationships. Only in the cases of 
bankruptcy or the very drastic decision to fundamentally restructure their network, it would be possible for an FSC 
to either abandon a hub (Redondi et al., 2012) or establish a new one (Düdden, 2006). For the sake of data 
consistency, we investigated the network evolution of route maps of FSCs, and found that Alitalia was the only 
example here through its partially abandoning of Milan Malpensa (MXP) in 2008. However, excluding MXP from 
our dataset did not alter the results of our improved model. Taken together, then, Burghouwt’s classification is still 
relevant for our research, in spite of it predating our own analytical framework. 
16 Brussels Airlines is the new flag carrier of Belgium. It started operations in 2007 after the merger between 
between SN Brussels Airlines (i.e., the former national carrier of Belgium, inherited from Sabena) and Virgin 
Express. 
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Figure 3.1 Non-stop connections between hubs of the European FSCs 
We also identified types of carriers other than FSCs (e.g., LCCs and regional carriers) to 
examine the overall market structure. As not all the carriers registered in Europe can readily 
enter the European HH markets due to high entry barriers, we collected a list of carriers that 
actually served the HH markets (i.e., with a market share larger than 1%) in May 2009 from 
our database (see below). By comparing the combined lists of LCCs recently developed by 
Dobruszkes (2009) and Klophaus et al. (2012), we establish a list of LCCs for this study. All 
the other carriers are then defined as regional carriers (RECs)17. The overview of carriers is 
represented in table 3.2. 
  
                                                 
17 Even though some RECs are partial- or fully-owned subsidiaries of FSCs, we treat them separately as 1) their 
combined market shares would cause severe anti-competition issues due to monopolistic or duopolistic tendencies; 
2) the integration may mask the roles played by RECs in reducing prices on routes with fierce competition from 
LCCs or those with unanticipated schedule disruptions (Forbes and Lederman, 2007). 
61 
 
Table 3.2 Overview of carriers and alliance for FSCs 
Carrier 
Type 
Carrier Name 
FSCs Air France (SkyTeam), Alitalia (SkyTeam), Austrian (Star), British Airways 
(OneWorld), Brussels (Star), Finnair (OneWorld), Iberia (OneWorld), KLM (SkyTeam), 
Lufthansa (Star), SAS Scandinavian (Star), TAP Air Portugal (Star) 
LCCs Aer Lingus, Air Europa Lineas Aereas, Air Berlin, EasyJet, Germanwings, Niki, 
Norwegian Air Shuttle, Spanair, Transavia.com, Vueling, Ryanair, Wind Jet 
RECs Adria Airways, Aigle Azur, Air Comet, Air Dolomiti, Blue1, BMI british midland, Brit 
Air, Cimber Sterling, Eurowings, Lufthansa Cityline, Regional, SAS Norge, Tyrolean 
Airways 
Note: Alliance membership for FSCs is shown between parentheses. 
The main dataset used in this paper is collected through a research cooperation with Sabre 
Airline Solutions, and contains information drawn from Airport Data Intelligence (ADI) on 
actual bookings for different carriers. The Sabre ADI has at least one major advantage when 
analysing pricing and scheduling in the airline industry: it seeks to establish a complete dataset 
by adjusting and calibrating data from 1) global distribution systems (GDS), 2) travel agencies, 
3) direct bookings, low-cost carriers, charter operations and 4) other non-IATA distribution 
channels. Sabre’s ADI database provides the required data for the proposed pricing analysis, 
including information at the route and carrier level of passenger numbers, revenue, cabin class 
and distance. It also indicates the intermediate stops when connecting services are available. 
The units of observation in our analysis are the non-stop connections between the 18 hubs in 
the overall network ‘produced’ by the 11 European FSCs given in Figure 3.1. An observed 
route is selected only if its monthly traffic volume is at least 100 passengers, and a carrier is 
considered to serve the route only if its market share is at least 1%. The data used in this paper 
is for May 2009. In addition, the population of the hub cities is obtained from www.World-
Gazetteer.com. The data related to the presence of LCCs on competing routes whereby either 
endpoints are connected by secondary airports are collected from www.skyscanner.net 18 . 
Finally, HST data are collected from the official website of HST companies in Europe, such as 
TGV, ICE, Eurostar and other companies. 
                                                 
18 This data were not available for the year 2009 in our Sabre dataset. Skyscanner providing information about 
routes and carriers allows us to control for the impact of LCCs competition at secondary airports, even though the  
online data are about scheduled flights in 2014. Competing routes are assumed to be actually served by LCCs only 
if nonstop return services are provided every week in May, 2014. The website was accessed on 4th April, 2014. 
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3.3.2 Exploratory analysis of market structure 
Market concentration depends on the actual structure of individual hub airport-pair markets. 
Given the complex nature of market structure in the EU (partly because of the shorter distances 
between hubs and the alliance formation), we first perform a descriptive analysis of market 
structure before proceeding to the econometric analysis. 
Market structure by route type 
As competition has not been homogeneous at the route level in Europe (Giaume and Guillou, 
2004), it is necessary to analyze the market structure for each HH route separately. Table 3.3 
shows that European HH markets exhibit three types of market structure in terms of the number 
and type of carriers: monopoly (10% of routes), duopoly (49% of routes) and oligopoly (42% 
of routes)19. Previous research carried out by Alderighi et al. (2012) has shown that the entry of 
LCCs has increased the competition of the European aviation market. They particularly 
distinguish between symmetric duopoly (two FSCs) and asymmetric duopoly (one FSC and one 
LCC), and also between oligopolistic routes with or without the presence of LCCs. Drawing on 
their categorization method, we find that 11 duopolistic routes and 28 oligopolistic routes have 
been entered by LCCs. These fundamental statistics indicate that European HH markets are 1) 
served by few carriers and characterized by high concentration, and 2) penetrated by LCCs.  
Table 3.3 An overview of market structure by route structure  
 Monopolistic 
routes 
Duopolistic routes Oligopolistic routes Total 
FSC FSC&LCC FSC&REC FSC FSC&LCC FSC&REC FSC&LCC&REC 
PP 2 11 0 2 1 2 4 4 26 
PS 5 13 8 7 1 9 6 6 55 
SS 3 2 3 3 1 6 1 1 20 
Total 10 26 11 12 3 17 11 11 101 
 
The presence of LCCs and RECs indicates the possible inequality of market shares among 
carriers. Route concentration measured by a regular HHI (i.e., the sum of squared market 
                                                 
19 For instance, Barcelona-Frankfurt is a monopolistic route as Lufthansa is the only carrier serving this route at 
the time of data collection. Amsterdam-Charles de Gaulle is a duopolistic routes served by two carriers – Air 
France and KLM. The oligopoly markets have three or more carriers in services. Note that from an alliance 
perspective the CDG-AMS link will be monopolistic. 
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shares) may, therefore, be inadequate to represent concentration, as it does not separate the 
effects of the number of carriers and share inequality20. We thus use the decomposed HHI to 
measure the market concentration when both asymmetries of market shares and the number of 
competitors on a route should be accounted for. The decomposed HHI index is measured as: 
Decomposed HHI = H1 + H2 =  CV2 N⁄ + 1 N⁄          (1) 
Where CV is the coefficient of variation of market shares, and N is the number of carriers on 
a route. The first part of this equation (H1) is of particular importance as it represents the market 
share inequality of carriers on a route, while the second part (H2) describes the value of HHI 
when all the carriers have equal market share (Laderman, 1995). 
The impact of alliances on airfares 
Alliances allow FSCs to form multi-hub-and-spoke networks and cooperate with carriers in 
the same alliance. 34 out of 101 routes in our study are connected by the same alliance’s hubs 
in our study (table 3.4). We categorize six types of routes by considering both the degree of 
hubness and alliances: PP*Alliance (e.g., FRA-CPH), PP*NonAlliance (e.g., FRA-CDG), 
PS*Alliance (e.g., FRA-OLS), PS*NonAlliance (e.g., FRA-FCO), SS*Alliance (e.g., OLS-
LIS) and SS*NonAlliance (e.g., FCO-OLS). For instance, as Lufthansa, SAS Scandinavian, 
Brussels and TAP Air Portugal all belong to the Star alliance, FRA-CPH is thus a PP*Alliance 
route whereby FRA and CPH are the primary hubs of Lufthansa and SAS Scandinavian, 
respectively. The same approach was applied to the other route types. Based on the 
disaggregated market share of the carriers in the same alliance, five allied routes are 
monopolistic and 21 are duopolistic. When the market shares of the alliance carriers are 
aggregated, about 90% of alliance routes are monopolistic or duopolistic.  
  
                                                 
20 Our econometric analysis also proves that the regular HHI index does not have significant impact on fares. In 
addition, the different effects of number of carriers and market share inequality on fares also indicate that the 
decomposed HHI is more appropriate to represent market concentration in this study. 
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Table 3.4 The effects of alliances on market structure by route type 
 Monopolistic routes Duopolistic routes Oligopolistic routes Total 
Before alliance     
PP*Alliance 2 4 2 8 
PS*Alliance 2 13 5 20 
SS*Alliance 1 4 1 6 
Total 5 21 8 34 
After alliance     
PP*Alliance 6 2 0 8 
PS*Alliance 9 9 2 20 
SS*Alliance 3 2 1 6 
Total 18 13 3 34 
 
We also carried out an exploratory analysis to examine whether allied carriers exercise 
pricing power when their joint market share increases. Table 3.5 shows that the alliance carriers 
charge significant higher fares only on PP routes, but not on the other types of routes. There are 
two possible reasons. First, the raised market concentration on the other types of routes is offset 
by the economies of density, resulting in statistically insignificant impact on airfares. Second, 
allied carriers coordinate their pricing decisions on the main PP routes, implying that they 
primarily wield market power on PP routes. 
Table 3.5 The t-test results for average fares by route type 
Average fares N Mean $ Std.dev. Std.err. t-value 
PP route      
Same-alliance routes  8  188.75  25.16  8.89  3.964  
(0.001)  Different-alliance routes 18  151.02  21.16  4.99  
Difference   37.73    9.52    
PS route      
Same-alliance routes 20  170.70  58.33  13.04  1.22  
Different-alliance routes 35  153.49  45.09  7.62  (0.227)  
Difference   17.21    14.08    
SS route      
Same-alliance route 6  134.73  46.14  18.84  -0.737  
Different-alliance routes 14  158.46  72.15  19.28  (0.471)  
Difference   -23.73    32.19    
Note: H0: mean (diff) = 0; Ha: mean (diff) > 0; the significance level is shown between parentheses. 
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The results in table 3.5 suggest that market concentration influences airfares, but previous 
research has shown that without taking mediating demand and cost variables into account such 
simple comparative approach can be misleading (Borenstein, 1989; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 
2005). In the next section, we therefore establish an econometric model to assess the influence 
of hub hierarchies, alliances and concentration on airfares by controlling for these potentially 
intervening variables. 
3.4 Econometric analysis 
3.4.1 The empirical model 
We establish an econometric model that explains the variability of earnings on non-stop HH 
routes in the intra-European air passenger markets. Earnings are measured through average one-
way fares, which serve as the dependent variable in our model. The independent variables in 
the model combine demand, cost, route structure, and market structure variables. Continuous 
variables (i.e., population, business/economy traffic mix, distance and average fare) are 
transformed into their natural logarithms to reduce the impact of outlying observations and 
facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities. The empirical pricing model for 
the HH network is specified as follows: 
Ln(Avgfare) = β0 + β1Ln(Population) + β2RegionalEffects + β3Ln(Business)
+ β4Ln(Distance) + 𝛽5PP + 𝛽6PS + 𝛽7AllianceRoutes
+ β8(PP ∗ AllianceRoutes) + β9(PS ∗ AllianceRoutes) + β10OneStop
+ 𝛽11Ln(AirportHHI) + β12H1 + β13H2 + β14 LCCs
+ β15LCCSecondary + β16 HST 
                                                                                                                                         (2) 
Where: 𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝛽𝑖 are the estimated coefficients for the independent variables. 
Avgfare is the average one-way fares measured by the total revenues divided by the total number 
of passengers of all the European FSCs on a route. 
Demand variables 
Population is the average population of cities where the hub airports locate, indicating the 
potential market size of a given route. The impact of Population on airfares can be mixed. On 
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the one hand, larger population imply that more people will buy air tickets to travel, thereby 
increasing prices. On the other hand, higher population enables carriers to reduce prices by 
using larger and more cost efficient aircraft (Wan et al., 2009). The estimated influence of 
population cannot be predetermined. 
The RegionalEffects variable is designed to control the unobserved regional effects in nature, 
for instance, warm weather (Morrison, 2001) or the coastal mass tourism belt in Southern 
Europe (Bramwell, 2004). Specifically, Wan et al. (2009) defined airports locating in 
“European countries on the Mediterranean Sea coast and Portugal” as vacation destinations. 
We, therefore, control routes whereby either of the two endpoints is located in Barcelona or 
Lisbon to account for regional effects. A negative relationship between regional effects and 
airfares is expected. 
Business (i.e. a traffic mix continuous variable) is measured as the proportion of passengers 
travelling for business on a HH route21. We aggregated four types of tickets (i.e., first, business, 
discount business, and premium coach) together as ‘business’ passengers because carriers have 
largely blurred the distinction among these categories of premium tickets (Lee and Luengo-
Prado, 2005). Morrison (2001) applied this variable to reflect the adoption of yield management 
techniques by airlines (i.e., charging business travelers higher fares than leisure travelers) and 
found that fares are 28 % higher on routes with 75% business travelers than comparable routes 
with 25% business travelers. The US Department of Transportation (2001) also concluded that 
high fares in hub markets can be explained by passenger mix when routes are lack of price 
competition. HH markets have a large proportion of demand coming from business travellers 
with a relatively high ‘willingness-to-pay’, making the demand curves for these markets steeper 
than is the case in respect of more price-elastic markets (Holloway, 2008). In other words, the 
price increase in HH markets may theoretically lead to a relatively small demand decline. The 
expected sign for business traffic indicator is thus positive. 
Cost variable 
                                                 
21  We use metropolitan-level data instead of airport-level data in 2008 (i.e., an earlier year) to measure 
‘BUSINESS’ in order to guarantee its independence and exogeneity, which is similar to the setting of Morrison 
(2001). 
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Distance is the non-stop distance (measured in miles) between two hubs. As distance 
increases, average fares can be expected to rise since carriers’ operating costs with regard to 
fuel, in-flight service and wages will increase (Borenstein, 1989; Windle and Dresner, 1995; 
Vowles, 2006). The expected sign for Distance is positive. 
Route structure variables 
We include two variables PP and PS to account for the ‘hub hierarchy’ effects and one 
variable AllianceRoutes to consider the impact of alliances on fares22. The expected sign for 
those variables are difficult to predetermine as discussed in the literature review. 
In order to study the interactive effect of alliances and route structure on airfares, we also 
establish two variables based on the exploratory analysis above. The 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 
dummy variable represents routes connected by two primary hubs served by carriers within the 
same alliance. As carriers operating on this type of routes may exercise certain pricing power23, 
the expected sign of this variable is positive. PS *AllianceRoutes is a dummy variable detecting 
the effects of alliance carriers serving PS routes. As the pricing power may be offset by the 
increased traffic and economies of density on this type of routes, the expected signs cannot be 
predetermined. 
The OneStop dummy variable represents routes whereby one-stop flights are also available. 
We consider a HH route with more than 1000 one-stop passengers on both directions in May, 
2009 as a competitive one-stop alternative. The influence of providing indirect service on 
airfares can be complicated. On the one hand, it may reflect carriers’ entry strategy into high-
yield routes whereby both endpoints are dominated by incumbent carriers and have a positive 
relationship with airfares. This requires the entry carriers to develop strong and competitive 
hubs capable of diverting passengers. On the other hand, a central hub enables its dominant 
carriers to provide competitive indirect flights on long-haul HH routes with strong directionality 
(i.e., North-South or South-East), and thus reduce the prices. In addition, the narrower European 
                                                 
22 In order to avoid the so-called dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2010), SS and Non-Alliance Routes are chosen 
to be the benchmark group for ‘hub hierarchy’ and ‘Alliances’, respectively, and thus not included in the model.  
23 We use dummy variables instead of market share of the leading carrier to define route dominance as it explicitly 
examines the relationship between route structure resulting from hub hierarchies and pricing. 
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market and reduced use of hub-and-spoke networks may make ‘hubbing’ insignificant on 
airfares (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). The expected sign of this variable is uncertain. 
Market structure variables 
AirportHHI is the simple average of Herfindahl indices at the two endpoints of a route. 
Researchers have found that concentration at the endpoint airports will lead to higher fares 
(Borenstein, 1989; Piga and Bachis, 2007). AirportHHI is expected to be positively associated 
with prices. 
H1 and H2 are the two components of the decomposed HHI index. As more than half of the 
European HH markets are routes where a large FSC competes with a small LCC or REC (table 
3), the market share distribution of those carriers is highly unequal. The smaller carrier is likely 
to reduce the price to maintain its presence, leading to a strong price competition between 
carriers (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). The sign of H1 is, therefore, expected to be negative. In 
a market characterized by perfect competition, higher market concentration due to a smaller 
number of carriers may increase the airfares on a route. Given that European HH markets appear 
to be imperfectly competitive, H2 may have insignificant impact on airfares.  
The LCCs dummy variable examines the impact of the presence of LCCs. LCCs are taken to 
be present in a market when they collectively have a market share larger than 1% of passengers 
in a market (Ito and Lee, 2003; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005; Windle and Dresner, 1995). The 
expected sign of this variable is negative. 
The LCCSecondary dummy variable investigates the competitive influence of LCCs at 
secondary airports. Extensive literature has proved that this variable has significant negative 
impact on airfares in US airline industry (Brueckner et al., 2013; Morrison, 2001). However, 
its impact is rarely examined and uncertain in European market. Even though FSCs in Europe 
has perceived the competitive pressure in prices from LCCs and are willing to adapt to these 
changes, their high cost structure and complex business model seems to hamper their swift 
transformation and response to the direct or adjacent competition from LCCs (Markus, 2004). 
The expected sign of this variable is uncertain. 
HST is a variable examining the competition from high-speed train in Europe. We only 
consider the direct high-speed train connections  including eight HST lines between cities where 
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hubs locate (i.e., Paris to Brussels, Amsterdam, Dusseldorf and London; Madrid to Barcelona; 
London to Brussels; Munich to Dusseldorf and Frankfurt). Competition from HSTs may reduce 
FSCs’ airfares due to shorter access time, the ability to hand large passenger volumes and better 
adaption to fluctuations in demand (Roman et al., 2007). However, Dobruszkes (2011) found 
that the ability of HSTs to compete with air transport was limited, particularly on routes with 
high flight frequency. The expected sign of this variable is, therefore, uncertain. 
3.4.2 Summary statistics of variables 
The summary statistics for all the variables are presented in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Descriptive statistics of variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Avgfare ($) 53.70  371.95  158.83  48.96  
Population (thousands) 581  5601  1985  1343  
RegionalEffects 0.00 1.00 0.24  0.43  
Business (%) 1.70  59.13  19.56  14.74  
Distance (miles) 186 1834 683.53  341.94  
PP 0.00 1.00 0.26  0.44  
PS 0.00 1.00 0.54  0.50  
AllianceRoutes 0.00 1.00 0.34  0.48  
PP*AllianceRoutes 0.00 1.00 0.08  0.27  
PS*AllianceRoutes 0.00 1.00 0.20  0.40  
OneStop 0.00 1.00 0.12  0.33  
AirportHHI  1000 4500 2200 600 
H1 0.00 0.67  0.08  0.11  
H2 0.17  1.00 0.47  0.20  
LCCs 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49  
LCCSecondary 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 
HST 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 
# obs 101 
3.4.3 The econometric methodology 
We perform a diagnostic test for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity to 
produce a robust and unbiased model. First, based on the variance inflation factor (VIF) for 
each independent variable (Baum, 2006), we do not find evidence of a multicollinearity 
problem. Second, as variables in our model are averaged, heteroskedasticity may occur in this 
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situation (Baum, 2006), and we therefore report the robust standard errors for both OLS and 
2SLS as developed by White (1980). Third, based on previous research (Borenstein, 1989; Piga 
and Bachis, 2007), we know that the AirportHHI variable may be endogenous, and we therefore 
apply a two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation method to correct this endogeneity 
problem. The instrument used in the 2SLS is the average airport HHIs in other markets, which 
is similar to the approach of Piga and Bachis (2007). It could be argued that other market 
structure variables may still confront potential endogeneity. However, it is difficult to find an 
instrument set to correct endogeneity in the airline industry given a large number of competition 
measures in the model, especially since the model already includes some route characteristics 
variables that might otherwise serve as instruments (Brueckner et al., 2013). As a result, we do 
not correct for the potential endogeneity bias of other variables.  
3.5 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.7 summarizes the regression results for the OLS and 2SLS models, whereby 9 out 
of 16 independent variables are found to be statistically significant, collectively explaining 55% 
of the price-setting of FSCs in the European HH markets. As the results for 2SLS with robust-
standard errors are more reliable, we focus on these results. 
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Table 3.7 Coefficients for the regression model 
 OLS 2SLS 
Constant 3.449***(1.122) 3.309***(1.041) 
Ln(Population) -0.083*(0.046) -0.082**(0.042) 
RegionalEffects -0.209***(0.061) -0.207***(0.056) 
Ln(Business) 0.094***(0.035) 0.095***(0.032) 
Ln(Distance) 0.189***(0.070) 0.189***(0.064) 
PP -0.012(0.098) -0.013(0.089) 
PS 0.008(0.089) 0.007(0.081) 
AllianceRoutes -0.037(0.120) -0.037(0.109) 
PP*AllianceRoutes 0.276**(0.133) 0.278**(0.121) 
PS*AllianceRoutes 0.091(0.140) 0.092(0.127) 
OneStop 0.197**(0.081) 0.199***(0.074) 
Ln(AirportHHI) 0.180**(0.087) 0.196**(0.087) 
H1 -0.667*(0.381) -0.681**(0.354) 
H2 0.045(0.116) 0.037(0.107) 
LCCs -0.093*(0.056) -0.093*(0.051) 
LCCSecondary -0.023(0.064) -0.024(0.058) 
HST -0.091(0.106) -0.091(0.096) 
R Squared 0.55 0.55 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
     *, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Demand variables 
The negative coefficient of Population indicates that carriers operating on the European HH 
routes can realize economies of scale by using larger and more cost efficient aircraft. As the 
average population increases 1% in the European HH markets, the prices are predicted to fall 
by 0.1%24. Routes centred on what are identified as predominant ‘vacation destinations’ are 
negatively related to airfares and are about 23% lower than the other routes. We also find that 
the ‘traffic mix’ is indeed a factor in the price setting of European FSCs in their HH markets. 
The estimates show that an increase of 10% in the proportion of business passengers leads to 
an increase of about 0.9% in fares charged by European FSCs. The relative small coefficient 
may reflect that business passengers may be becoming sensitive to fare (Gillen and Morrison, 
                                                 
24 When both independent and dependent variables are natural logarithmic transformed, back-transformation is 
compulsory to accurately interpret the results. The equation is ((1 + 1%)β − 1) ∗ 100% . For all the dummy 
variables, the equation applied to interpret the results is (eβ − 1) ∗ 100%. 
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2005). In the European airline markets, researchers have found that business travellers working 
for small companies are more willing to trade in-flight service, frequency and FFP points for 
lower fares than those working for larger companies (Mason, 2001), suggesting a shift of 
pricing strategies for FSCs. 
Cost variable 
Distance is positively related to the airfares as shorter routes are cheaper to run (in absolute 
terms) than longer ones. An increase of 1% in the route’s length leads to an increase of about 
0.2% in fares. The elasticity of less than one shows, however, that the airline’s cost of carrying 
a passenger does decrease in relative terms with the distance of his/her trip. 
Route structure variables 
Prices are found to be about 32% higher on primary-primary routes operated by carriers 
within the same alliance than the other routes, indicating that alliance carriers wield some 
pricing power due to reduced market competition. The insignificant influence of the other types 
of alliance routes on airfares can be explained by the less intense use of hub-and-spoke network 
in intra-European airline markets compared to the US, corroborating the findings of Giaume 
and Guillou (2004). For instance, Paris Orly (ORY) and Brussels (BRU) are de facto specialized 
switching points for African markets rather than intra-European hubs (Burghouwt and de Wit, 
2005). On the other hand, smaller airports have become more important in carrying intra-
European traffic. Piga and Bachis (2007) found that lower fares are charged by LCCs on the 
routes from their hubs such as Stansted for Ryanair due to cost advantages. 
In addition, the OneStop variable has a positive relationship with airfares, indicating that 
carriers choose high-yield routes to enter by providing one-stop flights25. Overall, prices on HH 
routes with the coexistence of nonstop and one-stop services are 22.1% higher than for the other 
routes. Lufthansa at Frankfurt and Swiss at Zurich contributed most to the transfer traffic on 
those routes due to their strong hub operations. As European FSCs gradually intensify the 
configuration of their hub-and-spoke network with less waiting time and lower routing factor, 
                                                 
25 The counterintuitive positive effect of OneStop variable found in this paper also occurred in Brueckner et al. 
(2013) and could be caused by endogeneity bias. When nonstop fares charged by FSCs are too high, other FSCs 
could provide more extensive onestop options for passengers. 
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indirect connections can become more attractive and competitive in intra-European markets 
(Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005). 
Market structure variables 
As predicted, concentration at the endpoint airports is positively associated with airfares. The 
market concentration measured as the market share inequality (H1) has a negative impact on 
fares, which contrasts with the US experience in which concentration leads to higher airfares. 
Assuming that there are two routes (i.e., route 1 and route 2) whereby each of them is served 
by three carriers, the market shares of the carriers for route 1 are 0.5, 0.25 and 0.25, whereas 
those for route 2 are 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3, respectively. In other words, the distribution of market 
shares among carriers on route 1 is more unequal than that on route 2. Based on equation 1, the 
value of H1 for route 1 (i.e., 0.063) is higher than that for route 2 (i.e., 0.01) by 0.053, implying 
that the average fares charged by FSCs on route1 is 4% (i.e., 0.053 multiplied by the coefficient 
of H1 in table 3.7) lower than that on route 2. This finding also supports the exploratory analysis 
of the market structure of European HH markets whereby 61% of routes served by FSCs 
confront competition from at least one LCC or REC. The large difference of market share forces 
the only carrier to reduce its prices to compete with FSCs. This can be explained in two aspects. 
First, when the smaller carrier such as a LCC or a REC choose not to follow the general industry 
price set by the large carrier, the latter finds it difficult to execute market power to make its 
rival ‘suffer’ due to the small size of its market share (Barla, 2000), while at the same time 
suffering losses by having to decrease its price on a large market share. These effects diminish 
as market shares converge, so that prices may decrease as the market share inequality rises. 
Second, at the same price levels, if passengers prefer the FSC with a larger capacity or a better 
service, cutting prices is likely to be the best strategy for the LCC or REC to increase its market 
share (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). 
The presence of LCCs can largely influence FSCs’ pricing decisions in the European HH 
markets. Their head-to-head competition with FSCs drives prices down by 9.7%. Finally, we 
do not find significant impact of competition from LCCs at secondary airports and HSTs on 
FSCs’ fares.   
3.6 Conclusion 
74 
 
The main purpose of this paper was to explore factors influencing the pricing of the European 
full-service carriers in the specific hub-to-hub markets. We find that five factors (i.e., route 
type, airport concentration, market share inequality, competition from low-cost carriers, and 
providing competitive one-stop alternative routings) contribute to explain the pricing in 
Europe’s HH markets. As a consequence, we conclude that through strategic alliances, FSCs in 
Europe do charge higher fares on the routes connected by their primary hubs. However this 
finding only holds for connections between primary hubs, which may be related to the fact that 
– in contrast to the US market that has a longer history of deregulation and straddles a larger 
geographic area – an extensive multi-hub-and-spoke network does not yet exist in Europe (at 
least in terms of its potential pricing consequences).  
Our finding that the market share inequality is negatively related with airfares corroborates 
the results obtained by Giaume and Guillou (2004). The specific characteristics of the European 
HH markets suggest that more new entries should be encouraged to compete with the incumbent 
FSCs. The low-cost carriers function as a main force for driving prices down in the HH markets, 
and will likely continue to influence the more extensive markets due to the enlargement of the 
European Union (i.e. the so-called ‘new Europe, new low-cost air services’ discussed by 
Dobruszkes, 2009).  
Even though nonstop HH routes generally have high barriers to enter, we find that carriers, 
such as Lufthansa and Swiss, who have established strong hubs tend to enter some routes with 
high profitability by providing one-stop routings (i.e., the positive relationship between one-
stop variable and prices). However, it is unclear how these carriers attract sufficient passengers 
to order these one-stop tickets along with sacrificing the longer travel time, given the short 
distances between airport-pairs in Europe. Future research may therefore focus on examining 
how FSCs in Europe set pricing strategies on one-stop connecting flights by considering factors 
such as, travel time, the competition from nonstop flights (Lijesen et al., 2004) and passengers’ 
willingness to pay (Garrow et al., 2007). 
Following Vowles (2006) and Zhang et al. (2013), this paper contributes to the literature in 
the field of examining pricing strategies in the hub-to-hub markets. Even though applying 
different geographical regions as empirical study, this paper confirms Zhang et al. (2013)’s 
finding that hub hierarchies characterizing route structure should be incorporated in a pricing 
model to better control inter-HH route heterogeneity. Furthermore, comparing the model and 
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results of current paper with Zhang et al. (2013) also suggests that the determinants of FSCs’ 
airfares seem to be different in the European and the US markets. First, the monopolistic effects 
on airfares diminishing as the hubs become less crucial in a carrier’s network occur in the US 
case, but not in the Europe. This may reflect the fact that a multi-hub-and-spoke network 
configuration has been deeply established by the US FSCs, while the European FSCs are still 
on their way to construct such a network practice via alliances or mergers. Second, the extent 
that LCCs’ direct presence reduces FSCs’ prices is less in Europe than in the US (9.7% versus 
49%). We also do not find a significant impact of the competition from LCCs at secondary 
airports on FSCs’ fares in Europe, which contrasts the US case.  
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Abstract  
In this paper, we outline and test an explanatory framework drawing on stochastic actor-
based modeling to understand changes in the outline of European air transport networks 
between 2003 and 2009. Stochastic actor-based models show their capabilities to estimate and 
test the effect of exogenous and endogenous drivers on network changes in this application to 
the air transport network. Our results reveal that endogenous structural effects, such as 
transitivity triads, indirect relations and betweenness effects impact the development of the 
European air transport network in the period under investigation. In addition, exogenous nodal 
and dyadic covariates also play a role, with above all the enlargement of the European Common 
Aviation Area having benefitted its new members to open more air routes between them. The 
emergence of major low-cost airline-focused airports also significantly contributed to these 
changes. We conclude by outlining some avenues for further research. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The deregulation of the air transport industry in Europe through the implementation of three 
subsequent deregulation ‘packages’ has greatly affected and transformed the entire sector. As 
a consequence, over the last decades air transport networks in Europe have undergone major 
changes in terms of structure, capacity, demand and scale.  
The structure of European airport network has evolved into a complex, multi-layered 
network consisting of hub-and-spoke and point-to-point networks (Malighetti et al., 2009). This 
mixed structure consists of a number of overlapping networks, but also and perhaps above all 
of a number of parallel networks (De Neufville, 2004). Ryanair, for instance, which is known 
to operate a point-to-point network, offers service between London, Brussels and Frankfurt via 
London/Stansted, Brussels/Charleroi, and Frankfurt/Hahn rather than through 
London/Heathrow, Brussels/Zaventem and Frankfurt/Main. In addition, air transport services 
tend to shift towards second ranked cities due to changes in global production and the use of 
smaller long-haul aircraft (O'Connor and Fuellhart, 2013; O’Connor, 2003). The 
deconcentration of air transport networks may imply opportunities for secondary airports, and 
pose challenges for large hub airports. 
Changing structures have coincided with network expansion. Burghouwt and Hakfoort 
(2001) found that the total seat capacity of European airport network has grown by 59% 
between 1990 and 1998, while the growth of intercontinental traffic and intra-European traffic 
has surpassed 70%. Fan (2006), examining intra-European flights between 1996 and 2004 
found that the number of cities served increased by 40% (from 94 to 135), while the number of 
city-pairs surged by 91% (from 224 to 428). Air travel in Europe continues to grow at a rapid 
rate, as Eurocontrol forecasts there will be 14.4 million yearly flights in Europe by 2035, which 
would be 50% more than in 2012 at a growth rate of 1.8% per year (EUROCONTROL, 2013). 
These overall figures clearly indicate that the European airport network continues to 
experience both growth and change. However, to date relatively little attention has been paid to 
the factors driving the changes in European air transport networks. Exceptions are the studies 
by Burghouwt and Hakfoort (2001) and Fan (2006). In Burghouwt and Hakfoort (2001), the 
authors investigate how the capacity of the European airport network changed over the period 
1990-1998 at the airport and the route level. Although their distinction between airport and 
route level change overcomes the drawbacks of previous empirical studies in that the nature of 
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change is better revealed, the study remains descriptive, thus largely ignoring the 
interdependence between airport (nodal) and route (dyadic) attributes. Fan (2006) provides 
more evidence on the evolution of inter-city air transport connectivity in Europe, showing for 
instance that network growth is mostly attributable to the rising importance of low-cost carriers. 
His analysis, however, does not explore other factors that may be driving the evolution of air 
transport networks in Europe.  
Taken together, it is clear that our understanding of the spatial-temporal development of 
European air transport networks can be enhanced by addressing the mechanisms of change and 
growth in a more comprehensive way. The objective of this paper is to explore and interpret the 
factors driving changes in European airport networks. To this end, we apply a stochastic actor-
based modeling (SABM) framework. To our knowledge, this is the first time that SABM is 
applied in a longitudinal analysis of air transport networks. Reviewing recent theoretical and 
empirical research suggests that SABM has indeed the potential to shed light on the processes 
underlying network dynamics (Andrew, 2009; Buchmann and Pyka, 2013; Ingold and Fischer, 
2014; Kinne, 2013; Liu et al., 2013c). The main advantages of applying SABM to examine 
network dynamics are that (1) the modeling framework encompasses a wide variety of 
endogenous and exogenous effects on network change, and (2) allows evaluating these effects 
in the spirit of statistical inference (i.e. by providing parameter estimates that allow for the 
formal testing of hypotheses regarding potential drivers of network change). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section (4.2), we discuss the 
conceptual parallels between the analysis of air transport structures and (social) network 
analysis in which SABM was developed. This is essential as one of the basic assumptions of 
SABM is that actors control and change their outgoing ties based on their and others’ attributes, 
their roles in the network and their interactions throughout the rest of the network (Snijders et 
al., 2010): unless it can be established that this assumption holds in the case of air transport 
networks, applying SABM would be a mere statistical exercise without much formative remit. 
The following sections outline the collection of longitudinal network data (4.3) and the 
methodological core of SABM (4.4). We then specify the SABM framework applied in this 
research by introducing the endogenous network and the exogenous actor and dyadic attributes 
used in the modeling (4.5), after which we discuss the main results of our analysis (4.6). In the 
final section (4.7), we present our main conclusions and outline some avenues for further 
research.  
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4.2 Air transport networks as ‘social networks’? 
4.2.1 Airports as ‘actors’ in air transport networks 
SABM has been developed in the domain of social network analysis, where ‘networks’ most 
commonly consist of interacting individuals who have the ability to exercise influence or (some 
degree of) control over their interactions. For SABM to be meaningful in other contexts, a 
discussion of how nodes or actors are able to exercise such influence is needed. In the present 
context, this entails a discussion of how airports can be considered as ‘actors’ in the 
development of airport transport networks. Of central importance in this discussion is the 
observation that the roles played by airports in the air transport value chain has changed over 
the last decades, as evidenced by their shifting operational objectives and their changing 
relationships with carriers, passengers and other airports. 
Since the mid-1980, there has been a gradual shift in the ownership structures and operational 
objectives of airports. In (admittedly overly) general terms, before the mid-1980s airports 
tended to be government-owned, and primarily (or merely) seen as “logistic medium” to serve 
regional and/or macroeconomic development. From the mid-1980s on, however, the neoliberal 
‘logic’ of privatization and commercialization has forced airports to function as  “multipoint 
service-provider firms”26 (Jarach, 2001) which focus on maximizing profitability by improving 
productive efficiency and competitiveness (Oum et al., 2006). Although this shift has been 
varied in its concrete operationalization, and has unfolded very unevenly in space and time, it 
seems fair to state that this is an overarching shift that has led airports to get more proactively 
involved as an actor in the air transport business by seeking interactions with the other key 
participants or ‘actors’ in air transport networks: carriers, passengers and other airports. 
4.2.2 Airport - carrier relationship 
Traditionally, airports and carriers worked together in a more or less stable supplier-customer 
relationship, whereby airports strived to attract a large number of carriers and provide them 
with infrastructure-related public services (e.g., air traffic control, ground-handling and other 
aviation-related activities). However, deregulation and liberalization have altered this. The most 
conspicuous examples of this changing relationship can, of course, be found in the advent and 
                                                 
26 Under this concept, an airport becomes a commercial hub, in which a bundle of diversified service propositions 
and products are offered to an enlarged category of target customers. 
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proliferation of low-cost carriers (LCCs) and the increased competitive pressures on legacy or 
full-service carriers (FSCs). With FSCs increasingly being vulnerable to potential bankruptcy, 
for instance, there was the danger of spillover effects in that this could also bring down their 
hub airports. For instance, the bankruptcies of Aloha Airlines, Skybus Airlines, and ATA 
Airlines in 2008 cost Oakland International Airport over $2 million in annual revenue due to 
losses in gate leases and landing fees (Waite, 2009). Meanwhile, LCCs have stimulated rapid 
growth at smaller airports. For example, the traffic at London Stansted languished at around 5 
million per year in its first decade (De Neufville, 2004), but it became the fastest growing major 
international airport in the world and saw a substantial passenger growth of 25.6% in 2000 
(Francis et al., 2004) after being selected as a major base for Ryanair’s operations. These 
dramatic changes have forced all airports to reexamine their relationship with carriers, with the 
former proactively and defensively participating in air transport business (Albers et al., 2005). 
Redondi et al. (2011), for instance, recently suggested that airports increasingly recommend 
new routes to carriers to improve their own network connectivity. 
In addition to the (shifting) operational relationships between airports and carriers, their 
interaction is also shaped by the wider socio-economic context and unfolding liberalization of 
the airline market. First, even though it is airlines that realize the opening or closure of routes, 
their decisions regarding the anticipated profitability are influenced by the socio-economic 
context (e.g., the economic power measured by GDP, population and other indicators) of the 
cities or catchment areas in which airports are located. And second, only in relatively liberalized 
markets carriers can freely choose to open or close a route: when shaping (de)regulation 
policies, government and airport operators consider the overall geographies of air transport 
aggregated by airports (Van De Vijver et al., 2014), and these geographies are not solely or 
always directly shaped by individual carriers. From this perspective, airports implicitly co-
determine the opening or closure of routes.  
4.2.3 Airport - passenger relationship 
Paralleling the changing ownership structure of airports and their shifting relations with 
carriers, airports also seek to transform their associations with passengers from an indirect 
airport - airline - passenger relationship to a more direct airport - passenger relationship (Francis 
et al., 2004). The most straightforward example is that some airports now try to sell tickets to 
passengers themselves, thus confronting airlines, tour operators and travel agents who 
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historically controlled this business (Jarach, 2001). A very visible example of the changed role 
of airports in their relation with passengers has been Stansted’s “Create your own connection” 
project, which helps passengers to ‘self-hub’ by taking advantage of its enormous potential for 
indirect connections (Malighetti et al., 2008). As independent, profit-seeking players in the air 
transport market they also tend to place more and more emphasis on passenger revenues that 
are not strictly air transport-related, such as spending in the terminals and car parks.  
4.2.4 Airport - airport relationship 
The relation between airports has transformed from being relatively independent entities into 
a closer relationship with cooperation and competition coexisting. On the one hand, cooperation 
can be expressed as opening a route between two airports to increase each other’s accessibility. 
Connection modes (i.e., direct or indirect) can be varied between different levels of airports 
(i.e., ‘hierarchy’ of airports) emerging from (regional) economic development and individual 
airline network strategies (Burghouwt, 2007; Zhang et al., 2013). For instance, large hub 
airports tend to attract more direct connections than non-hub airports by reducing waiting time, 
routing and other related factors (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005), while small airports in Europe 
strive to connect to a hub airport to indirectly reach more destinations or attract LCC services 
to have direct connections (Pels, 2008). On the other hand, and contrary to the conventional 
view that airports were monopoly providers of services to both airlines and passengers, airport 
markets in Europe are increasingly competitive in nature. In particular, they are likely to 
compete to each other in terms of local markets, connecting traffic, destinations and even cargo 
traffic (Tretheway and Kincaid, 2010). In particular, it is worth noting that secondary airports 
in Europe have shown to be intense competition for the major airports (Forsyth, 2010). 
This overview suggests that airports are no longer the passive bystanders they used to be: 
they are increasingly becoming major actors in the air transport networks. Indeed, the 
underlying logic of profit-maximization and revenue-generation leads them to actively alter 
and manipulate their relations with other major actors in the airline business (carriers, 
passengers, and each other). Although clear not exactly the same as individuals managing their 
position in inter-personal (social) networks, we believe the resemblance is strong enough to 
explore the potential of methods devised in the context of social network analysis to explore 
the networks connecting airports. In particular, we focus on the application of a modeling 
framework that allows understanding how networks change over time: SABM. 
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4.3 Data collection 
In this section, we introduce the data collection based on the requirements of SABM in terms 
of the number of observation moments, the number of actors, and the total number of changes 
between consecutive observations. 
We examine changes in the European air transport network between 2003 and 2009. This 
seven-year timespan guarantees the assumption of SABM that the total number of changes 
between two observations should not be too high or too low, as shown in table 4.1 and discussed 
below. If the total number of changes between consecutive observations is too high, this may 
violate the assumption that the network changes gradually. If, in turn, the total number of 
changes is too small, then SABM cannot provide enough information for estimating the 
parameters (Snijders et al., 2010)27.  
In terms of collection of actor (airport) information, we first confine the geographical scope 
of our research as countries that signed European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreements 
before 2009. This includes all 27 EU members, alongside Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and 
Serbia. In this ECAA, we selected the 120 airports serving more than 150,000 passengers in 
2009 (i.e., the total number of the local origin, destination and transit passengers)28. Figure 4.1 
shows the location of airports used in this study. Unsurprisingly, countries with a higher gross 
domestic product (GDP), a larger population, and a wider geographical extent tend to have more 
airports in the framework. 
                                                 
27 Even though the air transport industry experienced the single largest 21st century decline between the two 
observation points of 2003 and 2009 due to the SARS epidemic and economic downturn (MacDonald, 2011), 
SABM seems capable of capturing the network change mechanisms between the two observations. 
28 This paper only considers airports where their located cities have a high global network connectivity (GNC) 
index (Neal, 2012). Some tourist destinations in Italy or Spain may, therefore, not be included in the analysis. 
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Figure 4.1 Location of airports in Europe 
Drawing on this airport list, we constructed the network data that serves as the dependent 
variable in the model: two binary adjacency matrices representing the presence or absence of 
direct connections between airport pairs. The European air transport network in this analysis is 
a binary, non-directed and one-mode network. To achieve this, we collected data at the route 
level from Sabre Airline Solutions’ Airport Data Intelligence (ADI), which contains 
information on actual connection between two airports (i.e., an airport pair directly connected 
by a commercial carrier). In order to obtain meaningful entries, we deleted routes with less than 
100 passengers per year.  
To obtain meaningful estimation results, SABM also provide quantitative indicators to 
measure the total number of tie changes between two consecutive observations. The Jaccard 
index is used to guarantee the gradual change of the networks, which is calculated as 
𝑁11 (𝑁11 + 𝑁01 + 𝑁10)⁄ , where 𝑁11, 𝑁01 and 𝑁10 are the number of maintained ties, new ties 
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and broken ties. Drawing on experience with the SABMs, the value of the Jaccard index should 
preferably be above 0.3 (Snijders et al., 2010). Table 4.1 shows that our data results in a Jaccard 
index of 0.573, which implies that the underlying network-formation process can be modeled 
through SABM. Over the period from 2003 to 2009, the majority of the possible routes start by 
being absent and ended up so (0 → 0). About 18 percent significant connections remained 
unchanged, while 9 percent and 4 percent of routes were opened or canceled, respectively. The 
density of the network increased slightly and the average degree likewise also saw growth 
during the study period. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive network statistics and tie changes between the two periods 
Statistic 2003 2009 
Nodes 120 120 
Density 0.216   0.268 
Average degree 25.717  31.917 
Existing ties 1543    1915 
   
Changes 2003 → 2009  
Jaccard index 0.573  
No tie: 0 → 0  4941 (69%)  
New tie: 0 → 1 656 (9%)  
Broken tie: 1 → 0 284 (4%)  
Maintained tie: 1 → 1 1259 (18%)  
 
4.4 Stochastic actor-based models 
This paper employs stochastic actor-based models (SABMs) to examine the drivers of the 
air transport network change summarized in the previous section. Since their introduction for 
network dynamics by Snijders (1995) and his colleagues, SABMs have been widely applied in 
various fields, ranging from friendship networks (Cheadle et al., 2013) to inter-organizational 
networks (Liu et al., 2013a; Liu et al., 2013c; Van de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007), 
manufacturing networks (Buchmann and Pyka, 2013), political networks (Andrew, 2009; 
Kinne, 2013), and many other areas. However, to date this approach has not been applied to air 
transport networks, probably in part because of the high requirements in terms of availability 
of longitudinal network data, which has been a longstanding limitation to analyze the changes 
of transportation networks using statistical analysis tools (Xie and Levinson, 2009).  
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In the following paragraphs, we briefly summarize the basic mechanism of this approach. 
SABMs combine continuous time Markov models, random utility models and simulation 
techniques to analyze network dynamics (Van de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007). First, the 
models assume that network changes are time-continuous and decompose changes into 
unobserved ministeps, in each of which an actor creates a new tie, terminates an existing tie, or 
does nothing at all (Fischer et al., 2012), even though network changes are only observed at two 
or more discrete moments in time. The process is conceptualized as a Markov process, implying 
that for any point in time the probability distribution of the future network, given current and 
past states of the network, is only a function of the current network (Snijders et al., 2010). 
Second, the models consider the development of a network over time to be the result of the 
purposeful, utility-maximizing choices of individual actors (Kinne, 2013). Actors weigh the 
different options for network change by considering the current network structure (network 
effects), actors’ attributes (actor covariates) and properties of pairs of actors (dyadic covariates) 
as expressed by an objective function (Snijders et al., 2010). Third, very much as in 
‘conventional’ statistical procedures, SABMs are capable of estimating and testing parameters 
in order to assess the effect of a given mechanism, while controlling for the possible 
simultaneous operation of other mechanisms (Snijders et al., 2010). This means that the iterative 
Markov chain is treated as a Monte Carlo algorithm to draw up expected values, which are then 
confronted with the observed values. A method of moments is then adopted to estimate 
parameters by minimizing the difference between the observed and expected values (Snijders, 
2001). Convergence is checked by assessing deviations in the simulated network statistics from 
their targeted or observed values (Ruth M. Ripley et al., 2013). SABMs can thus test hypotheses 
as in conventional statistical models by calculating t-statistics from estimated coefficients and 
standard errors. Note that SABMs do not make any assumptions about whether the first 
observed network is in a long-term (dynamic) equilibrium and thus do not model the first 
observed network itself but only use it as the starting point of the simulations (Snijders et al., 
2010), so that results should not be interpreted as increases or decreases over time, but simply 
as non-random tendencies through time (Ingold and Fischer, 2014). In other words, quite 
opposite results would be obtained if one models and makes inferences about the first observed 
network. For instance, if the first observed network shows a strong transitivity effect, this does 
not mean that the extent of transitivity effect in the network will increase or sustain in the future. 
It would be possible that no transitivity exist in the longitudinal SABM approach where the first 
observed network is not modeled at all.   
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The so-called objective function is the core of the model, and determines the probabilities of 
the tie changes made by the actors (Snijders et al., 2010). The dependent variables in the model 
are the changes in tie variables derived from the 𝑛 × 𝑛 adjacency matrix 𝑥 = (𝑥𝑖𝑗), where 𝑛 is 
the total number of actors, and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is either 1 (i.e., presence of a tie) or 0 (i.e., absence of a tie). 
The objective function is assumed to be a linear combination of a set of network effects: 
𝑓𝑖(𝑥
0, 𝑥, 𝑣, 𝑤) = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑠𝑘𝑖(𝑥
0, 𝑥, 𝑣, 𝑤)𝑘                                                                       (1) 
Where, 𝑖 is the focal actor, 𝑓𝑖 is the value of the objective function for actor 𝑖 depending on 
the current state 𝑥0, a potential future state 𝑥 of the network (i.e., structural or endogenous 
effects), as well as on actor attributes 𝑣 and dyadic attributes 𝑤 (i.e. covariates or exogenous 
effects). The functions 𝑠𝑘𝑖 define effects that may potentially drive the changes of network from 
the perspective of actor 𝑖 and the weights 𝛽𝑘 are the statistical parameters that express dynamic 
tendencies of network evolution. If 𝛽𝑘 equals 0, the corresponding effect plays no role in the 
network dynamics; if 𝛽𝑘 is positive, there will be a higher probability that the network moves 
towards the direction with a high score on the corresponding network effect 𝑠𝑘𝑖 , and the 
converse if 𝛽𝑘 is negative (Snijders et al., 2010).  
Because we treat the European air transport network as a non-directed network, we chose to 
implement the actor-based ‘unilateral initiative and reciprocal confirmation’ model (Snijders, 
2011; Van de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007). In this model, one airport takes the initiative and 
decides to create a route to another airport based on the expected utility. The other airport then 
has to confirm this change, equally based on the expected utility. Note that for termination of a 
link this is not required (Ruth M. Ripley et al., 2013). This is a reflection of reality, as opening 
a new route requires mutual agreement between two airports, while termination only requires 
one airport to act. In the next section, we outline the different endogenous (structural) and 
exogenous (actor and dyadic) effects implemented in our model. 
4.5 Model specification 
We introduce the main effects in the objective function and the implications of the statistical 
parameters in the context of the air transport network. We include four endogenous network 
effects (i.e., density, number of distances two, betweenness and transitivity triads)29 and four 
                                                 
29 These four network effects correspond to nonstop route, one-stop route, hubbing and interconnected subgroup 
consisting of air transport network in practice.  
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exogenous effects (i.e., two actor covariates and two dyadic covariates reflecting the 
liberalization of air transport in Europe). The selection of the four endogenous network effects 
is based on the literature studying air transport networks using complex network theory 
whereby the classic metrics, such as degree distribution, clustering coefficient (i.e., transitivity 
commonly used in social sciences), length of shortest path and betweenness have been applied 
to explore the characteristics of air transport networks (Barrat et al., 2004; Boccaletti et al., 
2014; Boccaletti et al., 2006; Ducruet and Beauguitte, 2014; Guimera and Amaral, 2004; Liu 
et al., 2013b; Zanin and Lillo, 2013). 
4.5.1 Structural effects 
Density effect 
The most basic effect is defined by the density of airport i, which captures the tendency of 
airport i to connect to other airports during the period under investigation. As we are dealing 
with a non-directed network, in-degree and out-degree effects are combined into an overall 
degree or density effect. 
𝑆1𝑖(𝑋) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗                                                                                                (2) 
A positive value for the density parameter suggests that airports tend to open more routes; a 
negative value for the density parameter suggests that airports tend to have fewer routes. 
Snijders et al. (2010) suggest that this effect should be included in all models, and  basically 
serves as a baseline parameter that can be compared with the intercept in a conventional linear 
regression (Liu et al., 2013c). From a decision-theoretic perspective, this parameter can be 
regarded as the overall balance between benefits and costs of an actor (Snijders et al., 2010). 
For instance, a negative parameter could mean that the costs outweigh the benefits, and vice 
versa. 
Transitivity closure effect 
The transitivity triads effect assesses the tendency of two airports j and h to become 
connected if both airports share a common ‘partner’ (airport i) in the network. It is defined as 
the number of transitive patterns in i’s relations.  
𝑆2𝑖(𝑋) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑥𝑗ℎ𝑗<ℎ                                                                                    (3) 
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A positive sign suggests that airports connecting to the same ‘partner’ airport are more likely 
to initiate a new route compared to other airports that do not have a ‘partner’ in common. For 
example, the more airports A directly connect that also choose to connect to airport B, the more 
likely airport A will connect to B directly over time. A negative sign indicates that airports 
connecting to the same airport are less likely to form closed triangles than other airports that do 
not have a ‘partner’ in common.  
Number of distances two effect 
Number of distances two effect (nbrDist2) takes into account indirect connections between 
actors, which is defined by the number of actors 𝑗 to whom 𝑖 is indirectly related through at 
least one intermediary node (i.e., at geodesic distance two).  
𝑆4𝑖(𝑋) = #{𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0, 𝑚𝑎𝑥ℎ(𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑥ℎ𝑗) > 0}                                                                      (4) 
A positive sign for this effect suggests that airports prefer to open indirect routes connecting 
other airports through an intermediary airport, whereas the negative nbrDist2 effect indicates 
that airport A is more likely to directly connect to airport B, given that airport A’s ‘neighbor’ 
airport C directly connected to airport B (and regardless of any other indirect connection to 
airport B). Note that although both the transitivity closure effect and nbrDist2 effect pertain to 
the formation of triadic relationships, they differ in that the former is dependent on the number 
of indirect connections, whereas the latter is independent of the number of indirect connections. 
Betweenness effect 
The betweenness effect measures the number of pairs of actors (𝑗, ℎ) that are indirectly linked 
by actor 𝑖 . A positive sign indicates the tendency that airports prefer to be in between 
disconnected airports and are more likely to function as ‘transfer’ centers. A negative sign 
suggests that airports are less likely to be in between disconnected airports over time.  
𝑆3𝑖(𝑋) = ∑ 𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑥ℎ𝑗)𝑗,ℎ                                                                                 (5) 
4.5.2 Actor covariates 
ECAA Enlargement 
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Aiming at establishing a single European ‘sky’ to facilitate better air transport services for 
consumers, the European Commission initiated a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA). 
The ECAA grants its members more freedom to set prices, capacity or frequency. The fifteen 
Member States of the European Union (EU) plus Iceland and Norway were part of the ECAA 
in 2000, with Switzerland joining in 2002. During the period under investigation, the 
enlargement of the ECAA coupled with the extension of the EU in two rounds has resulted in 
significant increases in air traffic and the number of routes and carriers (Niemeier et al., 2012). 
In 2004, eight East European countries (i.e., Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Slovenia and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) joined the EU, 
followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In addition, the successful negotiation with several 
Balkan countries (i.e., Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro 
and Kosovo) to join the ECAA in 2006 again stimulated the development of the European 
aviation market. Dobruszkes (2009) found that low-cost carriers (LCCs) in Europe greatly 
benefited from the extension of the liberalization of the European skies to the new EU Member 
States, as their seats supply doubled between 2004 and 2008. The number of city-pairs 
connecting airports in the established member states to the new ones also showed a significant 
increase (i.e., from 21 in 2004 to 285 in 2008). We include a dummy variable called ‘ECAA 
enlargement’ to explicitly control for the contribution of the enlargement of the ECAA to the 
dynamics of European airport network during this period. This variable is coded as ‘1’ if an 
airport is located in countries that were not a part of the EU or the ECAA in 2003, and we 
expect a positive effect for this parameter.  
LCC bases  
It is known that the liberalization of air transport in Europe has led to the dramatic rise of the 
importance of (a new generation of) low-cost carriers. LCCs are responsible for a large portion 
of the dramatic increase of intra-European inter-city connectivity, and have above all impacted 
the connectivity of ‘smaller’ cities between 1996 and 2004. (Fan, 2006) found that, in 2004, 
60% of the city-pairs exclusively serviced by LCCs were operated out of secondary and tertiary 
cities, while 51% did not involve a primary city at all. Dobruszkes (2006) equally found that 
more than half of the growth of the supply available in terms of seats was directly due to LCC 
operations between 1995 and 2004, benefiting both the larger, main cities (such as London, 
Madrid and Milan) and secondary cities whose growth and survival are largely dependent on 
LCCs. Collectively, these studies reveal that the emergence of LCC bases is likely to be a major 
95 
 
driving force in the evolution of the airport network in Europe. We control for this effect by 
introducing a dummy variable called ‘LCC bases’. In general, LCC bases are defined as airports 
with significant presence of LCCs in terms of seats or flights, combining two lists developed 
by Dobruszkes (2006) and the Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) (2011), 
respectively30.  
4.5.3 Dyadic covariates 
Former ECAA members – Former ECAA members   
We include two exogenous dyadic covariates in our model. The variable ‘Former ECAA 
members – Former ECAA members’ tests the hypothesis that there is a higher propensity to 
create ties between the former ECAA members. 
Former ECAA members – New ECAA members 
The variable ‘Former ECAA members – New ECAA members’ tests the hypothesis that 
there is a higher propensity to open new routes between the former ECAA members and the 
new ECAA members as a result of the enlargement of the ECAA and the EU. 
4.6 Results and discussion 
4.6.1 Model tests and goodness-of-fit 
As the data and model structures for actor-based models are complicated even in the simplest 
cases and estimating these models are time-consuming, stepwise procedures combining forward 
steps (where model selection starts with a simple model and effects are gradually added to the 
model) with backward steps (where model selection starts with a complicated model including 
all effects that are expected to be strong and non-significant effects are then deleted) are used 
to select model (Snijders et al., 2007). However, forward model selection is technically and 
practically preferable to backward model selection due to better convergence and faster 
computation time. Wald and score-type tests are applied to determine whether individual or 
various effects should be included in the model based on the (joint) significance of parameters 
                                                 
30 The LCC bases included in this paper are BCN, BFS, BGY, BRS, CGN, CRL, DUB, DUS, EDI, EMA, FCO, 
GLA, GVA, HHN, KRK, LGW, LPL, LTN, MAD, MAN, MXP, NCE, NYO, ORY, OSL, RIX, STN, STR, SXF, 
VIE, VLC. 
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(Ruth M. Ripley et al., 2013)31. Moreover, we also assess the goodness-of-fit of the model by 
comparing degree distribution, geodesic distances distribution and the triad census of networks 
simulated from the estimated model with the observed networks (Liu et al., 2013c; Ruth M. 
Ripley et al., 2013). A satisfactory fit is achieved when the observed values are within a band 
which is a 90% relative frequency region calculated for the simulated values. The p-value (i.e., 
larger than 0.10) based on a test of Mahalanobis’ distance also shows that the simulated 
networks can well replicate features of the observed data that are not part of the model. 
We report the results of five intermediate model specifications: model 1 is the null model 
only including the density effect; model 2 accounts for endogenous structural effects only; 
model 3 also considers the effect of ECAA enlargement, while model 4 incorporates the impacts 
of LCC bases; and finally, model 5 also includes the two dyadic covariates and, therefore 
establishes a full set of potential endogenous and exogenous effects driving the changes outline 
of the European air transport between 2003 and 2009. We present the parameter estimates for 
each of the five models in table 4.2. Simulation runs implemented in the SIENA program based 
on the R platform (Ruth M. Ripley et al., 2013) have been repeated 2000 times. As the t-ratios 
indicating the deviation of observed network data from simulated values are less than 0.1 in all 
five models, our results exhibit good convergence.  
The significance of Score-type tests for models 2-5 suggests improvements in model fit, as 
new network statistics and actor and dyadic covariates are progressively added into the models. 
Wald-type tests for joint significance also create statistically significant values for models 2-5, 
meaning that the changes of the air transport network is influenced by the factors introduced in 
section 4.5. The violin plots in figure 4.2 show that the full model 5 is fitted well as the observed 
data are within the 90% band and the p-values are larger than 0.10. 
                                                 
31 The difference between the Wald test and the score-type test is that the former is based on the parameter 
estimates and thereby integrates estimating and testing, whereas the latter tests a parameter without estimating it. 
97 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
98 
 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.2 Goodness of Fit of Model: (a) Outdegree distribution, (b) Geodesic Distribution, 
(c) Triad Census 
Note: The goodness of fit of the model is represented by ‘violin plots’ in which the red solid line shows 
the observed values and the box plots and ‘violins’ show the simulated network. 
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Table 4.2 Simulation results  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Rate parameter 19.609*** 
(0.845) 
19.871*** 
(0.852) 
19.745*** 
(0.834) 
18.648*** 
(0.733) 
13.476*** 
(0.483) 
Density -0.706*** 
(0.039) 
-0.844*** 
(0.090) 
-0.958*** 
(0.134) 
-0.710*** 
(0.087) 
-0.693*** 
(0.110) 
Transitive triads  0.060*** 
(0.003) 
0.060*** 
(0.003) 
0.053*** 
(0.003) 
0.062*** 
(0.004) 
Number of distances two  -0.039*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.046*** 
(0.010) 
-0.051*** 
(0.014) 
Betweenness  0.011*** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
0.006  
(0.004) 
0.010  
(0.006) 
ECAA Enlargement 
 
  0.359*** 
(0.093) 
0.508*** 
(0.089) 
0.472*** 
(0.101) 
LCC bases  
 
   0.823*** 
(0.075) 
0.949*** 
(0.091) 
Former ECAA members – 
Former ECAA members   
 
    -1.104** 
(0.531) 
Former ECAA members – 
New ECAA members 
 
    -0.940*  
(0.556) 
Tests      
Score-type  2181.627*** 
df = 3  
19.0841**
* df = 1 
124.695**
* df=1  
4.9516*   
df= 2 
Wald  16.6***  
df=3  
14.9*** 
df=1  
119*** 
df=1 
4.925*  
df=2  
Note: Standard errors are within parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
4.6.2 Parameter interpretation 
For the interpretation of the numerical values of the estimated parameters, log odds ratios, 
which are similar to multinomial logistic regression, can be computed. The estimate for a given 
covariate is the log odds ratio of the respective probabilities that one actor will choose one 
particular tie over another, given that the only difference between the two ties is a one-unit 
change in the covariate of interest (Kinne, 2013; Snijders et al., 2010). Exponentiating the 
estimates thus yields odds ratios. 
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For each model, the rate parameter represents the frequency or the expected average number 
of opportunities of tie changes by each actor per micro time step. For instance, model 5 suggests 
that the expected number of changes of network ties for an airport is about 14. 
Model 1 is the null model and only includes the basic density effect. The density effect 
benchmarks the overall tendency for airports to launch new routes. The significant and negative 
density parameter indicates that airports had a low propensity to make (random) connections to 
other airports in this period - a probability of 33% [𝑒−0.706/(𝑒−0.706 + 1)]. The density effect 
is significant and negative in all five models. 
Conditional on the density effect in model 1, model 2 includes three other endogenous 
network parameters (i.e., three triadic closure effects: transitive triplets, number of actors at 
distance two and betweenness). The positive transitive triplets effect postulates that more 
intermediaries will add proportionately to the tendency to transitive closure (Snijders et al., 
2010). Numerically, if a potential route ij closes one more triad than an alternative route, then, 
ceteris paribus, the odds of the route ij being created is greater by a factor of 1.062 (𝑒0.060), or 
about 6.2%. European airports tend to form cohesive and interconnected triadic subgroups for 
several reasons. First, hub airports have the tendency to form “trunk traffic triplet” to lower 
costs on inter-hub routes (O'Kelly, 1998; O’Kelly, 2014; O’Kelly et al., 2014). Second, 
connecting with other hub airports can also improve the accessibility to the rest of their network. 
In particular, if the dominant carriers of those hubs have incentives to join in strategic alliances, 
then the inter-hub routes can benefit from higher frequencies and better coordination of time 
schedules (Doganis, 2006; Zhang et al., 2014). For instance, the strategic integration of the 
major Austrian and Swiss airports into the ‘sub-group’ led by Frankfurt airport may contribute 
to the network closure (Malighetti et al., 2009). In addition, some small airports tend to connect 
to each other via point-to-point low-cost services, leading to a larger percentage of formation 
of closed triplets (Malighetti et al., 2009; Redondi et al., 2013). 
Number of distances two effect takes into account indirect connections between airports. The 
significant and negative sign of this effect further confirms the tendency toward network 
closure. All other effects being equal, if airport A has one more one-stop route, the probability 
for airport A to open an additional direct route in the future is 49% [𝑒−0.039/(𝑒−0.039 + 1)]. 
This indicates that keeping connected with the other airports, even through a one-stop route is 
important for airport managers to increase their airports’ connectivity, especially for small 
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airports located in remote areas. For instance, Burghouwt (2007) found that a substantial 
number of small airports that lost direct air service was partially compensated by an increase in 
the number of one-stop connections through other airline hubs and traffic nodes. 
The significant and positive betweenness parameter suggests that airports have a tendency to 
occupy ‘broker’ positions in the network, allowing them to connect two airports that are not 
directly linked. If airport A has one more pair of airports that are indirectly linked by it than 
airport B, then ceteris paribus, the odds that airport A opening a new route is higher than airport 
B by a factor of 1.011 (𝑒0.011), or slightly by 1.1%. This corresponds to the practice of ‘hub-
and-spoke’ network configuration by full-service carriers in Europe32. Moreover, airports with 
low domestic air-services, such as a number of airports located in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Switzerland, Lithuania and Belgium, often function as the intermediary points to 
connect airports of Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe, represented by Brussels and 
Geneva airport (Malighetti et al., 2009).  
Model 3 adds the first nodal covariate “ECAA Enlargement” into model 2 and the result 
confirms our expectation that the enlargement of the ECAA has benefited the new joint 
members to open more new air routes. All other effects being equal, being the member of the 
ECAA increases the odds to open a new route by 43.2% [(𝑒0.359 − 1) *100%]. The significance 
and sign of structural effects in model 2 remains the same. 
Model 4 incorporates the second nodal covariate “LCC bases,” and the result shows that the 
major LCC airports have tended to add a large number of new routes into their networks, overall 
significantly driving the changing structure of the European air transport network. For instance, 
being a LCC-airport has a higher probability by 69.5% [𝑒0.823/(𝑒0.823 + 1)] to open a new 
route. The significance and sign of parameters in model 3 remains the same, except that the 
betweenness effect becomes insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that the impact of 
the major LCC airports on changes of European airport network is so dramatic that the effect 
of some airports playing bridging roles on network dynamics can be neglected. In addition, the 
major LCC airports were affected less than the hub airports given the recent economic crisis 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that betweenness used to define ‘hubs’ here only shows their spatial characteristics, but not 
the temporal properties (e.g., the adoption of the wave-system structures to coordinate inbound and outbound 
flights (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; O’Kelly, 2010)).  
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(Dobruszkes and Van Hamme, 2011), which may make the latter taking more conservative 
strategy to expand their networks. 
Model 5 incorporates the two dyadic covariates into the model. The negative effects of those 
two dyadic covariates may largely due to the recent economic crisis and they only show 
marginally significant effects (i.e., the p-values are 0.04 and 0.09, respectively). Dobruszkes 
and Van Hamme (2011) found that most airports in Europe faced a stagnation or decline in air 
supply in terms of number of seats during the recent economic crisis corresponding to the 
decrease of demand. Opening a new route seems to be risky and difficult for airlines to adapt 
to the economic decline due to long negotiation time and high costs. All the other parameters 
for endogenous network effects and the two exogenous actor covariates maintain their 
significance and sign as in model 4.  
4.6.3 Discussion 
This section discusses how the results obtained from SABM can benefit airport operators, 
carriers and local governments. First, we design a toy network to illustrate how the coefficients 
in table 3 can be applied in practice (Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3 Toy network 
Given the estimated coefficients, the objective function for opening a new route is33: 
                                                 
33 For simplicity, we assume that airport A neither locates in a country being a new ECAA member nor a LCC 
base. In this way, the objective function only includes the four network effects. 
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𝑓𝑖(𝑥) = ∑ (−0.693𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 0.062𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑥𝑗ℎ − 0.051𝑚𝑎𝑥ℎ(𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑥ℎ𝑗) + 0.01𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑥ℎ𝑗)𝑗,ℎ )         
(6) 
Taking airport A as an example, Figure 4.3(1) shows its initial network state. If airport A 
plans to enlarge its network and opens only one new route with three alternatives among airport 
B, D and E, then the objective function above can be used to calculate and compare the cost of 
opening a new route for these three cases shown in Figure 4.3 (2)-(4). For instance, the cost of 
connecting to airport B is: −0.693 ∗ 2 + 0.062 ∗ 1 − 0.051 ∗ 1 + 0.01 ∗ 0 = −1.375. Table 
4.3 presents the number of network structures and cost for each case and suggests that airport 
A would choose to connect to B (given that B also ‘agrees’) due to less costs. This means that 
airport A tends to deploy a more cohesive network strategy as forming interconnected subgroup 
may reduce costs. 
Table 4.3 Costs to airport A when considering a new route 
Case 
Number of Network Structures 
Cost 
Degree 
Transitivity 
Triads 
NbrDist2 Betweenness 
Initial network state for airport A 
(1) 
1 0 1 0 -0.744 
Connect to airport B (2) 2 1 1 1 -1.365 
Connect to airport D (3) 2 0 1 1 -1.427 
Connect to airport E (4) 2 0 1 1 -1.427 
 
Taken together, stakeholders such as airport operators, local governments and carriers can 
use the proposed model to assist in shaping network strategies. For airport operators, they can 
decide which airport to connect in the future by comparing the costs or utilities of different 
network ‘states’ given their existing networks. As the model allows adding exogenous actor 
and/or dyadic covariates, local governments can make corresponding policies based on the 
current results. For instance, the probability of opening a route between a former ECAA 
member and a new ECAA member is very low (i.e., 28% and the parameter is only marginally 
significant). Local governments and ECAA committees may thus consider devising more 
liberalized policies to encourage new entries. In addition, carriers can decide whether to take a 
conservative network expansion strategy or aggressive network expansion strategy based on 
the overall change of the air transport network. For instance, this paper finds that airports had 
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a low propensity to make new connections and the air transport network in Europe tend to be 
more cohesive and interconnected. This implies that it may be costly to open new routes. 
Therefore, carriers with high cost structure may consider taking a conservative network 
expansion strategy, but focusing on improving the efficiency of the current network. 
4.7 Conclusion 
To date, there has been little explicit research on the mechanisms driving the evolution of air 
transport networks. This paper has attempted to contribute to this under-researched topic by 
examining how stochastic actor-based modeling, a methodology drawn from the field of 
longitudinal social network analysis, may contribute to this stream of research. Compared to 
simpler forms of network analysis, SABM has four distinct advantages. First, simply measuring 
and comparing number of routes, density, betweenness and other network indicators at two 
different points in time can only show that the airport network increases or decreases in terms 
of these measures. However, it cannot verify whether these indicators significantly drive the 
changes (i.e., adding or deleting a route) of a specific network. Second, simple network analysis 
cannot control the influence of other factors on the network changes (i.e., the so-called “all 
other things being equal” effect in statistics). Third, the SABM can not only find out which 
factors affect network changes, but also quantify to what extent they change. Odds or binary 
probability can be used to interpret the results. And fourth and finally, the objective function of 
SABM based on the estimated parameters can help airports choose which airport to connect in 
the future by comparing the cost or utility of different network ‘states’. 
The empirical specifics of this study were drawn from data on changes in the European air 
transport market (for passengers) between 2003 and 2009. Drawing on the SABM framework, 
we considered four endogenous structural effects (i.e., outdegree, transitive triads, number of 
distances two and betweenness), two exogenous actor covariates (i.e., the ECAA enlargement 
and LCC bases), as well as two dyadic covariates regarding the opening of new air services 
between former and new ECAA members.  
During this period, airports in Europe showed a low tendency to open new connections. As 
indicated by the positive transitive triads effect and the negative number of distances two effect, 
the European airport network has a tendency toward network closure, implying the formation 
of several cohesive and interconnected triadic subgroups. This corroborates the finding of 
Malighetti et al. (2009) that subsystems (or modules) of high interconnectivity exist within the 
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European airport network. In addition, the slightly positive betweenness effect means that 
airports in Europe tend to ‘stand’ between two indirectly connected airports, corresponding to 
the development of ‘hubs’ in the ‘hub-and-spoke’ network configuration by full-service carriers 
in Europe, even though this effect is offset when controlling for the impact of growing LCC 
bases. The positive transitive triplets effect representing network closure and cohesiveness and 
the positive betweenness effect representing the opposite network concentration and sparseness 
provide explicit evidence that a multi-layered network in which hub-and-spoke network 
structure and point-to-point network structure are melted together (Dennis, 2005; Goedeking, 
2010), suggesting that the trade-off game between these two types of network structures seems 
to continue in the future. 
Moreover, the enlargement of the ECAA plays a crucial role in driving the changes of airport 
network in Europe and has benefited the new members to open more new air routes. The major 
LCC airports also significantly contribute to the changes in the European air transport network. 
Finally, the recent economic crisis starting from 2007 may hinder European carriers’ strategies 
to expand services between the former ECAA members and the new ECAA members or within 
each group.  
Although we uncover the determinants of evolution of airport network in the pattern of 
statistical analysis rather than the descriptive level analysis in the previous literature, our model 
can be improved in the following aspects. First, more observation time points need to be 
collected between 2003 and 2009. For instance, we could collect data in 2005 to investigate the 
potential different impacts of EU enlargement or in 2007 to establish separate models for 2003 
- 2007 and 2007 - 2009 to control for the influences on network changes before and after the 
current economic crisis. When handling data with three or more time periods, the issue whether 
parameters are constant across the periods should be considered. For instance, if the 
development of average degree does not follow a smooth curve, time-varying variables should 
be included or separate models should be established to capture time heterogeneity in model 
parameters (Snijders et al. 2010). In this way, the two dyadic covariates may reveal different 
results. Second, as stochastic actor-based models for non-directed networks become more and 
more capable of incorporating interaction terms, we could test whether the network closure is 
a result of inter-hub connection due to the alliance formation or the adoption of point-to-point 
network structure of LCCs. Third, more control variables, such as the market power of airports, 
could also be included to create a more profound model. Finally, SABM is currently limited to 
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binary network ties, so data consisting of valued ties (e.g., a continuous measure of strength of 
ties) had to be dichotomized for using this method. Although choosing an arbitrary cutoff value 
for dichotomization may affect results in general, our dataset consisting of the actual booking 
information of origin and destination guarantees the ‘real’ presence or absence of the ties. 
Appendix 
The appendix shows the mathematical expressions of stochastic actor-based model (SABM) 
summarized from Snijders (2011) which can be consulyed by readers for detailed information. 
The SABM combines continuous time Markov models, random utility models and simulation 
techniques to analyze network dynamics (Van de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007).  
Let us assume a network consists of a set of nodes {1, 2, … , 𝑛} and tie indicator variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗 
which has the value 1 or 0 depending on whether there exists a tie between node 𝑖 and node 𝑗. 
A particular relization of the network is denoted by lower case 𝑥. Observation time points are 
indicated by 𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑀 with 𝑀 ≥ 2. Given a time point 𝑡𝑚 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑚+1, the current state of 
the network is 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑡) . The actor-based network change process consists of two sub-
processes, i.e., the change opportunity process and the change determination process. 
First, the change opportunity process models the frequency or opportunity of tie changes by 
actors instead of actual change. This process is denoted as a rate function 𝜆𝑖(𝑥, 𝛼, 𝜌𝑚) , where 
𝛼  and 𝜌𝑚 are statistical parameters. The waiting time until the next opportunity for change by 
any actor has the exponential distribution:  
𝑃{Next opportunity for change after t is before 𝑡 + ∆𝑡} = 1 − exp (−𝜆∆𝑡)                 (7)  
where parameter 𝜆 = 𝜆+(𝑥, 𝛼, 𝜌𝑚). 
The probability that the next opportunity for change is for actor 𝑖 is given by 
𝑃{Next opportunity for change by actor i} =
𝜆𝑖(𝑥,𝛼,𝜌𝑚)
𝜆+(𝑥,𝛼,𝜌𝑚)
                                                   (8) 
Second, the change determination process models the precise tie changes made when an actor 
has the opportunity to make a change. Because we treat the European air transport network as 
a non-directed network, we chose to implement the actor-based ‘unilateral initiative and 
reciprocal confirmation’ model (Snijders, 2011; Van de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007). In this 
model, one airport takes the initiative and decides to create a route to another airport based on 
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the expected utility. The other airport then has to confirm this change, equally based on the 
expected utility. Note that for termination of a link this is not required (Ruth M. Ripley et al., 
2013). 
Each actor 𝑖 has an objective function 𝑓𝑖  (𝑥, 𝛽) which determines the probability of the next 
tie change by this actor. 
𝑓𝑖(𝑥, β) = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑠𝑘𝑖(𝑥)𝑘                                                                                                         (9) 
Where, 𝑓𝑖 is the value of the objective function for actor 𝑖 depending on the current state 𝑥, 
a potential future state of the network (i.e., structural or endogenous effects), as well as on actor 
attributes and dyadic attributes (i.e. covariates or exogenous effects). The functions 𝑠𝑘𝑖 define 
effects that may potentially drive the changes of network from the perspective of actor 𝑖 and 
the weights 𝛽𝑘  are the statistical parameters that express dynamic tendencies of network 
evolution. 
In the case of one-sided initiative, actor 𝑖 selects the best possible choice. The probability of 
the network 𝑥 changing into 𝑥(±𝑖𝑗) is given by: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑥, 𝛽) =
exp (𝑓𝑖(𝑥
(±𝑖𝑗),β))
∑ exp (𝑓𝑖(𝑥
(±𝑖ℎ),β))𝑛ℎ=1
                                                                                            (10) 
Actor 𝑗 then accepts based on a binary choice based on objective function 𝑓𝑗  (𝑥, 𝛽), with 
acceptance probability: 
 𝑃{j accepts tie proposal} =
exp (𝑓𝑗(𝑥
(+𝑖𝑗),β))
exp (𝑓𝑗 (𝑥,𝛽))+exp (𝑓𝑗(𝑥
(+𝑖𝑗),β))
                                                  (11) 
If actor 𝑖 take an initiative to terminate of an existing tie, then there is need for actor 𝑗 to 
confirm. The joint probability that the current network 𝑥 changes into 𝑥(±𝑖𝑗) is given by: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑥, 𝛽) =
exp (𝑓𝑖(𝑥
(±𝑖𝑗),β))
∑ exp (𝑓𝑖(𝑥
(±𝑖ℎ),β))𝑛ℎ=1
 (
exp(𝑓𝑗(𝑥
(+𝑖𝑗),β))
exp(𝑓𝑗 (𝑥,𝛽))+exp(𝑓𝑗(𝑥
(+𝑖𝑗),β))
)1−𝑥𝑖𝑗                                    (12) 
Note that the second factor functions only if 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0, which implies that 𝑥
(+𝑖𝑗) = 𝑥(±𝑖𝑗). 
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Abstract 
The EU/US ‘open skies’ agreement (OSA) signed in April 2007 marks one of the most 
significant and substantial regimes of international air transport liberalization and has two 
stages. Stage I that took effect in 2008 removes restrictions on fares and routes, and stage II 
aims to address remained issues in terms of foreign ownership and cabotage rights. This paper 
examines the immediate impact of the Stage I of the Agreement given the available data 
between 2005 and 2008. As secondary airports become more important in global aviation 
market and only a few studies exist that examine changes at secondary airports in the context 
of the EU/US OSA, this paper attempts to investigate to what extent the transatlantic traffic 
changes at secondary airports in the European Union and the United States during the period 
2005-2008. We find different trends among secondary airports: airports, such as Dusseldorf and 
Barcelona in the EU, and Seattle and Las Vegas in the US, show growth in terms of market 
presence and traffic level, whereas other secondary airports in general do not improve their role 
in the transatlantic market.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Having long been one of the most regulated industries in the global economy, long-haul air 
transport has only become possible given a range of liberalized air service agreements, open skies 
treaties, regulation and deregulation of national/regional aviation markets, and traditional Bermuda-
type air service agreements (Burghouwt, 2014). The EU/US ‘open skies’ agreement (OSA) signed 
in April 2007 marks one of the most significant and substantial regimes of international air transport 
liberalization and has two stages. The first stage that came into force at the end of March 2008 grants 
any licensed European Union (EU) carrier the right to fly between any EU airport and any United 
States (US) airport. In addition, it gives US carriers full fifth freedom rights between EU countries, 
provided that the flight originates from, or is destined for an airport in the US. However, issues in 
terms of imbalanced foreign ownership and cabotage rights remained in this first stage. Under the 
Agreement, US carriers can own 49% of the voting rights in European carriers, whereas European 
carriers can hold only 25% of voting rights and 49% of non-voting shares in US carriers. Although 
US carriers can fly into any EU country and from there onwards third EU country, EU carriers are 
not allowed to fly between US cities, which leads to unequal cabotage rights. In order to try to get 
the foreign ownership and cabotage rights, a  second stage of negotiations was launched in May 
2008 in order to further liberalize the transatlantic market with an aim of achieving an Open Aviation 
Area (OAA) by mid-2010. 
Several studies have examined the impact of the EU/US OSA at the airport level and found that 
the liberalization effects vary from airport to airport. For instance, Humphreys and Morrell (2009) 
found that London Heathrow increased daily frequency by 20% after summer 2008, whereas 
London Gatwick lost nine flights per day mainly due to the switch of services from Gatwick to 
Heathrow by US carriers and British Airways. Barrett (2009) showed that Open Skies increased the 
number of direct routes by 3 to 10 between Dublin and the US without a compulsory stop at 
Shannon. Earlier research on the impact of bilateral OSAs also found that airports in highly 
populated regions saw traffic growth in long-haul traffic while smaller airports lost services due to 
reduced feeder functions (Mandel and Schnell, 2001). The review of these studies shows that only 
one or two airport(s) located in the EU have been investigated. As secondary airports become more 
important in global aviation services (Bel and Fageda, 2010; Maertens, 2010; O'Connor and 
Fuellhart, 2013; Weber and Williams, 2001), there can be potential for secondary airports to attract 
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long-haul traffic for new launched routes in a more liberalized circumstance (Sismanidou et al., 
2013). It is, therefore, interesting to study to what extent passenger numbers change at secondary 
airports in transatlantic market, where traffic has long been concentrated in a few large airports (i.e., 
primary airports in this paper), against the backdrop of the EU/US OSA. 
In addition, Burghouwt and Veldhuis (2006) concluded that both direct and indirect connections 
should be taken into account due to two reasons. First, as carriers adopting hub-and-spoke networks 
can benefit from economies of density and scope (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; Caves et al., 1984), 
hub premium (Borenstein, 1989; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005) and entry deterrence (Goolsbee and 
Syverson, 2008), they compete for indirect traffic by improving the efficiency of schedule 
coordination and lower prices. Second, indirect connectivity is essential for consumer welfare. 
Demand on many long-haul routes is still too ‘thin’ to support any direct flight. Without these 
indirect connections, passengers would not reach their desired destinations. Based on an empirical 
case study on the market between Northwest Europe and the US, they found that the number of 
indirect connections increased at a higher rate than direct connectivity (i.e., 41% versus 21%) 
between 2003 and 2005. Redondi et al. (2011) found that hubs at the global level compete fiercely 
for indirect traffic and highlighted that average travel time and geographical location are important 
elements to improve the performance of hubs. Moreover, Valentina et al. (2014) found that the 
EU/US OSA had different impacts on direct and indirect flights: ‘the number of direct transatlantic 
connections and served airport pairs decreased and only indirect competition increased’. We thus 
investigate both direct and indirect markets in the analysis. 
Taken together, the objective of this paper is to examine to what extent passenger numbers change 
at a group of secondary airports in the EU and the US after the EU/US OSA, distinguishing between 
direct and indirect markets. Due to data limitations, we only explore the impact of the first stage of 
the new Agreement and thus capture immediate changes. The studied years are 2007 (i.e., the year 
when the OSA was signed), 2005 (i.e., before the OSA) and 2008 (i.e., the year when the first stage 
of the OSA came into force). In section 5.2, we review the literature on the estimated and actual 
impact of the EU/US OSA on passenger numbers. Section 5.3 presents our dataset and method of 
classifying airports. We show changes in passenger numbers for secondary EU airports and 
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secondary US airports in both direct and indirect markets in section 5.4. We present our main 
conclusions in section 5.5, and outline areas for future research.  
5.2 Impact of EU/US OSA on passenger numbers 
This section reviews the literature examining the impact of fully liberalizing transatlantic market 
on passenger numbers. In theory, the OSA would lead to increased competition among carriers 
(Alves and Forte, 2015; Pels, 2009), and thus impose pressure on the participated carriers to lower 
costs and enhance efficiency through price cooperation and schedule coordination. The outcome of 
lower costs and better quality of services is that the number of passengers traveling across the 
transatlantic market will increase (Button, 2009). On the basis of this assumption, a number of 
earlier and more recent studies have estimated the impact of the OSA on passenger numbers and 
identified positive consequences. For instance, Gillen and Hinsch (2001) estimated that Hamburg 
airport would gain 149,000 new passengers of which 17,000 would be connecting passengers 
through the airport in a liberalized international aviation market. Brattle Group (2002) forecasted 
that additional transatlantic passengers would amount to between 4.1 and 11.0 million in a full and 
open transatlantic aviation market. Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) (an update of Brattle Group) 
estimated that 26 million more passengers will be carried across the EU and US over five years as 
a result of the OSA. In addition, Mayor and Tol (2008) predicted that passenger numbers in tourism 
from the US to the EU will increase by approximately 1% and 14%, depending on the magnitude of 
price reductions. 
The literature discussed above mainly focus on the expected effects of liberalization on passenger 
numbers. Few studies are dedicated to conduct an empirical analysis of the actual impact of the EU-
US OSA on traffic with an exception of the work done by Pitfield (2011). Focusing on routes from 
London airports (in particular from London Heathrow) to four major US cities (i.e., New York, 
Washington, Chicago and Los Angeles), Pitfield (2011) applied a number of Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models to determine the impact of the EU/US OSA on 
passenger numbers using data from January 1990 to March 2009. In contrast to the estimated 
outcomes, he found no significant impact on passenger numbers in all the cases and concluded that 
carriers, civil servants and governments may be overly optimistic to expect a significant change in 
passenger numbers after liberalization. However, as the analysis is solely based on individual case 
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studies, his finding cannot illustrate that other airports also experience the same situation as the 
London airports. This paper therefore also contributes to the empirical research on passenger effects 
of the EU/US OSA and provides a more comprehensive analysis by incorporating a group of primary 
and secondary airports. 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Dataset 
The main dataset used to examine the impact of the EU/US OSA is collected through a research 
cooperation with Sabre Airline Solutions, and contains information drawn from Airport Data 
Intelligence (ADI) on actual bookings. Sabre’s ADI database provides the required information for 
this research in terms of origin and destination airport in the EU34 and the US, intermediate stops (if 
any), and passengers numbers at the route level in 2005, 2007 and 2008. We first define a viable 
direct or indirect route with at least 1% of market share in the overall direct or indirect market. 
Aggregating at the level of the origin airports generates 129 airports in total, 69 of which are located 
in the EU and 60 in the US. 
Identifying secondary airports obviously requires a systematic examination of airport hierarchies, 
as there is no consensus in the literature as regards a classification mechanism. Ranking systems 
generally vary, with different indicators used in different fields (e.g., passengers and seats in air 
transport research per se, or degree, betweenness, clustering and community in research streams 
drawing on complex network theory), datasets, route type (i.e., direct or indirect connection), 
research scope (e.g., domestic, regional, international or global), dynamism (i.e., temporal aspect), 
and other dimensions (Burghouwt and Veldhuis, 2006; Derudder et al., 2007; Guimerà et al., 2005; 
Matsumoto, 2007; O’Connor, 2003; Redondi et al., 2011). As the geography of long-haul air 
transport in the EU is different from that of the US, classification is done separately for both regions. 
Different indicators are used due to the availability of data sources. 
5.3.2 Identification of secondary airports in the EU 
                                                 
34 Here, the European Union (EU) comprises its 27 members in 2007. 
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The EU long-haul market tends to be country-oriented before 2007 as the EU members 
individually signed bilateral OSAs in order to provide transatlantic services with no restriction on 
fares, service level, or fifth freedom operations (Button, 2009). Until 2007, EU countries such as the 
United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Spain, or Greece had no OSAs with the US. We therefore proceed 
with the identification of secondary airports in the EU at the level of countries. In addition, countries 
such as The Netherlands, Belgium or Austria only have one international airport being capable of 
serving long-haul market and it may be difficult to establish a second international airport because 
of relatively small and concentrated populations. Hence, we only consider countries that have one 
primary airport concentrating most of its long-haul traffic alongside one or more secondary airports 
that may have the potential to become international gateways. The sampled countries in this research 
are France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia35, Spain and the UK.  
The Airport Industry Connectivity Report published by Airports Council International (2014) 
released individual airport connectivity figures for 461 airports in 44 European countries, allowing 
us to benchmark the most important airports in our sampled countries. The connectivity index 
represented by the total connectivity units (CNUs)36, which is strongly correlated with economic 
growth and international trade, shows an airport’s competitive role in global air aviation and can be 
used to benchmark airports. In each of the investigated countries, primary airports are defined as 
those that serve as hub(s) of a national carrier and have the largest CNUs, whereas secondary airports 
are identified as those that have the second largest CNUs (Table 5.1). In three countries (i.e., 
Germany, Italy and the UK), we further consider airports with the third largest CNUs as a secondary 
airport because these airports also provide direct flights in the EU/US transatlantic market.  
  
                                                 
35 As Copenhagen, Sweden and Norway share the same national carrier SAS airlines, we use Scandinavia to represent 
these three countries. 
36 Based on the SEO NetScan connectivity model, the total CNUs measures the number and quality of direct and indirect 
connections by considering frequency, travel time and connecting time for every single market from perspectives of 
airlines, alliances, airports and passengers (Burghouwt and Redondi, 2013). 
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Table 5.1 Primary and secondary airports in the EU 
Country OSA date National carrier Primary airport 
(CNUs, 2014)* 
Secondary airport 
(CNUs, 2014) 
France 10/19/2001 Air France CDG** (17989) NCE (4376) 
Germany 02/29/96 Lufthansa FRA (18364) DUS (6994) 
   MUC (12132) TXL (6159) 
Italy 11/11/1998 Alitalia FCO (9889) MXP (5505) 
    VCE (3696) 
Scandinavia 04/26/1995 SAS CPH (7943) ARN (7062) 
Spain 04/30/2007 Iberia MAD (10440) BCN (8582) 
UK 04/30/2007 British Airways LHR (22272) MAN (6347) 
    LGW (3760) 
Note: * The numbers shown in brackets are the total CNUs. ** IATA codes represent the following airports: 
Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG), Nice (NCE), Frankfurt (FRA), Munich (MUC), Düsseldorf (DUS), Berlin 
Tegel (TXL), Rome Fiumicino (FCO), Milan Malpensa (MXP), Venice (VCE), Copenhagen (CPH), 
Stockholm Arlanda (ARN), Madrid (MAD), Barcelona (BCN), London Heathrow (LHR), Manchester 
(MAN), and London Gatwick (LGW). 
5.3.3 Identification of secondary airports in the US 
For the identification of secondary US airports, we first single out 19 airports in the US based on 
whether they have significant presence (i.e., market share larger than 1% in terms of direct origin 
passengers) in the EU-US market. Next, we use the number of international passengers, which 
indicates the performance of an airport in long-haul market, to proceed with classification. Data 
about the number of international passengers in 2007 is collected from the US Department of 
Transportation, which publishes historical data about non-stop international passengers at US 
airports using their T-100 Segment Data (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2008).  
We classified the identified US airports into two categories based on their ranks in terms of 
international passenger volumes. More specifically, the top 10 airports that function as international 
gateways are considered as primary airports, and secondary airports are those that rank just behind 
the identified primary airports (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2 Primary and secondary airports in the US 
Primary Airport* International 
Passengers  
(000s, 2007) 
Rank Secondary 
Airport  
International 
Passengers  
(000s, 2007) 
Rank 
JFK 21,201 1 DTW 3,788 11 
LAX 16,840 2 BOS 3,664 13 
MIA 15,192 3 PHL 3,603 14 
ORD 11,384 4 SEA 2,546 17 
EWR 10,539 5 MSP 2,429 18 
ATL 8,897 6 MCO 2,145 19 
SFO 8,597 7 LAS 2,141 20 
IAH 7,403 8 CLT 2,106 21 
IAD 5,818 9 DEN 2,088 22 
DFW 4,804 10    
Note: * IATA codes represent the following airports: New York John F. Kennedy (JFK), Los Angeles (LAX), 
Miami (MIA), Chicago O’Hare (ORD), Newark Liberty (EWR), Atlanta (ATL), San Francisco (SFO), 
Washington Dulles (IAD), Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW), Houston George Bush (IAH), Detroit (DTW), Boston 
(BOS), Philadelphia (PHL), Seattle (SEA), Minneapolis-Saint Paul (MSP), Orlando (MCO), Las Vegas 
(LAS), Charlotte (CLT), Denver (DEN), Phoenix (PHX). 
5.4 Changes at secondary airports in the EU and the US 
In this section, we examine to what extent passenger numbers change at secondary airports in the 
EU and the US in the first stage of the EU/US OSA in the transatlantic market. We distinguish 
between direct and indirect markets and apply two indicators to measure changes in the period 2005-
2008 in both markets. The first approach is to measure the ratio of origin passenger numbers at 
secondary airports to those at primary airports. For the secondary EU airports, primary airports in 
the same country are used to benchmark their importance, whereas JFK that has the largest number 
of passengers in both markets is used to evaluate the performance of the identified secondary airports 
in the US37. This indicator reflects the market presence of secondary airports in the transatlantic 
                                                 
37 We scrutinize the passenger number changes at primary US airports and find that: (i) Even though EWR showed a 
higher growth rate than JFK between 2005 and 2007 (i.e., 39% versus 21%), this has not been enough to significantly 
narrow the gap as the number of passenger at JFK is still 1.8 times larger than that at EWR in 2007. (ii) Other primary 
airports have much less passenger numbers than JFK and EWR and do not show substantial increase in the period 2005-
2008. JFK can, therefore, be used to benchmark secondary US airports. 
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market. The second approach is to calculate the percentage change in the origin passenger numbers 
of secondary airports. Furthermore, we also examine types of indirect connections of the secondary 
airports in order to explain changes in the indirect markets. As long-haul indirect connections can 
be significantly affected by location and quality of hubs (Burghouwt and Veldhuis, 2006), we 
distinguish types of indirect connections based on the location of hubs that transfer passengers from 
secondary airports in one continent to the other side of the continent. For the secondary EU airports, 
three types of indirect connections are identified based on whether hubs locate in the same country 
as secondary airports, in the EU, or in the US, respectively. While two types of indirect connections 
from the secondary US airports are detected based on whether hubs locate in the EU or in the US, 
respectively. 
5.4.1 Changes at secondary airports in the EU 
In the direct market, the secondary EU airports in different countries reveal different trends (Table 
5.3 in Appendix). First, although primary airports in all of the investigated EU countries still play a 
predominant role in the transatlantic market in 2008, secondary airports, such as DUS and BCN, 
become more important. The surge in traffic at DUS can be largely attributed to the entry of Air 
Berlin after acquiring LTU International – a former Inclusive Tour Charter carrier basing at DUS, 
and the improvement of services by Lufthansa that has established DUS as a tertiary hub to handle 
the ‘spilled’ long-haul traffic from its primary hub at FRA and secondary hub at MUC (Burghouwt, 
2014). Meanwhile the dramatic growth of BCN is likely to have benefited from the OSA as Spain 
previously had no bilateral OAS with the US.  
Second, LGW witnesses decreased market presence comparing to its primary airport LHR. 
Humphreys and Morrell (2009) argued that LHR was more attractive than LGW due to the larger 
catchment area and the stronger hubbing practice at the former airport, even though LHR had serious 
delay problem due to the capacity limitation. Therefore, after removing the so-called “Bermuda II 
constraints”, the major carriers in both UK and US quickly transferred their services from LGW to 
LHR to take advantage of the new Agreement. Consequently, the reduction of frequencies and 
aircraft size resulted in decreased market presence and traffic at LGW. Third, given the modest 
increase or even decrease in traffic, secondary airports, such as MXP, ARN and MAN, stagnated in 
their role of secondary transatlantic gateways in their countries. And finally, other secondary airports 
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(i.e., NCE, TXL and VCE) have low direct presence in the transatlantic market, even though the 
number of passenger shows some degree of increase.  
In the indirect market, the gap between the secondary EU airports and their countries’ primary 
airports is, in general, narrower than that in the direct market (Table 5.4 in Appendix). In particular, 
following the new Agreement, BCN surpasses MAD and sustains growth of indirect traffic in 2008. 
The market presence and the number of passengers also continuously increased at DUS, TXL, and 
MXP. However, not every airport becomes more connected. Two airports in the UK report dramatic 
reduction in market presence and demand, similar to their performance in the direct market. Other 
airports, such as NCE, VCE and ARN do not have substantial growth in terms of market importance 
and traffic levels. 
Analysis of changes in the share of the three types of indirect connections (i.e., indirect 
connections from secondary EU airports via primary hubs in the same country, via hubs located in 
the EU and in the US) highlights heterogeneous situations of the secondary EU airports. We identify 
and designate four distinctive types of hub-connection strategies (Figure 5.1). First, some secondary 
airports tend to bypass their countries’ primary hubs and seek connections to other EU hubs or to a 
lesser degree to US hubs due to the lack of strong hubs in their own country, especially in the 
transatlantic market. Examples are ARN, MXP and VCE. Second, contrasting the primary-hub-
bypassers, secondary airports, such as NCE and TXL, function as traffic feeders to their strong 
primary hubs. Third, we observe that BCN and DUS have mixed connections through hubs located 
in all three places, but reveal substantial growth in indirect traffic through US hubs due to the new 
entry of the US carriers. We term this type of situation as ‘US hub - inclined’. Finally, two airports 
in the UK are more attractive to US carriers to feed their own hubs due to their geographical 
advantages. The case of BCN and DUS suggests that feeding hubs in different geographical 
locations can improve the performance of secondary airports in the indirect market as the 
transatlantic market becomes more liberalized. 
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Figure 5.1 Hub-connection patterns of the secondary EU airports in indirect market 
Note: The vertical axis shows the share of each type of indirect connection in terms of passenger 
numbers. 
Taken together, the first stage of the EU/US OSA has mixed impact on secondary airports in the 
EU. Growth is observed at DUS and BCN in both direct and indirect markets, whereas little or even 
negative impacts are observed at other secondary EU airports. 
5.4.2 Changes at secondary airports in the US 
In the direct market, the secondary US airports have been constrained in the shadow of their 
primary counterparts and overall do not substantially increase their role in the transatlantic market 
in 2008 (Table 5.5 in Appendix). First, there was a very large difference, in the relative terms, 
between JFK and the investigated secondary airports in 2005 with the exception of BOS and MCO. 
After the first stage of the EU/US OSA, only two airports slightly improve their market presence 
(i.e., SEA and LAS). BOS and MCO show decreased importance, whereas other airports have nearly 
no change in passenger ratios. Second, in terms of percentage changes in passenger numbers, growth 
is experienced at four airports (i.e., SEA, DTW, MSP, and DEN) between 2007 and 2008, whereas 
other airports decline. During the period 2005-2008, the largest increase is at SEA where major 
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carriers opened several new routes to connect their or others’ primary hubs, such as SEA-CDG by 
Air France, SEA-FRA by Lufthansa, and SEA-LHR by Northwest. However, such growth rate is 
still too limited to significantly alter SEA’s market presence as its traffic only accounts for less than 
5% of that at JFK in 2008. 
Analyzing changes in the indirect market for the secondary US airports resembles the picture in 
the direct market. We observe reduced or marginally increased service levels in terms of the relative 
importance in market presence and passenger numbers at most airports (Table 5.6). An exception is 
LAS, which displays a small degree of improvement in serving the transatlantic market during 2005-
2008. Its passenger ratio as compared to JFK increased from around 30% in 2005 to 35% in 2008 
and its passenger numbers increased around 18% in the first stage of the new Agreement.  
We further examine the pattern of indirect connections at the secondary US airports as regards 
the geographical location of hubs. Figure 5.2 shows three distinguished types of hub-connection 
strategies. First, some airports mainly feed hubs located in the EU (i.e., BOS, DTW and PHL). The 
decrease of indirect passenger numbers at these airports may be attributed to reduced performance 
of hubs in the EU to coordinate flights between direct transatlantic and intra-EU segments38. Second, 
airports such as DEN, LAS and PHX provide more feeder traffic to hubs in the US than those in the 
EU given their strong focus on the domestic market. The observed reduction in indirect traffic at 
some of these airports (i.e., CLT, DEN and PHX) is partially due to the contraction of the US 
domestic market (Valentina et al., 2014). In addition, MSP and SEA have experienced increased 
share of indirect connections via EU hubs during the periods under investigation. As reflected by 
the airports functioning as the ‘EU-hub feeder’, deteriorated coordination capability of European 
hubs leads to decline on indirect passenger numbers at MSP and SEA. 
                                                 
38 Due to a lack of data on scheduling, we cannot verify this explanation. However, examining the hub-connection 
pattern of indirect routes originating from secondary airports provides evidence that geographical location of hubs plays 
a role in redistributing traffic, and thus influences changes of indirect passenger numbers at secondary airports. As the 
attractiveness of an indirect flight depends on prices and network quality (e.g., frequency, waiting time at hubs and 
routing factor) (Veldhuis, 1997), future research can attempt to collect the related data to investigate schedule 
coordination of carriers at hubs. 
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Figure 5.2 Hub-connection patterns of the secondary US airports in indirect market 
Note: The vertical axis shows the share of each type of indirect connection in terms of passenger 
numbers. 
The analysis in both direct and indirect market reveals that the secondary US airports under 
investigation, in general terms, show small or little growth in terms of market presence and traffic 
level during the period 2005-2008. We solely observe major growth figures at SEA in direct market 
and LAS in indirect markets. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to examine passenger number changes in transatlantic market at a 
group of secondary airports in the EU and the US against the backdrop of the first stage of the 
EU/US OSA by distinguishing between direct and indirect markets. The results reveal variant trends 
between secondary airports. A few airports show growth in terms of market presence and traffic 
level, as illustrated by Dusseldorf and Barcelona in the EU, and Seattle and Las Vegas in the US. 
However, the significant decline of passenger numbers at London Gatwick can be directly attributed 
to the influence of the Agreement as shown by the swift transfer of air services to London Heathrow 
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by major carriers. It is noticeable that although both Spain and the UK have no bilateral OSAs with 
the US before 2007, their secondary airports (i.e., Barcelona and Gatwick) seem to be affected 
differently after ‘open skies’. Other investigated secondary airports in general do not improve their 
role in providing transatlantic air services, reflecting that air services concentrating on primary 
airports is still a relevant feature in transatlantic market. In addition, changes at secondary airports 
in indirect transatlantic markets can be interpreted by different patterns of connections via hubs 
located in different regions. 
It is obvious that, since its inception in 2007, the global economic crisis partially restricts carriers’ 
entry into the market to exploit more opportunities provided by the EU/US OSA. In particular, 
Dobruszkes and Van Hamme (2011) found that the crisis of air services has much more affected the 
US, Europe and Japan than the rest of the world during the economic crisis using data from January 
2008 to January 2010. Meanwhile, several other factors may also intervene when examining the 
impact of the Agreement on air services. There are three considerations that should be taken into 
account for further research. First, although a three-year data period (i.e., 2005-2008) can capture 
some changes at secondary airports, data investigating the impact of the Agreement only covers one 
year when the first stage of the Agreement took effect due to a lack of data after 2008. As it takes at 
least five years for the effects of OSA to fully materialize (Alves and Forte, 2015), data for longer 
time periods needs to be collected. Second, we find that changes at secondary airports in indirect 
transatlantic markets can be interpreted by different patterns of connections via hubs located in 
different regions (i.e., EU and US). However, a hub’s performance is determined by not only its 
regional location but also its capacity to coordinate schedules (Redondi et al., 2011). Future research 
can investigate how total travel time including waiting time at hubs affects the indirect connection 
at secondary airports. In addition, there are many potential factors other than ‘open skies’ that may 
affect changes at secondary airports, such as carrier strategies, international tourism and a city’s role 
in city networks, as well as the economic cycle. This calls for establishing time series models as 
suggested by Pitfield (2009) to estimate the impact of the ‘open skies’ agreement by controlling for 
these intervening variables. 
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Appendix 
Table 5.3 Changes at the secondary EU airports in direct market, 05-08 
Country Airport Passenger Number Passenger Ratio (%) Percentage Change (%) 
2005 2007 2008 2005 2007 2008 2005-2007 2007-2008 
France CDG 865,657 1,062,758 975,251 100 100 100 22.77 -8.23 
 NCE 25,861 18,941 24,019 2.99 1.78 2.46 -26.76 26.81 
Germany FRA 527,258 767,265 694,944 100 100 100 45.52 -9.43 
 DUS 24,544 55,123 142,813 4.66 7.18 20.55 124.59 159.08 
 TXL 18,138 29,205 41,560 3.44 3.81 5.98 61.02 42.30 
 MUC 105,961 149,677 177,582 100 100 100 41.26 18.64 
 DUS 24,544 55,123 142,813 23.16 36.83 80.42 124.59 159.08 
 TXL 18,138 29,205 41,560 17.12 19.51 23.40 61.02 42.30 
Italy FCO 190,597 199,984 316,348 100 100 100 4.93 58.19 
 MXP 93,294 131,401 153,688 48.95 65.71 48.58 40.85 16.96 
 VCE 25,602 25,249 27,531 13.43 12.63 8.70 -1.38 9.04 
Scandinavia CPH 70,047 90,262 69,530 100 100 100 28.86 -22.97 
 ARN 70,322 51,015 65,319 100.39 56.52 93.94 -27.46 28.04 
Spain MAD 154,027 245,500 221,535 100 100 100 59.39 -9.76 
 BCN 16,908 51,023 86,783 10.98 20.78 39.17 201.77 70.09 
UK LHR 2,692,706 2,937,552 2,804,011 100 100 100 9.09 -4.55 
 MAN 289,369 415,111 372,732 10.75 14.13 13.29 43.45 -10.21 
 LGW 877,030 1,070,548 728,472 32.57 36.44 25.98 22.07 -31.95 
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Table 5.4 Changes at the secondary EU airports in indirect market, 05-08 
Country Airport Passenger Number Passenger Ratio (%) Passenger Change (%) 
2005 2007 2008 2005 2007 2008 2005-2007 2007-2008 
France CDG 600,161 565,600 555,162 100 100 100 -5.76 -1.85 
 NCE 87,615 93,971 89,579 14.60 16.61 16.14 7.25 -4.67 
Germany FRA 555,807 455,261 435,185 100 100 100 -18.09 -4.41 
 DUS 100,011 110,506 128,960 17.99 24.27 29.63 10.49 16.70 
 TXL 128,824 132,214 147,858 23.18 29.04 33.98 2.63 11.83 
 MUC 249,837 228,664 234,878 100 100 100 -8.47 2.72 
 DUS 100,011 110,506 128,960 40.03 48.33 54.91 10.49 16.70 
 TXL 128,824 132,214 147,858 51.56 57.82 62.95 2.63 11.83 
Italy FCO 496,089 536,357 419,268 100 100 100 8.12 -21.83 
 MXP 171,792 180,165 224,447 34.63 33.59 53.53 4.87 24.58 
 VCE 120,077 146,723 134,477 24.20 27.36 32.07 22.19 -8.35 
Scandinavia CPH 183,984 207,831 242,658 100 100 100 12.96 16.76 
 ARN 165,754 172,066 191,280 90.09 82.79 78.83 3.81 11.17 
Spain MAD 225,368 233,646 229,009 100 100 100 3.67 -1.98 
 BCN 202,904 264,091 272,934 90.03 113.03 119.18 30.16 3.35 
UK LHR 586,476 501,565 656,964 100 100 100 -14.48 30.98 
 MAN 354,221 293,992 313,477 60.40 58.61 47.72 -17.00 6.63 
 LGW 446,090 360,992 219,366 76.06 71.97 33.39 -19.08 -39.23 
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Table 5.5 Changes at the secondary US airports in direct market, 05-08 
Airport Passenger Number Passenger Ratio (%) Percentage Change (%) 
2005 2007 2008 2005 2007 2008 2005-2007 2007-2008 
JFK 2,082,768 2,511,760 2,494,264 100 100 100 20.60 -0.70 
         
DTW 109,158 96,781 136,549 5.24 3.85 5.47 -11.34 41.09 
BOS 379,489 407,313 391,875 18.22 16.22 15.71 7.33 -3.79 
PHL 153,288 195,443 182,310 7.36 7.78 7.31 27.50 -6.72 
SEA 46,855 81,346 120,492 2.25 3.24 4.83 73.61 48.12 
MSP 31,491 33,072 45,786 1.51 1.32 1.84 5.02 38.44 
MCO 455,634 437,948 394,829 21.88 17.44 15.83 -3.88 -9.85 
LAS 106,170 183,926 165,185 5.10 7.32 6.62 73.24 -10.19 
CLT 21,049 46,775 29,518 1.01 1.86 1.18 122.22 -36.89 
DEN 47,992 46,260 56,259 2.30 1.84 2.26 -3.61 21.61 
PHX 31,222 31,746 29,232 1.50 1.26 1.17 1.68 -7.92 
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Table 5.6 Traffic changes at the secondary US airports in indirect market, 05-08 
Airport Passenger Number Passenger Ratio (%) Percentage Change (%) 
2005 2007 2008 2005 2007 2008 2005-2007 2007-2008 
JFK 920,976 836,091 926,565 100 100 100 -9.22 10.82 
         
DTW 125,239 129,081 131,407 13.60 15.44 14.18 3.07 1.80 
BOS 475,588 468,180 460,279 51.64 56.00 49.68 -1.56 -1.69 
PHL 110,483 96,837 87,576 12.00 11.58 9.45 -12.35 -9.56 
SEA 191,011 177,911 166,798 20.74 21.28 18.00 -6.86 -6.25 
MSP 126,781 121,744 108,844 13.77 14.56 11.75 -3.97 -10.60 
MCO 401,767 348,478 391,219 43.62 41.68 42.22 -13.26 12.27 
LAS 272,227 274,573 323,078 29.56 32.84 34.87 0.86 17.67  
CLT 49,674 64,183 54,010 5.39 7.68 5.83 29.21 -15.85 
DEN 190,224 176,453 152,416 20.65 21.10 16.45 -7.24 -13.62 
PHX 133,434 122,752 111,256 14.49 14.68 12.01 -8.01 -9.37 
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6 CONCLUSIONS: MAIN RESULTS AND FUTURE ISSUES 
6.1 Introduction 
The starting point of this dissertation was the identification of two significant and under-
examined research areas. First, in the realm of examining determinants of airfare pricing in the 
airline industry, there is a lack of attention on hub markets and the associated problem of not 
having a concise definition of what hubs imply. As a result, the impact of route structure in hub-
to-hub networks on the fare-setting may be insufficiently explored. Second, there is the limited 
research on the dynamics of air transport networks. This can be explained by an absence of 
applying suitable, advanced methodologies in network science, but also a lack of research 
investigating how liberalization policy may drive changes in the intercontinental markets. This 
dissertation has addressed both issues by putting forward four research questions, which are: (i) 
What factors affect the fares of full-service carriers in the US hub-to-hub markets? (ii) What 
factors determine price-setting of full-service carriers in European hub-to-hub markets? (iii) 
What factors drive changes of the European air transport network drawing on the explanatory 
framework of the stochastic actor-based modelling technique? (iv) To what extent does 
transatlantic traffic change at secondary airports in the European Union and the United States in 
the context of the EU/US ‘open skies’ agreement? We have answered these research questions 
throughout four different chapters. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarize and 
discuss our main findings, and to identify avenues for further research.  
This concluding chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the 
main findings of each chapter in order to answer the above-introduced research questions. Next, 
we frame our findings in a broader context. To this end we use the overview scheme presented 
in the introductory chapter (Figure 1.1). This will help us to better analyze the route structure of 
an air transport network and to discuss the main factors that have significant impacts on airfares. 
We will also look at the network dynamics in terms of methodologies. In addition, attention will 
be paid to the impact of low-cost carriers. In the final section we outline a number of avenues 
for future research. 
6.2 Overview of the main results 
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In Chapter 2, we defined hubs for the US full-service carriers (FSCs) using a spatial indicator 
(i.e., the relative volume of transfer passengers), and then obtained the route structure by 
classifying these hubs into primary and secondary hubs. Based on whether the endpoints of a 
route type are served as hub for one or two different carriers, we established several route 
structure variables that were then incorporated into an econometric model. The results show that 
an airport’s position in the carriers’ hub hierarchies influences average airfares charged by FSCs. 
Moreover, we also find that competition from low-cost carriers (LCCs) reduces prices charged 
by these FSCs. A special case is Southwest. It differs from other LCCs in that both the actual 
and adjoining presence of this LCC can impose a relatively larger pressure on the existing FSCs. 
In Chapter 3, we explored the factors influencing the pricing behavior of full-service carriers 
(FSCs) in European hub-to-hub (HH) markets. A temporal indicator (i.e., the number of 
competitive indirect connections) was used to define the route structure of the examined 
network. Both the exploratory analysis and the econometric model showed that, in the case of 
alliances on routes connecting two primary hubs, airport concentration, market share inequality 
and competition from low-cost carriers  influence average airfares charged by FSCs in European 
HH markets. 
In Chapter 4, we attempted to bridge research on air transport networks and social networks 
by elaborating the roles airports play as ‘actors’ in their changing relationships with carriers, 
passengers and other airports. We also verified that stochastic actor-based models can be used 
to estimate and test the effect of exogenous (e.g., the emergence of major low-cost-carrier-
focused airports and the enlargement of the European Common Aviation) and endogenous (e.g., 
degree, transitivity triads, indirect relations and betweenness effects) drivers on evolutions of the 
European air transport network between 2003 and 2009. 
In Chapter 5, we examined how the transatlantic traffic evolves at secondary airports in the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US) against the backdrop of the EU/US ‘open 
skies’ agreement during the period 2005-2008. Our preliminary analysis shows different trends 
among secondary airports: airports, such as Dusseldorf and Barcelona in the EU, and Seattle and 
Las Vegas in the US, show growth in terms of market presence and traffic level, whereas other 
secondary airports in general do not improve their role in the transatlantic market. 
6.3 Further discussion 
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6.3.1 Network structure analysis 
In this dissertation we have combined a spatial approach, a temporal approach, and complex 
network theory to define and analyze different air transport networks (Table 6.1). As these 
networks vary in terms of function (i.e., hubs versus ‘ordinary’ airports) and scale (i.e., the total 
number of airports), different indicators should be selected to answer different research 
questions. 
Table 6.1 Overview of indicators for network analysis used in this dissertation 
Indicator Description Category Application 
Scope 
Chapter 
Number 
Transfer 
passengers1 
The relative volume of transfer 
passengers at hubs 
Spatial Hub 2 
     
Number of 
weighted indirect 
connections per 
day2 
A weighted indirect connection is 
defined based on the quality of the 
connection (e.g., flying and transfer 
time) at the hub and the quality of the 
indirect flight compared to the direct 
flight (e.g., routing factor) 
Temporal Hub 3 
     
Degree3 The number of nonstop connections 
of an airport 
Complex 
network 
theory 
Any airport 4 
     
Transitivity triads3 The number of transitivity triads of 
an airport whereby an airport’s two 
‘neighbor’ airports become 
connected 
Complex 
network 
theory 
Any airport 4 
     
Number of 
distances two3 
The number of airports to whom an 
airport is indirectly related through at 
least one intermediary node 
Complex 
network 
theory 
Any airport 4 
     
Betweenness3 The number of airport-pairs that are 
indirectly linked by an airport 
Complex 
network 
theory 
Any airport 4 
Source: Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005)1, Burghouwt (2007)2and Ruth M. Ripley et al. (2013)3.  
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Chapter 2 and 3 exclusively focused on HH networks from the perspective of carriers, and 
thus required a concise definition of hubs in a carrier’s network system as ‘the lack of 
homogeneity amongst hubs and any universally accepted definition can be confusing in debate, 
and, more importantly, can lead to a misunderstanding of what the role of any hub may be’ 
(Button, 2002). As these two chapters emphasize the function of hubs as switching points to 
reroute passengers in space and time (Derudder et al., 2007), the spatial and temporal indicators 
cited in Chapter 2 and 3, respectively, can thus well represent this central characteristic of hubs 
in a carrier’s network. We used secondary literature to externally define carrier’s hubs and the 
ensuing route structure for such HH networks due to the lack of data on the examined carriers’ 
entire networks. As a result, this part of research can be further strengthened in two ways. First, 
Snijders et al. (2010) elaborated that the development of a network is determined by both 
endogenous variables depending only on the current network structure itself and exogenous 
variables depending only on externally given attributes. As shown in Table 6.1, the four 
indicators originating from the complex network theory (i.e., density, number of distances two, 
betweenness and transitivity triads) are examples of such endogenous effects, whereas the 
exogenous covariates can be illustrated by two spatial and temporal indicators. Put it differently, 
there may exist not only direct and/or indirectly connected routes but also interconnected 
subgroups in a HH network. Future research can thus analyze the characteristics of HH networks 
per se to better explain interrelationships among hubs. Second, mergers and acquisitions among 
carriers are still a fact in an increasingly consolidated US and European airline industry. For 
example, during 2005-2015, the US witnessed four mergers involving the six largest carriers 
(i.e., America West Airlines and US Airways; Northwest Airlines and Delta Airlines; 
Continental Airlines and United Airlines, and US Airways and American Airlines), which has 
led, for the time being, to three major FSCs in the domestic US airline industry. This implies 
that the hub hierarchy has also been altered as operational resources are rearranged and 
associated hub functionalities are being redefined (Ryerson and Kim, 2013). This calls for further 
research. One could, for example, apply the integrated complex network theory as elaborated in 
this dissertation to re-analyze carrier networks, and evaluate the pros and cons of these methods. 
Chapter 4 introduced complex network theory in air transport networks to select the potential 
drivers underlying network change. Our results show that all four endogenous factors are 
relevant in explaining the changes of the airport network in Europe. In a recent paper, Neal 
(2014) compared three nested types of air transport networks by scale (route vs. origin-
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destination), species (business vs. leisure) and season (summer vs. winter), and found that they 
share similar complex network topologies (i.e., scale-free, small-world, and modular). However, 
they are different in substantively important ways. For instance, although both the route and 
origin-destination networks are scale-free, the former is scale-free driven by efficiency in 
distribution networks while the latter is driven by urban population (e.g., Atlanta has a high 
degree in the former but low in the latter, and for New York it is the other way around). What 
Neal’s (2014) research therefore suggests is that future research can verify whether the findings 
in Chapter 4 are still valid by differentiating between varieties of airport networks (e.g., short-
haul vs. long-haul). 
6.3.2 Main factors influencing airfares 
As network management is directly linked with airfare pricing, Chapter 2 and 3 embedded 
route structure variables into econometric models investigating the pricing behavior of FSCs. In 
addition, several market structure variables and demand and cost variables, which have been 
shown to have significant impacts on airfares, were also incorporated and merit further 
discussion.  
In the US market (Chapter 2), we find that the monopolistic effects on airfares are gradually 
weakened as hubs become less crucial in a carrier’s network. Meanwhile, duopolies in routes 
connecting the hubs of different carriers have no or limited effects on airfares. In the European 
market (Chapter 3), higher fares are only found on routes where both endpoints are primary hubs 
for carriers within the same alliance. These results confirm that hub hierarchies characterizing 
route structures should be incorporated in the pricing models to better control for the inter-HH 
route heterogeneity. Moreover, a careful examination of these results also reveal that these 
variables are de facto the interaction term of route structure variables (i.e., primary-primary, 
primary-secondary and secondary-secondary) and market structure variables (e.g., routes are 
dominated by one carrier/alliance (monopoly) or two carriers/alliances (duopoly)). In other 
words, the separate route structure or market structure variables seem to have limited explanatory 
power in terms of pricing. One possible explanation is that these variables were taken into 
account as dummy variables, which may cause an endogeneity problem in the econometric 
models. For instance, Table 3.3 and 3.4 show that the route structure is mixed with the market 
structure, meaning that a route whereby both endpoints are primary airports for the same 
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carrier/alliance is not necessary a monopolistic route, but can also be a duopolistic route or even 
an oligopolistic route. Consequently, the established econometric models may suffer from the 
endogeneity problem arising from omitted-variable bias. In the future, we can attempt to quantify 
the route structure and market structure variables, study their interactive relationships, and then 
compare the outcomes with their dummies counterparts to generate a more encompassing study, 
as was done by Evans and Kessides (1993). 
In addition, other factors, such as the competition from LCCs, airport concentration, market 
share inequality and providing competitive one-stop alternative routings as well as control 
variables (e.g., current demand as represented by number of passengers, potential demand as 
indicated by population, traffic mix, slot-control, distance and regional tourism effect) can also 
have significant impacts on airfare pricing of FSCs in the HH markets. The complexity of pricing 
and its essential impact on profitability of carriers has made it a longstanding research topic, 
especially in changing market circumstances such as the proliferation of LCCs. We will 
systematically discuss the low-cost carrier impacts in section 6.3.4. 
6.3.3 Network dynamics 
The second research objective of this dissertation was to broaden our knowledge of the 
dynamics of air transport networks. This section provides a further discussion in terms of the 
methodologies that can be applied to achieve this objective. The fourth chapter innovatively 
explored a stochastic actor-based modeling (SABM) technique that is drawn from the field of 
longitudinal social network analysis to investigate the mechanisms leading to changes in 
networks. In our case, this involved exploring how carrier behavior can be used to explain 
changes in the European air transport network. We have verified the relevance of SABM in air 
transport networks in a conceptual and practical way.  
Conceptually, we tried to answer the following question: “Can airports be considered as 
‘actors’ in social networks who have the ability to exercise influence or (some degree of) control 
over their interactions?” In our view, the role of airports can be decomposed into a ‘physical’ 
and a ‘virtual’ role. A physical airport can be a multipoint service-provider firm that offers 
commercial services, tourist services, meeting and incentive services, logistic services and 
consulting services (Jarach, 2001). In terms of route and traffic development, physical airports 
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offer discounts and rebates on standard charges through incentives which can be significantly 
influenced by economic regulation, airport competition, airport ownership or characteristics of 
airports’ catchment areas (Allroggen et al., 2013). From this perspective, airports play a 
relatively passive role in determining to open or end a route. However, virtual airports have 
become more proactively involved in the air transport business as they keep seeking interactions 
with carriers, passengers and other airports. First, the airport-carrier relationship has shifted to 
an interdependent one as illustrated by the risky status of hub airports imposed by FSCs and the 
improved service at secondary airports stimulated by LCCs (Francis et al., 2004; Waite, 2009). 
We argue that carriers and airports co-determine the dynamics of air transport networks (i.e., 
opening or closure of routes) in that (i) socio-economic factors of catchment areas where airports 
locate influence a carrier’s decision to enter or exit a route; (ii) it is the entire air transport system 
aggregated by airports that help government and airport operators make (de)regulation policies, 
relying on which carriers can freely determine route entries. Second, airports attempt to ‘bypass’ 
carriers to establish direct contacts with passengers with regards to both air-transport-related 
businesses (e.g., tickets sale) and non-air-transport-related businesses (e.g., car parking and 
expenses in terminals). Third, traditionally functioning as relatively independent entities, 
airports have increasingly established a more closer relationship in which cooperation and 
competition coexist. On the one hand, airports have intended to increase each other’s 
accessibility by opening more routes among them via direct or indirect connections (Burghouwt, 
2007). On the other hand, airports appear to compete with each other in terms of local markets, 
connecting traffic, destinations and even cargo traffic (Tretheway and Kincaid, 2010). Taken 
together, airports can, therefore, be considered as ‘actors’ in social networks. Practically, we 
incorporated air transport-related variables (i.e., the enlargement of the European Common 
Aviation Area and the LCC-focused airports) into the models, interpreted the outcomes in the 
context of the air transport and proposed policy suggestions for airport operators, local 
governments and carriers. 
In Chapter 5, we performed a descriptive analysis to examine the impact of the EU/US ‘open 
skies’ agreement on the transatlantic traffic at a group of secondary airports in the EU and US. 
The preliminary results show growth for some secondary airports in the long-haul sector, even 
though this sector has long been dominated by primary airports. Although our yearly passenger 
data at the route level allows us observing the changes in the demand side at the investigated 
airports after the first stage of the ‘open skies’ agreement, the results drawn from this descriptive 
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analysis can be improved in order to arrive at broader findings by circumventing several data 
and methodological difficulties. First, empirical evidence suggests that it takes at least five years 
for the effects of ‘open skies’ agreement to fully materialize (Alves and Forte, 2015), thus data 
for longer time periods needs to be collected. Second, as the global strategic alliances including 
virtually all the major carriers now dominate a large proportion of international air transport 
(Button, 2009), data at carrier and alliance levels can be helpful to investigate the impact of the 
new Agreement on the performance of allied carriers in terms of scheduling coordination and 
fare reduction (Whalen, 2007). In addition, there are many factors other than ‘open skies’, such 
as the economic cycle, variations in carrier competition, and other internal and external factors 
that may affect changes in demand and supply variables after ‘open skies’. This, therefore, calls 
for establishing a formal econometric model that can estimate the impact of the ‘open skies’ 
agreement by controlling for other intervening variables. Pitfield (2009) argues that time series 
models or Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models can be useful to isolate 
the residual impact of the ‘open skies’ agreement by seeking an intervention effect after the end 
of March 2008. The future work will explore the applicability of these models by collecting 
monthly data in terms of passenger numbers and fares at the level of routes, carriers and alliances 
for longer time periods. 
6.3.4 The low-cost impacts 
Corroborating the findings of previous research on low-cost carrier impacts (Alderighi et al., 
2012; Brueckner et al., 2013; Daraban, 2007; Dresner et al., 1996; Fan, 2006), we have also 
captured their impacts on the airfare pricing of FSCs (Chapter 2 and 3) and on their ability to 
drive changes in the European air transport network (Chapter 4). We also briefly discussed the 
possibility of transferring the low-cost model to long-haul markets under more liberalized 
circumstances (Chapter 5).  
In the US market (Chapter 2), we find that it is indeed necessary to distinguish between 
Southwest and other LCCs: both the actual and adjacent presence of Southwest in a HH route 
can cut FSCs’ prices by 49% and 6%, respectively, while other LCCs have no significant impact. 
Even though this differentiation means that the ‘Southwest copy-cats’ can still follow its model 
due to Southwest’s continuous profitability (Francis et al., 2006), there is also the concern that 
‘it is troubling to attribute a large part of the fare reductions from airline deregulation to one 
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carrier’ (Morrison, 2001). In the European market, the direct presence of LCCs reduced the 
FSCs’ prices by 9.7%, whereas no effect was found from the adjacent presence (Chapter 3). 
These findings suggest that policies should encourage more entries in hub markets dominated 
by FSCs in the US and Europe. Future research can consider the potential competition from 
LCCs to improve modelling in these two studies. 
In modelling network dynamics in a SABM framework (Chapter 4), we established an 
exogenous variable (LCC bases) to examine whether more new routes tend to be opened by 
airports characterized by larger proportions of LCC services. The outcome shows that LCC-
airports have a significantly higher probability of opening a new route. However, it should be 
noted that LCCs can easily exit an airport when negotiating successfully with another cheaper 
airport (Allroggen et al., 2013) or LCCs per se can go to demise and quickly leave the whole 
market. 
Although we did not explicitly examine the low-cost long-haul issue in Chapter 5, the 
liberalization of the EU/US long-haul market would be a strong catalyst to make both FSCs and 
LCCs reconsider the possibility of the low-cost model in the long-haul sector. Launching low-
cost long-haul services to date has been a challenging task due to difficulties to realize cost 
efficiency. Some services that can be minimized in short-haul markets are not as easy to be 
dropped in the long-haul market, such as in-flight entertainment, food, shorter seat pitch etc. 
Nonetheless, the costs of providing these services only account for a small proportion of the total 
costs, especially comparing to fuell costs, labor and central administration costs. Put differently, 
new long-haul LCCs may achieve cost leadership through lowering labor and central 
administration costs.  
Despite obtaining cost advantages, there are three further significant factors influencing the 
success of long-haul LCCs, i.e demand, FSC’s responses and the need for connecting traffic 
(Francis et al., 2007; Morrell, 2008). First, two types of potential demand can be substantially 
captured by long-haul LCCs, i.e. pure leisure markets, especially visiting friends and relatives 
markets and dense PTP markets with modest market share. Second, as generating new traffic is 
more difficult in the long-haul market than in the short-haul market, long-haul LCCs tend to 
diverge traffic from the established FSCs. FSCs that may respond by offering cross-subsidised 
low fares to deter new entrants will determine how successful long-haul LCCs are. To illustrate, 
at the time of writing, Lufthansa considered launching low-cost long-haul services to respond to 
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the fierce competition of LCCs and Middle Eastern carriers39. Its performance may, to some 
degree, affect entries into this market. Finally, as long-haul services require high density with at 
least 300 seats per flight and need daily or five weekly frequencies in order to be profitable, it is 
important to provide feeder traffic from strong local markets. LCCs that do not operate a hub-
and-spoke system may consider to explore the possibility of ‘self-hubbing’ to allow passengers 
arrange transfers by themselves or to seek partnerships for interline, code-sharing or even 
alliances. 
6.4 New pillars for future research 
This dissertation has broadened our understanding on the fare effects and dynamics of 
network structure in the air transport industry. Based on the aforementioned discussions, a 
variety of follow-up research questions can be put forward. We conclude by suggesting four 
major avenues for further research. 
First, we should take a closer look at the interrelationship among hubs within hub-to-hub 
networks, which (i) has impacts on the configuration of multi-hub-and-spoke networks due to 
the rearrangement of operational resources and the redefinition of hub functionality, and (ii) 
better understand the mechanisms underlying network closure. For instance, would the extent of 
network closure over time caused by inter-hub connection due to alliance formation or multi-
hub-and-poke network configuration outweigh that caused by the adoption of point-to-point 
network structure of LCCs, or vice versa? 
Second, in the realm of airfare pricing, it is interesting to define the route structure and market 
structure as continuous variables, study their interactive relationships, and then compare the 
outcomes with their dummy counterparts to generate a more encompassing study. 
Third, the framework of stochastic actor-based modelling can be further extended by (i) 
differentiating varieties of airport networks (e.g., short-haul vs. long-haul), (ii) collecting more 
observation time points to control for the potential temporal heterogeneity, (iii) incorporating 
more exogenous variables, (iv) exploring the possibilities of weighted network analysis. 
                                                 
39 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b8c38b8-076e-11e4-81c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3UuVdRDu5 
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And fourth, it would be worthwhile to study time series models to further analyze the impact 
of the EU/US ‘open skies’ agreements on both primary and secondary airports and to outline the 
opportunities and challenges for secondary airports in the process of developing their long-haul 
markets. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Prijseffecten en netwerkdynamiek  in de luchtvaartindustrie:  empirische studies over de 
Verenigde Staten en Europa 
Context en doelstelling 
De voortschrijdende liberalisering van de luchtvaartindustrie wordt vaak gezien als een van de 
voornaamste invloeden op de netwerkconfiguratie, de marktstructuur en de bedrijfsmodellen in 
de luchtvaartsector. Doorheen de liberaliseringstendenzen ontplooiden en intensifieerden 
luchtvaartmaatschappijen een ‘hub-and-spoke’ (HS)-strategie waarbij passagiers via een andere 
luchthaven moeten overstappen om hun bestemming te bereiken. Luchtvaartmaatschappijen zijn 
ook geleidelijk omgevormd van nationale maatschappijen naar ‘full-service carriers’ (FSCs) die 
meerdere diensten bundelen. Door de grotere concentratie van verkeer en verbindingen u hunb-
luchthavens verkregen de FSC’s een dominante positie binnen het operatieveld van hun hub-
luchthaven, wat hen de macht verleent om hogere tarieven op te leggen voor de routes van en 
naar die hubs (het welgekende ‘hub premium’-debat in de luchtvaarindustrie). De mate van 
dominantie is echter niet altijd gelijk, en varieert niet alleen binnen een individueel netwerk, 
maar ook tussen de verschillende netwerken van luchtvaartmaatschappijen. Deze 'hub-
hiërarchie' leidt tot onderzoeksvragen over het verband tussen ‘hub-to-hub’ (HH) netwerken en 
het 'hub premium'-debat. 
Tegen de achtergrond van een reeks liberaliseringsmaatregelen (zoals bijvoorbeeld drie 
consecutieve liberaliseringsovereenkomsten in Europa en de ‘open skies’-overeenkomst tussen 
de Europese Unie (EU) en de Verenigde Staten) evolueren luchtvaartnetwerken in een ongekend 
snel tempo, en dit zowel in termen van verkeerstoename, nieuwe bestemmingen, routes en 
uitbreiding van de capaciteit in zowel regionale als intercontinentale markten. Toch zijn de 
ontwikkeling van luchthavennetwerken blootgesteld aan risico's, zoals cyclische economische 
crisissen. Die efemere, externe omgeving dwingt luchthavens ertoe de dynamiek van hun 
netwerken continu te beoordelen.  
Tot op heden is er echter weinig onderzoek gewijd aan (i) de manier waarop de netwerkstructuur 
van invloed is op het prijsstellingsgedrag van FSCs in hun hub-markten; en (ii) het verkennen 
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van zowel interne en externe drijvende krachten achter de veranderingen in luchtvaartnetwerken, 
waarbij de veranderende rol van een luchthaven als proactieve speler in de ontwikkeling van het 
netwerk in acht wordt genomen. 
Het algemene doel van dit proefschrift is dan ook om bij te dragen aan het lopende onderzoek 
naar tariefeffecten en de dynamiek van de netwerkstructuur in de luchtvaartsector. We stellen 
vier onderzoeksvragen: (i) Welke factoren hebben invloed op de tarieven van FSC’s in de hub-
to-hub markten in de Verenigde Saten? (ii) Welke factoren bepalen de prijsstelling van de full-
service luchtvaartmaatschappijen in de Europese hub-to-hub markten? (iii) Welke factoren 
veroorzaken veranderingen in het Europees luchtvervoersnetwerk vanuit het perspectief van de 
luchthavens (en dit aan de hand van de stochastische, actor-gebaseerde modelleertechniek)? (iv) 
En in hoeverre verandert het trans-Atlantisch verkeer op secundaire luchthavens in de Europese 
Unie en de Verenigde Staten in de context van de ‘open skies’-overeenkomst tussen beide 
economische zones? 
Overzicht van het proefschrift en de belangrijkste bevindingen 
In hoofdstuk 2 definiëren we hubs voor de Amerikaanse full-service carriers (FSC's) met behulp 
van een ruimtelijke indicator (meer bepaald het relatieve volume van transferpassagiers). Op 
basis van de vraag of de eindpunten van een route fungeren als hubs voor één of twee 
verschillende luchtvaartmaatschappijen, stellen we een aantal routestructuurvariabelen op die 
vervolgens in een econometrisch model worden opgenomen. De resultaten tonen aan dat de 
positie van een luchthaven in het hiërarchisch netwerk van de hub de door de FSC’s opgelegde 
gemiddelde vliegtarieven beïnvloedt. Bovendien stellen we ook vast dat door de concurrentie 
van low-cost carriers (LCC’s) de FSC’s worden genoodzaakt om lagere prijzen aan te 
nemen. Een speciaal geval is Southwest Airlines. Deze maatschappij verschilt van andere LCCs 
in die zin dat zowel de werkelijke als de aangrenzende aanwezigheid van deze LCC een relatief 
grotere druk legt op de prijsstructuur van FSC's. 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken we de factoren die het prijsbeleid van FSCs in de Europese hub-to-
hub (HH) markten beïnvloeden. Een temporele indicator (meer bepaald het aantal concurrerende 
indirecte verbindingen) wordt gebruikt om de routestructuur van het onderzochte netwerk te 
definiëren. Zowel de verkennende analyse als het econometrisch model laten zien dat, in het 
geval van allianties op routes tussen twee primaire hubs, luchthavenconcentraties, ongelijkheden 
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in marktaandel en concurrentie tussen LCCs de gemiddelde vliegtarieven beïnvloeden die door 
FSC's in de Europese HH markten worden opgelegd. 
In hoofdstuk 4 proberen we het onderzoek naar luchtvaartnetwerken en het domein van de 
sociale-netwerkanalyse netwerken samen te brengen door te onderzoeken hoe luchthavens als 
‘actoren’ fungeren in hun veranderende relaties met luchtvaartmaatschappijen, passagiers en 
andere luchthavens. We tonen aan dat de stochastische, actor-gebaseerde modelleertechniek 
gebruikt kan worden om het effect in te schatten van exogene (bijvoorbeeld de opkomst van de 
op grote LCC’s gerichte luchthavens en de uitbreiding van het European Common Aviation)) en 
endogene (bijvoorbeeld transitiviteit, indirecte relaties en ‘betweenness’-effecten) krachten 
achter evoluties van het Europees luchtvaartnetwerk tussen 2003 en 2009. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoeken we hoe het trans-Atlantische luchtverkeer in de secundaire 
luchthavens van de Europese Unie (EU) en de Verenigde Staten (VS) tijdens de periode 2005-
2008 evolueert, met de EU/VS ‘open skies’-overeenkomst als context. Onze analyse toont 
verschillende trends onder secundaire luchthavens: luchthavens zoals Düsseldorf en Barcelona 
in de EU en Seattle en Las Vegas in de VS tonen een groei in termen van marktaanwezigheid en 
verkeersniveau, terwijl de posities in de trans-Atlantische markt van een reeks andere secundaire 
luchthavens niet noemenswaardig veranderen. 
 
